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As development practitioners, we face the challenge of ensuring food security in
an increasingly shock-prone world. Poor and vulnerable households are unable
to smooth their food consumption in times of drought, flood or when pests des-
troy their crops. This dissertation draws on the poverty literature and posits
resilience as a latent capacity allowing households to recover from the effects of
shocks. It presents several definitions and measurements across multiple contexts.
In particular, this thesis explores the tension between focusing on a shock-specific
response and emphasizing household well-being in a stochastic context. It analyzes
both short and long term measurements of food security in Malawi and Ethiopia,
investigating the effects of internal interventions as well as household-level char-
acteristics that may allow households to better manage risk. The first chapter
motivates the investigation in the context of eliminating hunger and expanding
our understanding of socio-ecological systems. The second chapter investigates
the causal impact of the Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP) in Ethiopia,
finding that it mitigates the effect of drought on long-term food insecurity. The
third chapter uses a novel 12 month high frequency dataset in Malawi to track
the incidence and persistence of subjective shocks. It finds that households living
in the flood plain and those with fields far from home are more resilient to the
effects of drought, while female-headed households are less resilient to the effects
of illness. It also illustrates the use of machine learning algorithms to identify
predictors of short-term food insecurity. The fourth and final chapter picks up on
the insight that households with spatially dispersed parcels may better manage
risk. Using a natural experiment from Ethiopia, it shows that land fragmentation
reduces both short and long-term food insecurity. Endowed with a diversified set
of parcel characteristics, households grow a more varied set of crops, mitigating
the effect of drought. Together, these chapters argue that reducing food insecur-
ity and improving resilience is possible. In order to avoid doing more harm than
good, external interventions must take into account households’ and communities’
existing ability to mitigate shocks.
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“Substantive freedoms include elementary capabilities like being able to avoid




“The belly is an ungrateful wretch, it never remembers past favors, it always
wants more tomorrow.”
Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn
One day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich
1.1 Motivation
Hunger is the ultimate obstacle to human flourishing. Chronic hunger occupies the
mind at the expense of all else, becoming a near obsession. Hunger deprives indi-
viduals of their most elementary freedom from deprivation, and its physical effects
hasten an early death. Hunger also impedes individuals’ instrumental effectiveness,
in the words of Sen (2001). These include the freedom to take advantage of op-
portunities for education, employment, social and civic participation. Specifically,
with respect to hunger, Sen continues:
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“Protective security is needed to provide a social safety net for preventing the
affected population from being reduced to abject misery, and in some cases even
starvation and death.”
Over the past half-century humanity has engaged in an unprecedented social
experiment: the elimination of global poverty and hunger in order to provide this
protective security. The United Nations Sustainable Development Goals aims to
end both hunger and poverty by 2030 (UN, 2015). These goals are ambitious but
attainable. The poverty rate has halved since 1990, assuming a poverty line of
$1.25 in 2005 PPP, and is on a downward trend approaching zero (Chandy et al.,
2013). In parallel, undernourishment at the global level has decreased from 18.6%
to 10.8% of the global population between 1991 and 2015 (FAO, 2017a). Ending
both hunger and poverty is possible, fueled by the cumulative wealth of resources,
research and effort poured into understanding and addressing these twin scourges.
Yet further progress is jeopardized by the threat climate change poses to food se-
curity. Droughts in particular threaten to become increasingly frequent and severe
over the next century (Dai, 2011). These pose particularly salient risks for the
poorest, many of whom depend on rain-fed agriculture or pastoralism to survive.
They often lack access to credit, insurance and formal safety nets that would allow
them to mitigate the impact of such shocks, making them particularly vulnerable
(Dercon, 2006). These incomplete markets hinder households’ ability to smooth
consumption over time or over states of the world. Dissaving is hard when assets
are in illiquid form, such as cattle or land (Dercon et al., 2005). Living with this un-
certainty makes households less likely to invest in lucrative but risky technologies,
perpetuating their state of poverty and creating a dynamic poverty trap (Carter
and Barrett, 2006). Households that do manage to accumulate sufficient assets
to emerge from poverty risk sliding back when they experience a shock. Instead
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they rely on informal mechanisms to manage risk, often relying on social networks
which facilitate borrowing in times of need (Fafchamps and Gubert, 2007). Yet the
persistence of chronic hunger reveals that, even when these mechanisms do exist
they are far from sufficient. Understanding and, whenever possible, strengthening
these mechanisms to smooth consumption and provide protective security is key.
In addition to its short-term consequences, shocks and the experience of hunger
have long-term adverse consequences. Children who experience malnutrition at
a young age due to drought or conflict are physically shorter and less educated
than their peers (Alderman et al., 2006). Young girls becoming mothers pass these
adverse effects on to their children, who have lower outcomes in terms of education
and income (Tafere, 2017). This has spurred interest in mechanisms to mitigate
the effect of shocks, particularly around the concept of development resilience. The
concept of resilience in development seeks to quantify the dynamic well-being of
individuals and households subject to shocks. It draws from the ecology literature,
where Holling (1973) posited resilience as an ecosystem’s ability to remain within
the boundaries of a domain of attraction. For example, vegetation will gradually
recolonize the ashes after a forest fire. Ostrom (2009) argues that human societies
can also self-organize in such a way as to maintain or restore equilibrium. As an
illustration, she documents how farmers managing irrigation works in the foothills
of Nepal and lobster fishermen in Maine operate within a complex, self-contained
socio-economic system without the need for government or market oversight. Deep
dives into the dynamics of these systems can help us better understand which in-
terventions strengthen them, and which may prove counterproductive. Elements
of this thesis explore the role that socio-ecological systems play in determining
a household’s response to shocks; in particular it demonstrates how relying on
a diversified portfolio of agro-ecological characteristics reduces risk exposure and
3
improves food security outcomes.
1.2 Resilience and Food security
In order to study food security in the context of shocks, resilience and vulnerability
are useful short-hands for the concepts I seek to tackle. These both build on
existing measure of poverty dynamics by quantifying how welfare trajectories shift
in response to external stimuli. Though related, the two concepts are distinct;
resilience is not simply the inverse of vulnerability. According to Gallopin (2006):
“Vulnerability does not appear to be the opposite of resilience, because the
latter is defined in terms of state shifts between domains of attraction, while vul-
nerability refers to (or at least also refers to) structural changes in the system,
implying changes in its stability landscape.”
How to precisely define these terms remains a subject of much debate. Indeed,
comparing different definitions and the measurements they imply constitutes a
central theme of this dissertation. As a working definition the reader can think of
vulnerability as a unit’s susceptibility to shocks, and resilience as a unit’s ability
to recover from these shocks. An emergent literature has sought to differentiate
and quantify these concepts empirically. These efforts can be roughly categorized
as follows:
1. Classification and compilation of multiple indicators into a comprehensive
measure or index (Alinovi et al., 2009; Be´ne´ et al., 2012).
2. An emphasis on the capacity to recover to equilibrium after a shock (Constas
et al., 2014a; Vollenweider, 2015).
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3. A moments based approach defining resilience as a probability (Barrett and
Constas, 2014a; Cisse´ and Barrett, 2016).
4. A property of time-series, focusing on fluctuations and trend lines (Chavas,
2016, Smerlak and Vaitla, 2016).
Alinovi et al. (2009) build on existing insights into the factors that mitigate
the impact of shocks on food security. They identify six categories of variables
which constitute resilience, and use principal component analysis to compile an in-
dex. Though a useful first approximation, the methods suffers from two significant
drawbacks: the researcher must choose which measures to incorporate ex-ante, and
the resultant index has little intuitive interpretation. Be´ne´ et al. (2012) though
skeptical of resilience as an alternative to traditional poverty measures, propose
to evaluate interventions along two dimensions: the intensity of change (coping,
adapting or transforming), and the time horizon (reducing impact vs. address-
ing structural causes). Though they do not quantify these measures, they offer a
framework defining the purpose of a given intervention.
Constas et al. (2014a) present an attempt to consolidate efforts at quantify-
ing resilience in the context of food insecurity. They emphasize the importance
of focusing on dynamic well-being Yit in the context of shocks Zit conditional on
characteristics Xit. Yit can be a measure of assets or consumption, though in the
context of this thesis it relates directly to food security. This approach explicitly
acknowledges that the effect of mitigating factors may depend on the shock in ques-
tion. For example, characteristics affecting a household’s recovery from drought
differ from those affecting a households recovery from illness. The Constas et al.
approach allows explicit modeling of these effects, holding all else constant, by
conditioning the effect of shocks Zit on household characteristics Xit.
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As one of the first to operationalize this approach, Vollenweider (2015) uses a
distributed lag non-linear model to estimate the impact of past shocks on present
consumption. The estimated parameters allow him to project consumption traject-
ories into the future. However because the paper relies on cross-sectional data it
assumes household un-observables are orthogonal to the recovery trajectory. This
is of particular concern regarding weather shocks, as households living in different
climactic zones will certainly have adapted to the expected occurrence of shocks.
Recent work has expanded the number of empirical investigations into resi-
lience. The FAO uses principal component analysis to capture the variation in
various elements of a households capacity to cope with shocks, and compiles it
into a latent resilience index for Mali and Uganda (d’Errico and Pietrelli, 2017;
d’Errico and Di Giuseppe, 2018). It finds this to be highly correlated with fluctu-
ations in a household’s food security outcomes. Smith and Frankenberger (2018)
interact specific shocks with measures of households resilience capacities. Draw-
ing from the literature, they classify these capacities into absorptive, adaptive,
and transformative. Absorptive capacities seek to mitigate the impact of shocks
and include the availability of assets and savings. Adaptive capacities spread risk
by diversifying livelihoods and relying on social safety nets. Finally transformat-
ive capacities seek to change the underlying dynamics, for example by improving
governance, improving access to markets or empowering women.
In an attempt to recover the complexity of households’ response to shocks, Bar-
rett and Constas (2014a) focus on the distribution of well-being outcomes condi-
tional on observable characteristics. The emphasis on stochastic dynamics presents
resilience as a latent parameter of the probability distribution of well-being. In a
follow-up paper, Cisse´ and Barrett (2016) propose estimating resilience as the con-
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ditional mean and conditional variance of a household well-being indicator (e.g.
assets) and, by positing a known distribution, constructing the conditional prob-
ability p(X,Z) that this indicator will be above a given threshold. A particularly
elegant feature of this measure is that it can be disaggregated to the household
level or aggregated up to reflect the resilience of particularly communities, regions
or countries. Unlike Constas et al. (2014a) this approach does not condition the
effect of shocks on household characteristics. In that sense, the measure confounds
the effect of a shock on well-being and the response capacity, which we may want
to distinguish.
Finally, some authors have rejected the emphasis on equilibrium and focused
instead on time-trend trajectories. Smerlak and Vaitla (2016) look at long term
trends in country-level caloric availability. Instead of positing a threshold or equi-
librium level of food adequacy, they consider a country resilient if its long-term
food insecurity trend is non-negative and any shocks experienced do not persist
over time. In parallel Chavas (2016) uses a threshold quantile auto-regressive
model and defines a resilient system as one where the first unit roots |λ| > 1 given
a particularly negative sequence of shocks (in the bottom quantile of yields) but
returns to a more stable |λ| < 1 when yields are at or above average. Here the
well-being trajectory is the focus and shocks are implicit.
Each of the approaches above entails certain trade-offs, some of them determ-
ined by data availability and others by the nature of the hypothesis to be tested. In
my thesis, I draw principally from Constas et al. (2014) and Barrett and Constas
(2014), though with elements of Smerlak and Vaitla (2016) informing my work on
high frequency data. This tension between focusing on a shock-specific response
and emphasizing household well-being in a stochastic context is a leitmotiv of my
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thesis. I also explore how different data sets can inform our analysis, including
year-on-year panel data, high frequency data and data augmented with geophys-
ical characteristics. From a methodological perspective, I seek to infer causality in
a non-experimental context using a variety of econometric tools, and demonstrate
how new machine learning techniques can be used for predictive purposes.
1.2.1 Temporal Dimension of Resilience
A particularly important component of resilience analysis is the temporal factor
(Constas et al., 2014a). Given the consensus that resilience is a latent capacity to
withstand and recover from shocks, it is important to consider over what timespan
that recovery is allowed to occur, or not occur. For example, does a household
recover from drought as soon as the next rain comes? Or do the detrimental effects
on human capital imply that it may take years for it to fully recover? As discussed
earlier, if experienced at a critical developmental age, these effects may even prove
permanent over an individual’s life cycle (Alinovi et al., 2009). A more prosaic
example is the illness or death of one’s family member. Though the immediate
effects on household livelihood may be brief and measure in months, such an event
can traumatize an individual for life.
This thesis considers the temporal factor by attempting to measure the impact
of shocks and resilience over different timespans. Chapter 2 looks at household’s
experience of hunger over a decade and finds the effects of drought to persist across
the years. Chapter 3 takes a single year and observes the shifts in households
subjective shock persistence, as well as short term persistence. Chapter 4 seeks to
capture a mechanism for mitigating shocks endowed to a household decades ago.
As the different approaches reveal, different measures may be appropriate. Some of
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these are fast moving, like the perception of shocks or the Coping Strategy Index,
which measures food stress over the past week and can shift quickly. Others are
more slow moving by design: Months Hungry measures the experience of hunger
over an entire year. A comparative approach such as the one undertaken in chapter
4 can therefore prove illustrative of the differing sensitivities.
Furthermore, consider seasonality. The existence of a recurrent hungry season
is an unfortunate empirical reality for many households living at or near subsist-
ence, as they wait for their crop to mature while their stores dwindle. Datasets
like the World Bank’s Living Standards and Measurements Survey acknowledge
seasonality with separate planting and harvest modules. Chapter 3 is particularly
illustrative in this respect. One of the most important insights from monthly meas-
ures of subjective shocks is how they vary intra-annually. Crop disease may seem
insignificant to a household when seeds are sown, but become a vitally urgent mat-
ter as its effects on the ripening harvest are revealed. Any analysis of shocks based
on inter rather than intra-annual data must implicitly assume that the incidence of
a shock varies linearly year on year. As the chapter explores, this may significantly
under-estimate the importance of that shock to a household’s well-being.
1.3 Outline
In my dissertation, I apply econometrics and machine learning tools to the ana-
lysis of food security and resilience using longitudinal household data collected in
Ethiopia and Malawi. A complementary logic links the three papers:
• Chapter 2 uses instrumental variable analysis to evaluates a country-level
cash transfer program over an eight-year window. In addition to demonstrat-
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ing the program’s effect in mitigating hunger due to drought, it provides a
proof of concept for evaluating the impact of an intervention on long-term
food insecurity.
• Chapter 3 takes a deep dive into a single district in rural Malawi over a
12-month window, measuring subjective shocks and short-term food insec-
urity. It explores multiple analytical approaches to trace these dynamics,
estimating an auto-regressive model, using a Blundell Bond estimator and
harnessing machine learning algorithms. Among other results, it finds that
having distant fields is an important determinant of household’s ability to
recover from drought.
• Chapter 4 expands on this spatial diversification narrative in greater depth
in the context of Ethiopia. It harnesses land redistribution as an exogenous
source of land fragmentation, and explores the impact of fragmentation on
both short and long-term food insecurity.
In my second chapter I assess the impact of a social protection program,
Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP), on the longer-term impacts
of drought on household food security. The chapter finds that reported drought
shocks reduce the number of months a household considers itself food secure and
that these impacts persist for up to four years after the drought has ended. Using
an instrumental variable approach, the results suggest that receipt of payments
reduced the initial impact of drought shocks by 62 percent and eliminates their
adverse impact on food security within two years. This impact is largest for pro-
gram beneficiaries with little or no land. Results are robust to using an objective
measure of drought derived from satellite data.
My third chapter harnesses monthly household data collected in Malawi to
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understand vulnerable households’ food insecurity dynamics and their ability to
cope with shocks. I worked with an NGO, Catholic Relief Services (CRS), in
implementing a 12-round household survey using smartphones. I estimate an auto-
regressive model to track households’ experience of subjective shocks over time.
I find that households with spatially dispersed fields are less likely to experience
the adverse effects of drought, while female-headed households are more likely to
experience the adverse effects of a family member falling ill. Using a Blundell-Bond
estimator, I find that differences in land farmed, gender of household head, and
having spatially dispersed fields lead to shifts in the distribution of expected well-
being outcomes. Finally, I harness machine learning techniques to predict future
well-being. I find that zones of crisis are concentrated in specific geographic areas,
making targeting all the more important.
My fourth chapter assesses the relationship between land fragmentation and
food insecurity. Households are not passive in the face of shocks. There is an older
literature on the role of land fragmentation as a risk-coping mechanism, but much
of this literature failed to advance largely because of endogeneity and related data
issues. This chapter uses a natural experiment in Ethiopia, where land redistribu-
tion under the communist regime split land into fragmented parcels, and a ban on
land sales restricted any subsequent endogenous reallocation. Using a wide set of
land fragmentation indicators, it shows that these consistently cause a decrease in
household food insecurity. The chapter expands upon this mechanism by showing
that land fragmentation allows households to buffer the effects of drought, and
that households with diverse parcel characteristics and crop types experience less
food insecurity.
The sum of these chapters provides an exploratory investigation into methods
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to measure and mitigate food insecurity in a shock prone world. It compares
and seeks to reconcile different conceptual approaches around risk, vulnerability
and resilience. It demonstrates how questions raised by these conceptual clashes
can be addressed through a toolkit combining novel data and rigorous analytical
techniques. Though it demonstrates the potential benefits of external intervention,
these papers also highlight the rich set of mechanisms households and communities
employ to manage risk, and cautions against taking these mechanisms for granted.
In seeking to tailor these questions to pressing matters of policy, it is my sincere
hope that this thesis informs researchers, practitioners and policymakers working
to eliminate world hunger.
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CHAPTER 2
SHOCKS, SOCIAL PROTECTION AND RESILIENCE: EVIDENCE
FROM ETHIOPIA
2.1 Introduction
The malign effect of shocks has long been a concern within economics. One long
running strand of work, the consumption smoothing literature, has focused on
whether these events result in transitory welfare losses (Carter et al., 2007; Dercon
et al., 2005; Zimmerman and Carter, 2003). A second such strand, the vulnerability
literature, examines what type of households are unable to smooth consumption
(Dercon, 2006). The third and more recent strand of work examines whether these
shocks have long term adverse consequences (Alderman et al., 2006; Barrett and
Santos, 2014; Hoddinott and Kinsey, 2001; Mancini and Yang, 2009). Increasingly,
this third strand centers around the concept of resilience. While resilience as a
concept has its earliest roots in engineering, it is used most extensively in ecology
and psychology. In ecology, Holling (1973) introduced the term, describing it as the
amount of disturbance a system can absorb before shifting into an alternative state
(Walker et al., 2006). Other writers have focused on the speed of return to a pre-
existing equilibrium following a perturbation or shock (Perrings, 2006). Around the
same time, psychologists also began exploring the notion of resilience (Garmezy,
1974). In development, interest in resilience has arisen out of concern over the
cumulative effect of humanitarian crises caused by climatic events and political
instability. Viewed as a strategic approach to deal with the range of unpredictable
risks that undermine efforts to reduce poverty and improve food security, resilience
has emerged as a key concept for policy and program development (Be´ne´ et al.,
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2012; Constas et al., 2014b; Walsh-Dilley et al., 2016). Hoddinott (2014) writes,
”resilience focuses attention on the idea that short-term shocks are malign not
just because of their immediate effects but also because of their adverse long-term
consequences”.
Academic work on resilience has focused heavily on definition and measure-
ment. There are a plethora of definitions (Barrett and Constas, 2014a; Be´ne´ et
al., 2012; Constas et al., 2014a). Early efforts to measure resilience, which include
constructing a multi-dimensional index, are based on ex ante assessment of charac-
teristics associated with resilience (Alinovi et al., 2009). Rather than assume that
the determinants of resilience are known, subsequent approaches seek to estimate
these determinants empirically. Barrett and Constas, 2014a propose estimating a
stochastic distribution in wellbeing outcomes such as consumption and food se-
curity (Barrett and Constas, 2014a). Using a moments based approach, Cisse and
Barrett (2016) measure resilience ex-ante as the distribution of expected welfare
over time . While this approach has desirable properties, it does not map recovery
trajectories in response to specific shocks, which may be important in the con-
text of impact evaluation (Constas et al., 2014a). An alternative approach uses
cross-sectional household data to estimate vulnerability and resilience separately
(Vollenweider, 2015). Specifically, it uses a distributed lag non-linear model to
estimate the lagged impact of past shocks on present consumption, and assuming
the past is a good predictor of the future, then uses these to project consumption
trajectories into the future.
Building on the insight of Barrett and Constas (2014) that resilience is a ca-
pacity, the contribution of our article is an assessment of how a social protection
intervention shifts the relationship between shocks and outcomes. The setting is
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Ethiopia, and the intervention is the Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP), one
of the largest social protection programs in sub-Saharan Africa. Using longitud-
inal household data, we find that it takes households four years to recover from
a drought shock. However, PSNP payments reduce vulnerability and increase re-
silience. At average payment levels, the PSNP reduces the post-drought drop in
food security by 62 percent and eliminates the adverse impact of drought on food
security within two years.
To address concerns regarding the subjectivity of our shock variable, we run ro-
bustness check using the Standard Precipitation Evapo-transpiration Index. Com-
puted using remote sensing data, it is widely considered an objective measure of
drought. We matched it to our observations and found the results to be consistent
with the above in sign, significance and magnitude.
2.2 Ethiopias Productive Safety Net Program
The catalyst for Ethiopias Productive Safety Net Program was a major drought in
2002-03 that resulted in more than 13 million people being left reliant on emergency
food aid. While this assistance was successful in preventing outright starvation, it
left untouched the underlying vulnerability of many Ethiopians to rainfall shocks.
In response, the Government of Ethiopia, in consultation with major international
donors including the UKs Department for International Development, USAID and
the World Bank, developed a new intervention, the Productive Safety Net Pro-
gram (PSNP). Implementation of the PSNP began in January 2005. Operating
in eight regions, the PSNP continues to provide benefits to approximately eight
million people with a budget of approximately 500 million dollars per year. Dur-
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ing preparatory work associated with the inception phase of the PSNP, discussions
were held about the desirability of randomizing access to the program in order to
evaluate its impact. The Government of Ethiopia rejected this idea.
The goals of the PSNP are twofold: eliminate the food gap, the number of
months the household cannot satisfy its food needs; and prevent distress sales,
that is to stabilize household asset holdings (GFDRE, 2009). The PSNP is a tar-
geted intervention. It does not operate everywhere in Ethiopia; rather, it is focused
on woredas which historically have been drought-prone recipients of food aid. 1
Within woredas, households are selected using a process that combines both ad-
ministrative and community mechanisms. Administrative mechanisms include the
provision of a specified number of clients that can be included within a specific ad-
ministrative area (woreda, kebele), guidance found in the PSNPs Program Imple-
mentation Manual (PIM) on targeting criteria to be used at the community level,
and oversight to ensure transparency and accuracy. Household selection is carried
out via community (kebele) targeting, particularly the identification of clients by
community Food Security Task Forces (FSTFs). The PIM specifies that house-
holds who are targeted should fall into the following categories: be community
members; have faced continuous food shortages in the last three years; be acutely
food-insecure due to a shock resulting in the severe loss of assets; lack adequate
family support and other means of social protection and support; level of household
assets (land, livestock, land quality); income from agricultural and nonagricultural
activities; and households perceived to be vulnerable, such as female-headed house-
holds and elderly households or households with chronically-ill members (GFDRE,
2010).
Payments are provided in the form of food and cash. Particularly in the early
1A woreda is equivalent to a county or district. A kebele is equivalent to a sub-district.
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years of PSNP implementation, there were difficulties in ensuring these payments
were regular and complete. This was a particular problem for food payments; see
Berhane et al (2011, 2013, 2015) and Gilligan et al (2007, 2009). Most beneficiaries
receive these payments for undertaking labor intensive public works. These works
are intended to improve economic productivity; they include road construction and
maintenance, land rehabilitation, small scale water harvesting and irrigation works
and well construction. This work is undertaken between January and June each
year, the dry season in much of Ethiopia. There are variations in the amount of
work done across woredas, reflecting woreda and regional decisions made about the
type of public works to be undertaken, the labor intensity of that work and random
factors such as delays in obtaining materials and obtaining access to complement-
ary capital equipment; again see see Berhane et al (2014, 2015) and Gilligan et al
(2007, 2009) . A smaller number, approximately 15 percent of the caseload, re-
ceives payments without having to work. This component, called Direct Support,
is targeted largely to households unable to supply labor such as those consisting
of elderly persons or those with disabilities (Coll-Black et al., 2012).
2.3 Empirical Specification
Figure 2.1 provides a visual means of conceptualizing resilience as a recovery tra-
jectory. The horizontal axis is time. The vertical axis is a welfare outcome of
interest to a policymaker. Given the objectives of the PSNP, we put household
food security on the vertical axis. We represent the pre-shock path of food security
for household Q by the chord HH-Q. A shock occurs which causes food security to
fall. The magnitude of this initial drop can be thought of as capturing the house-
holds vulnerability to shocks. Gradually, food security recovers, reaching pre-shock
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levels at time period T. The length of time it takes to recover from the shock can
be thought of as a measure of resilience. Now consider a second household, R.
It shares a similar pre-shock food security trajectory with household Q. However,
when the shock occurs, household R is a beneficiary of a social protection inter-
vention. This reduces the magnitude of the initial shock and shortens the recovery
period. The goal of our empirical work is to estimate these trajectories.
In this figure we focus on a consumption measure rather than assets. One reason
for doing so is that consumption is a welfare measure; assets matter to the extent
that they affect consumption but they do not intrinsically contribute to welfare.
Second, as Zimmerman and Carter (2003) and Hoddinott (2006) note, selling assets
in response to shocks today risks permanently lowering future consumption and
in fact a much older literature that focused on household behavior under famine
conditions made this point explicitly: to sell off the meagre assets a household
possessed under dire circumstances is to invite future destitution Corbett, 1988.
Consequently, a focus on assets might obscure the true impact of the shock on
household welfare. A third reason is more practical. Some PSNP beneficiaries
are destitute. If these households are unable to borrow, a reasonable assumption
in rural Ethiopia, a shock has no effect on asset holdings because these holdings
are already at zero Bernard and Spielman, 2009. An asset based outcome would
require us to either drop such households or assume that they were unaffected by
a shock because we observed no change in their outcome metric. An empirical
representation of Figure 2.1 for household Q is given by equation (1):
Yit = α +
t−L∑
l=t
βlShockil + γXit + ǫit (2.1)
Yit is the outcome of interest, here a measure of household food security. The
shock experienced by the household is denoted as Shockil. Representing shocks
18
in this way allows us to map the recovery trajectories within a household up to
L periods after they experience a given shock, controlling for subsequent shocks.
Absent a shock, food security is a function of Xit, a set of household level controls.
In Figure 2.1, the pre-shock measure of food security reflects Xit and α. The βs
capture the impact of the shock. The coefficient on βl when l = t captures the
immediate effect of the shock. The coefficient on l when βl = t-L indicates whether
a household is still experiencing adverse consequences to its welfare from a shock
experienced in period t-L. So for example, βt−2 is the lagged impact on current
welfare of a shock experienced two years previously. Rejecting the null of βˆt = 0
for l ∈ [t = 1; t = L] is strong evidence of the persistence of a shocks impacts.
Estimating (1) allows us to plot that households recovery trajectory, and therefore
its resilience.
Now consider household R, the beneficiary of the social protection intervention.
This household is a participant in the PSNP; further, we assume that the benefits
of participation rise monotonically with the amount of payments it receives from
the program. With this in mind, we introduce two new terms into equation (1):
Treatil; and Treatil ∗ Shockil. We write this as:
Yit = α +
t−L∑
l=t
[β1lShockil + β2lTreatil + β3lTreatil ∗ Shockil] + ǫit (2.2)
We can infer the effect of payments as follows: β2l is the effect of the treatment
on the household food security absent any shock. We expect β2l to be positive.
β3l is the main coefficient of interest, as it allows us to evaluate the programs
effect on household vulnerability and resilience. In the short term, when l=t,
it measures whether payments mitigate household vulnerability. A positive and
significant coefficient would suggest that treatment decreased vulnerability. In the
long term, when l = t-L we can plot the recovery trajectory of treated beneficiaries.
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A positive coefficient here reflects a more rapid recovery trajectory, indicating
increased household resilience. However, we face an endogeneity problem. In
section 2, we explained that the PSNP is a targeted intervention. This targeting,
on both food security outcomes as well as characteristics correlated with food
security, implies that the payment levels received by beneficiary households might
well be correlated with the disturbance term in (2), yielding biased parameter
estimates. Some of this correlation can be accounted for by estimating a household




[β1lSil + β2lTil + β3lTil ∗ Sil] + γXit + µi + ǫit (2.3)
Here, for brevity, we have substituted S for Shocks and T for Treatment. Under
the assumption that after controlling for µi and Xit , E(T, ǫit) = 0 and E(T ∗
Shocks, ǫit) = 0, equation (3) yields unbiased estimates of β1l,β2l, and β3l. Our
initial estimates are based on this specification.
2.4 Data
The data requirements for equation (3) are significant. We need a dataset with
the following characteristics:
1. Longitudinal household data to allow for household fixed effects estimation.
2. A consistently measured outcome variable.
3. Shocks occurring within the data collection time-frame with both cross-
sectional and temporal variation.




A feature of the PSNP is the bi-annual collection of longitudinal data on bene-
ficiaries and non-beneficiaries, five survey rounds over a nine year period. The
first survey, in 2006, used a two stage clustered sampling approach. Across the
four regions where the PSNP operated (Amhara, Oromiya, SNNP and Tigray), 68
woredas (districts) were randomly selected using probability proportional to size
(PPS) sampling based on estimated numbers of beneficiaries. Within each selected
woreda, a random sample of two or three kebeles (depending on the region) was
selected. Beneficiary lists were used to select randomly 17 PSNP households and
lists of non-beneficiaries were used to select an additional eight yielding a sample
of 25 households per kebele. Additional rounds were collected in 2008, 2010, 2012
and 2014.
These surveys have a number of strengths. Data are collected at approximately
the same time (June and July) in each round and so our results are not confounded
by differences in survey timing across years. Questions pertaining to household
food security, program participation and shocks are identical across all rounds as
are a rich set of control variables. Both PSNP participants and non-participants are
selected within the same geographic localities meaning, inter alia, they are exposed
to the same shocks and share the same time invariant and time varying locality
characteristics. Attrition is low, approximately two percent per year. Much of this
attrition is due to kebeles being dropped where the PSNP ceased operating. Work
investigating whether potential differences in attrition rates can be attributed to
differences in baseline characteristics shows that being a program beneficiary was
not correlated with the probability of attrition. Older and smaller households were
slightly more likely to attrite than other household types, but the impact of these
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characteristics on attrition was small (Berhane et al., 2013; Berhane et al., 2011).
2.4.2 Welfare Variable: Months Food Secure
The primary goal of the PSNP was to reduce the food gap. This was measured by
asking survey participants to report the number of months, out of the preceding
12 months, that they had problems satisfying the food needs of the household with
a month where the household had problems satisfying food needs being defined as
one where the household experienced hunger for five or more days. We convert this
to Months Food Secure by starting with 12 months and subtracting the number
of months when households reported having problems satisfying their food needs.
This somewhat non-standard measure has two advantages. First, the Government
of Ethiopia uses this to assess the impact of the PSNP.2. Second, it allows us
to measure food-security over a 12 month period. This contrasts with measures
such as caloric acquisition or food expenditures that are typically reported over
a shorter period such as seven or 14 days. Such measures are more sensitive to
seasonality and other factors leading to short term fluctuations, which might mask
our attempts to measure long run impacts.
Figure 2.2 shows how Months Food Securee has evolved over the nine years
covered by the PSNP surveys. In general, food security improves with the distri-
bution shifting rightwards over time. The proportion of households experiencing
no reported hunger (Months Food Secure=12) increases from 34.9% to 48.4%.
However, notice that this trend is not linear; reported Months Food Secure
deteriorate in the 2010 round, when the proportion of fully food secure household
2The super goal of the PSNP is the elimination of the food gap where the food gap is defined
as 12 months food secure
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dropped to 29.7%. We know from rainfall data that Ethiopia experienced a severe
drought in 2009. This deterioration is an example of drop shown in Figure 2.1; the
question which arises is whether access to the PSNP mitigated the effect of such
a shock and whether it sped recovery from it.
2.4.3 Shock data
The survey instrument collects information on self-reported shocks. Specifically,
households were asked: We would like to learn about shocks in the last two years.
Has this household been affected by a serious shockan event that led to a serious
reduction in your asset holdings, caused your household income to fall substantially
or resulted in a significant reduction in consumption? We would like to learn more
about the worst shocks in the last 2 years. This was followed by 17 questions on
different types of shocks that households might have experienced divided into three
broad categories: Covariate climatic shocks, including drought, floods, frost and
pest incidence; Covariate economic shocks, including lack of access to inputs and
price shocks affecting either inputs or outputs; and Idiosyncratic shocks, such as
death, disease or divorce affecting a family member.
Figure 2.3 shows the five most frequently reported shocks by survey round.
Drought is by far the most frequently reported shock. In every survey round, at
least 20 percent of respondents reported being affected by drought in the two years
preceding the survey with this figure rising to nearly 80 percent in the 2010 round.
Given their frequency we focus on drought. In our estimates below, Drought is
defined as equaling one if a household reports experiencing a drought shock in the
two years prior to the survey.
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2.4.4 Treatment: PSNP Payments
All survey rounds collected self-reported information on payments received by
PSNP beneficiaries from participation in Public Works and from Direct Support.
Specifically, for each survey round we know the total amount of payments that the
household received in the nine months preceding the survey. These nine months
overlap with the 12 months recall period for the food gap. We use these data to
construct our measure of treatment, PSNP Payment, the value of the payment
received.
Payments are received either as cash or in-kind (usually wheat or maize). In-
kind payments are valued using data on local market prices. To account for in-
flation, which at times was substantial over the period covered by these surveys,
we follow the methods outlined in Berhane, Hirvonen, and Hoddinott (2015). We
construct a cereal price index, a weighted average of prices of the 6 main cereals
(maize, teff, barley, wheat, sorghum and millet) in a given community in a given
year. We weigh them by the consumption shares of each cereal type, collected at
the household level and aggregated up to the community. Our price index thus
captures both temporal and cross-sectional differences in price levels. We then de-
flate nominal payments using 2014 as a benchmark. PSNP Payment is expressed
in 100 birr increments with each increment equivalent to about 5 USD in 2014.3
Table 2.1 reports these payments by region and year.
3Because this is expressed in real terms, these figures may differ from previous articles such
as Berhane et al (2014) .
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2.4.5 Additional controls
In addition to household fixed effects, we control for household land ownership,
education as a proxy for human capital, and the age, size and gender composition
of household. Some of these variables, such as household size, are correlated with
household food security. Their inclusion improves the precision of our parameter
estimates. Others, such as land ownership, are correlated with both household food
security and the likelihood of receiving PSNP payments. Descriptive statistics for
these control variables in two round, 2006 and 2014, are shown in Table 2.2.
2.5 Results
We begin by estimating equation (1) . While this does not include the impact of
the PSNP, it allows us a first look at how reported drought shocks affects household
food security. Results are shown in Table 2.3. Column (1) reports the contempor-
aneous effect of drought with columns (2), (3) incorporating additional lags in the
drought variable to reflect long term effects.4 Table 2.3 shows that drought reduces
food security and that it has persistent effects. Given our definition of shocks, each
lag is equivalent to two years. Column (3), for example, indicates that Drought
reduces Months Food Secure by 1.56 months initially. Two years after the drought
occurs, Months Food Secure is still reduced by 0.55 months and four years after
the drought, Months Food Secure is reduced by 0.35 months. We illustrate this in
Figure 2.4.
We can construct a version of Figure 2.1 by taking the results from column (3),
4We test and reject unit roots for our lagged variables. For robustness we ran the above spe-
cification with a Prais-Winsten feasible generalized least squares estimator and got qualitatively
equivalent coefficients, of the same sign and significant.
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and plotting them along with their 95% confidence intervals. We take the constant
as representing a baseline level of 10.25 months food secure for a representative
household. Assuming the household suffers from drought, its level of food security
can be computed as βˆ0 + βˆdrought ≈ 10.25 − 1.56 = 8.69 months food secure. To
infer the effects of the drought two years after it ends we compute βˆ0+ βˆL.drought ≈
10.25 − 0.55 = 9.7 months food secure. Up to four years after the drought ends
the household is still less food secure than it would have been otherwise.
2.5.1 Ordinary least squares estimates
Next, we estimate equation (3), using an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimator
with fixed effects. The results are reported in Table 2.4. Looking at the coefficients
on the interaction terms in column (3), we again see that Drought reduces Months
Food Secure. The interaction terms between Drought and PSNP Payment is pos-
itive, indicating that the PSNP offsets some of the impact of drought. However,
the magnitude of this effect is small; at mean payment levels, payments reduce the
effect of the drought by 0.1 months.
2.5.2 Instrumental variables estimates
Results in Table 2.4 control for household fixed effects and the time varying house-
hold characteristics. This removes much of the potential correlation between the
disturbance term and PSNP treatment but possibly not all. To address this, we
need instrumental variables that are correlated with payments but not correlated
with household food security.
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Furthermore, to address concerns that kebele level program implementation
is correlated with beneficiary household un-observables, we use these exogenous
variables to construct a Hausman Instrument Hausman, 1994. We aggregate the







|W | − |K| (2.4)
Where W is the set of observations in a given woreda, and K the set of observa-
tions in a kebele. This reflects underlying trends in program implementation at the
woreda level that would affect the kebele, but excludes potential correlation with
kebele level un-observables, which may be correlated with individual outcomes.
Our description of the PSNP in section 2 suggests the following candidates for
exogenous instrumental variables:
1. Public Work Months : The total number of months in which public works were
undertaken. An increase in the number of months when the PSNP employed
beneficiaries in the woreda as a whole could be positively correlated with
payments at the household level if it reflects greater resource availability
overall. However, because our Hausman instrument explicitly excludes own
kebeles, it is possible that an increased allocation elsewhere in the woreda
would imply decreased resource availability in the households kebele, leading
to a negative correlation. The mean number of months of public works is
5.4.
2. Cash Payments : An indicator variable equaling one if a payment was made
in cash. Analysis of PSNP payment processes showed that cash payments
were made in a more complete and timely fashion than payments made in-
kind; see Berhane et al (2011, 2013). However, in years of high inflation,
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food payments were more likely to retain their purchasing power, suggesting
that the cash payment reduces the real value of payments Berhane et al.,
2015. This indicator has a mean of 0.84.
3. Cash Payments * Distance to Town: An indicator variable constructed as the
interaction between the cash payment dummy described above and distance
to the nearest town. As Berhane et al (2011, 2013, 2015) show, distances
beneficiaries must travel to payment sites can be large, particularly for food
payments. Cash payments may overcome, to some extent, the difficulties that
more remotely located households might have in receiving the payments. In
other words, we expect that the cash payments increase in the likelihood of
household receiving payments and that this correlation gets stronger the more
remotely located the household is. We proxy remoteness with distance from
the center of the kebele to the nearest town. The mean of this interaction
term is 12.9.
Table 2.5 shows the correlations between these instruments and payments received
by PSNP households. (Note that the sample size is larger than that reported in
other tables because we include lagged treatment variables.) Note that we create
instruments for our endogenous interaction term by interacting the instrument
with the exogenous variable drought.
Table 2.5 shows a negative correlation between village level payment and own
payments. Though seemingly counter-intuitive, recall that this is a Hausman in-
strument at the woreda level, explicitly excluding payments from the households
own kebele. Hence the negative correlation suggests that given a fixed budget, an
increase in public works provided to other kebeles reduces the amount of work (and
therefore payments) to the own kebele. Receiving payments in cash is positively
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correlated with level of payments, possibly due to the reasons described above.
Our interaction between cash payment and distance is also positively correlated,
suggesting that cash helps overcome remoteness to a certain extent.
Table 2.6 reports the results of estimating equation (3) using the Hausman IV
approach with a system GMM estimator. Standard errors are clustered at the
kebele level. We present three estimates: column (1) reports findings with no lags;
column (2) reports a two year lag structure while column (3) gives the results with
a four year lag structure. Noting that the coefficients on the initial drought shocks
and the interaction term between the initial drought shock and PSNP payments
are similar across all three columns, we focus on column (3).
As we saw earlier, Drought reduces Months Food Secure and the magnitude of
their effect is large. Using column (3), a household reporting a drought shock in
the previous 12 months saw its months food secure fall by 4.55 months. PSNP
Payment offsets much but not all of this initial shock. Recall that mean payments
are approximately 500 birr per year and that in Table 2.6, payments are reported in
100 birr increments. This means that for the average beneficiary, PSNP payments
offset 2.8 months of the drought shock a 62 percent reduction in vulnerability.5
There is a lagged effect of drought; in column (3), this is a reduction of 2.1 months
in food security two years after the drought ended. However, at the mean level
of payments, this is nearly completely offset by PSNP payments (5 multiplied by
0.36 = 1.8). By contrast, households not receiving any PSNP payments do not
benefit from this mitigation and suffer the full effect of the drought. They do not
return to their pre-drought level of food security until four years after the drought
ended (column (3)). Figure 2.5 graphs these trajectories for PNSP households
receiving mean levels of payments and non-PSNP households. Table 2.6 and figure
5(500birr/100) = 5, 5 ∗ 0.56 = 2.8)
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2.5 convey the core findings of the article.
The magnitude of the coefficients on PSNP Payment and the interaction term
increases substantially relative to our OLS fixed effects specification. This suggests
that while our OLS specification controlled for both household fixed effects and
some time varying household characteristics that were correlated with program
targeting criteria, they did not control for other unobservable factors that were
correlated with both payments and the extent of food insecurity. Using both the
OLS and IV estimates, we constructed a Hausman test. This rejected the null
hypothesis that the OLS estimates were unbiased. We constructed a Hansen J
test. P values are reported at the bottom of Table 2.6; these show that we do not
reject the null hypothesis of the validity of our instruments.
Results in Table 2.6 assume that the impact of shocks, and of the PSNP, is
the same across all households. This may not be true. For example, relatively
wealthier PSNP households may be better able to consumption smooth in the
face of shocks, something our estimates do not take into account. We consider
heterogeneous effects across four household characteristics: land holdings; baseline
(2006) food security; baseline (2006) livestock holdings; and household heads grade
attainment.6
We disaggregate our sample into two groups: households with land holdings
less than or equal to one hectare, and households with more than one hectare of
land.7 Results are shown in Table 2.7. Column (1) is the aggregate result, column
(2) restricts results to households with 1 ha of land or less and column (3) restricts
6We use baseline values for these because subsequent values may be affected by both drought
and payments received from the PSNP.
7An alternative approach would be to split the sample into two groups of equal size. However,
because a large fraction of the sample reported operating exactly one hectare of land, this was
not feasible.
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results to households with more than 1 ha of land. Drought has a larger effect on
households with smaller land holdings. But for these poorer households, PSNP
Payment has a relatively larger offsetting effect, implying that these payments
have a particularly powerful effect on enhancing the resilience of poor households.
This is seen clearly when we use the results from Table 8 to graph the food security
trajectories of PSNP and non-PSNP households, disaggregating by land holdings.
Households with more than one hectare of land suffer a smaller reduction in food
security and recover more quickly compared to households with one hectare or
less. Among households with less than one hectare of land, the PSNP cushions
the initial effects of drought shocks and permits a faster recovery from them. The
dis-aggregated results are illustrated in figure 2.6.
Next we disaggregate by initial (2006) household food security; specifically we
disaggregate the sample based on whether the household had food security above
or below the mean level for the region it resided in. Results are shown in Table
8. Column (1) is the aggregate result, column (2) restricts results to household
below the mean level of Months Food Secure in 2006, and column (3) restricts
them to households above the mean. Results are similar to those found for the
land disaggregation. Households that initially are more food insecure experience
a greater reduction in food security following a drought shock compared to more
food secure households. However, among these initially food insecure households,
recovery from drought is faster when they receive PSNP payments.
We disaggregate by initial (2006) livestock holdings; specifically we disaggregate
the sample based on whether the household had livestock holdings above or below
the mean level for the region it resided in. We also disaggregated by whether the
household head had any formal schooling. In both instances, we find no differences
31
in treatment effects across these disaggregations. Results are available on request.
2.6 Robustness Checks
We consider five potential concerns regarding our results: measuring drought
through the use of self-reported shocks, sample composition, the presence of other
interventions, alternative estimators, and accounting for time effects.
2.6.1 Self-reported versus measured shocks
Our results are based on household self-reports of drought shocks. To the extent
that these capture a households perception of what has occurred rather than what
actually occurred, they may contain measurement error. Reverse causality is an-
other possibility. Beneficiaries may mistakenly believe that receiving payments is
conditional on experiencing a shock and so report that these have occurred even
when they did not. All these possibilities will result in biased parameter estimates.
We can address these by replacing our self-reported shocks with measured
shocks. To do so, we obtained geo-spatial climate data, specifically the Stand-
ardized Precipitation-Evapotranspiration Index (SPEI). SPEI was developed as
a multi-dimensional measure of drought incorporating the effects of variations in
precipitation and temperature. It combines two widely accepted measures, the
Palmer Drought Severity Index (PDSI) and the Standardized Precipitation Index
(SPI). It is available from 1901 to 2013 with a 0.5 degrees spatial resolution and
monthly frequency.
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SPEI, based on the water balance equation, measures wetness as positive values
and dryness as negative values, incorporating prior precipitation, moisture supply,
runoff and evapo-transpiration. It is a relative probability index sensitive to times-
cale. Intuitively, what constitutes an episode of drought or flooding depends on
the pre-existing agro-ecological context. This determines what is ’enough water,
and the lag between the arrival of water inputs as rain, runoff or snow-melt, to its
availability for watering crops or livestock. This comparison between actual and
historical can be made over different timescales allowing the user to distinguish
between hydrological, environmental, and other droughts. We used a 12 month
timescale, capturing variations in drought conditions over the past year, reasoning
that this was the scale that most affected households in our sample as well as being
most comparable to our self-reported drought measure. Since the available SPEI
datasets are at the global level, we extracted observations for Ethiopia using its
geo-coordinates. SPEI data were matched to individual woredas GIS coordinates
using inverse distance weighting.
Figure 2.7 illustrates SPEI in Ethiopia by region. Values less than zero indic-
ate drought conditions, a cursory comparison with Figure 2.3 suggests that these
measured drought shocks correspond with the frequency of self-reported shocks;
most notably in 2009.
Using these SPEI data, we run the same IV specification as in table 2.6, using
the same set of lags for previous droughts but replacing our binary variable for
self-reported drought with a new independent binary variable SPEI, that equals
one if the average of 12 months prior SPEI was less than zero. When we do so,
the results in table A.1 are similar to those reported in Table 2.6.
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2.6.2 Sample Composition
Our sample includes households in the Amhara region of Ethiopia. Some of these
households received PSNP payments through funding provided by the US govern-
ment. These payments were all in the form of in-kind payments. Given our IV
strategy, we wondered if their inclusion affected our results. As a robustness check,
we excluded these households and re-ran the IV model used to estimate equation
(3). Doing so gave similar results (see Table A.2).
As noted in section 2, some PSNP beneficiaries, those with no able bodied mem-
bers, such as widows, orphans and disabled individuals unable to perform public
works, unconditional payments called Direct Support. Their payments might be
unaffected by one of our instruments, the number of months when public works
employment was provided. As a robustness check, we also excluded these house-
holds and re-ran the IV model used to estimate equation (3). Doing so gave similar
results (see Table A.3).
2.6.3 Other Interventions
Suppose that in addition to the PSNP, there was another intervention operating
in the woredas in our sample and that it had a similar beneficiary profile. If this
were the case, we might incorrectly ascribe the impact of such a program to the
PSNP.
There is only one such program that fits this description. Initially, the PSNP
was complemented by a series of food security activities called the Other Food
Security Program (OFSP) (Berhane et al, 2014). The OFSP aimed to increase
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incomes through the provision of credit for activities that would improve crop
and livestock production. Problems with its implementation led to a re-design;
the replacement program, the Household Asset Building Program (HABP), had a
greater emphasis on technical assistance. Both the OFSP and HABP were intended
to assist a subset of PSNP beneficiaries. As a robustness check, we re-estimated
equation (3) including as an additional control, participation in the OFSP/HABP.
Doing so had no substantive effect on our estimates (see Table A.4).
2.6.4 Alternative estimators
Our dependent variable is a discrete count variable, taking on integer values from
0 to 12. As a robustness check we estimated equation (3) using a household
fixed effects instrumental variable Poisson maximum likelihood estimator. Poisson
household fixed effect results are presented in table A.5 and instrumental variable
poisson household fixed effect results in table A.6. Because we use a non-linear
estimator, in order to recover the average marginal effect we must multiply the
coefficients by the sample average of the outcome variable. The results are consist-
ent with the results reported in Table 2.6 in sign, magnitude and significance. For
example, using the model specification with two lags, the marginal effect of the
interaction term PSNP payment by drought in past year is 0.39 which is statistic-
ally indistinguishable from the equivalent coefficient reported in Table 2.6, column
(3).
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2.6.5 Accounting for time effects
Results such as those shown in Figure 2.2 suggest that we should be concerned
about controlling for time (secular) trends. Doing so, however, is not without its
own problems; in particular there is a high correlation between reported drought
shocks and some of our survey years, most notably 2010, making it infeasible to
include survey round dummies. We note that we control for some of the effects of
secular change; for example our price deflator ensures that the effect of inflation
on payments is taken into account. At the household level, our inclusion of the
age of the household head will also capture some of these secular trends.
Yet, despite all this, one might be concerned about time trend effects. A further
way of addressing this is to detrend our dependent variable. As a robustness check,
we did so, subtracting the predicted outcome from the time trend alone.8 The
results are available in table A.7 and are consistent with our principle results in
sign, significance and magnitude.
2.7 Conclusion
The malign effect of shocks has long been a concern within economics, partly
because they result in transitory welfare losses and partly because they may have
persistent effects. In development discourse, this latter concern has spurred interest
in the concept of resilience and how public interventions such as social safety nets
can enhance resilience. However, operationalizing these ideas has been constrained
by their daunting data requirements which include: (1) Longitudinal household
8Specifically, we regressed Yit = γ0 + θt + ǫit and generated the predicted variable Yˆ
Trend
t .
Y detrendit = Yit − Yˆ Trendt
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data to allow for household fixed effects estimation; (2) A consistently measured
outcome variable; (3) Measured shocks that occur within the data collection time-
frame with both cross-sectional and temporal variation; and (4) Data on payment
levels with sufficient exogenous variation to identify program impacts.
Within this context, we assess the impact of a social protection program,
Ethiopias Productive Safety Net Program, on the longer term impacts of drought
on household food security. Surveys conduced over multiple years satisfy these
data requirements. We find that drought shocks reduce the number of months a
household considers itself food secure and that these impacts persist for up to four
years after the drought has ended. Using a Hausman instrumental variable estim-
ator, we find that receipt of PSNP payments reduced the initial impact of drought
shocks by 62 percent and eliminates their adverse impact on food security within
two years. In this way, the PSNP strengthens the resilience of its beneficiaries
against adverse shocks. This impact is largest for PSNP beneficiaries with little
or no land. Our results are robust to how shocks are measured, changes in sample
composition, the presence of other interventions and the estimator used. If this
findings can be replicated with other programs in other settings, they suggest that




Table 2.1: Mean PSNP Payment Received, by year and region
Round
Region 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 Total
Tigray 6.16 3.84 4.66 8.06 5.70 5.63
(10.30) (7.42) (8.63) (12.69) (11.44) (10.30)
Amhara 2.34 0.79 1.36 5.06 3.36 2.62
(4.65) (2.33) (6.04 ) (10.06) (8.15) (7.20)
Oromiya 5.84 2.88 2.06 10.59 7.29 5.61
(9.89) (5.41) (5.26) (19.93) (16.48) (12.87)
SNNP 4.72 3.78 6.18 7.47 5.24 5.44
(7.55) (6.35) (11.21) (12.23) (11.20) (9.97)
Total 4.81 2.33 3.04 7.03 4.88 4.38
(8.56) (5.27) (7.94) (13.34) (11.37) (9.83)
Note: Real price index adjusted values, reported in 100 birr increments.
Standard deviation in parentheses
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Table 2.2: Selected HH Characteristics, by Round and PSNP Status
(a) First Round (2006)
PSNP Beneficiary Non-PSNP Beneficiary p value
Land (ha) 1.28 1.17 0.00
Age of Household Head (years) 44.39 45.98 0.00
Education of Household Head (years) 0.54 0.47 0.04
Household Head is Male 0.78 0.74 0.01
Number of Males 0-6 0.59 0.61 0.42
Number of Females 0-6 0.58 0.61 0.27
Number of Males 7-15 0.67 0.70 0.37
Number of Females 7-15 0.63 0.67 0.22
Number of Males 16-60 1.08 1.02 0.02
Number of Females 16-60 1.14 1.15 0.73
Number of Males ¿60 0.12 0.13 0.40
Number of Females ¿60 0.09 0.12 0.02
(b) Last Round (2014)
PSNP Beneficiary Non-PSNP Beneficiary p value
Land (ha) 1.18 0.96 0.00
Age of Household Head (years) 49.70 51.82 0.00
Education of Household Head (years) 0.57 0.41 0.00
Household Head is Male 0.79 0.61 0.00
Number of Males 0-6 0.51 0.42 0.00
Number of Females 0-6 0.50 0.42 0.00
Number of Males 7-15 0.92 0.76 0.00
Number of Females 7-15 0.83 0.77 0.09
Number of Males 16-60 1.23 1.05 0.00
Number of Females 16-60 1.27 1.22 0.07
Number of Males ¿60 0.17 0.16 0.29
Number of Females ¿60 0.11 0.19 0.00
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Table 2.3: Impact of Drought on Months Food Secure by Lagged
Drought
(1) (2) (3)
Drought in past year -1.314∗∗∗ -1.409∗∗∗ -1.563∗∗∗
(0.092) (0.094) (0.10)
Drought 2 years ago -0.372∗∗∗ -0.550∗∗∗
(0.079) (0.092)
Drought 4 years ago -0.349∗∗∗
(0.094)
constant 10.01∗∗∗ 10.13∗∗∗ 10.28∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.039) (0.057)
N 8005 8005 8005
Note: Coefficients correspond to Droughtt, Droughtt−1 and Droughtt−2 in eqn (1),
respectively. N restricted to 2010, 2012 and 2014 due to double lag structure.
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.4: Impact of Drought and PSNP Payment on Months Food
Secure, Household Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3)
PSNP Payment 0.008 0.011∗ 0.012∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Drought in past year -1.300∗∗∗ -1.352∗∗∗ -1.507∗∗∗
(0.240) (0.260) (0.252)
PSNP Payment * Drought in past year 0.017∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗
(0.007) (0.008) (0.009)
PSNP Payment 2 years ago 0.017∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.007)
Drought 2 years ago -0.282 -0.464∗
(0.230) (0.251)
PSNP Payment * Drought 2 years ago 0.011 0.007
(0.009) (0.013)
PSNP Payment 4 years ago 0.005
(0.008)
Drought 4 years ago -0.315
(0.221)
PSNP Payment * Drought 4 years ago -0.017
(0.016)
N 8005 8005 8005
Note: Coefficients correspond to eqn (3), where Sit is the incidence of drought and Tit is the PSNP
payment received. N restricted to 2010, 2012 and 2014 due to double lag structure. Standard
errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.5: Instrument Relevance: First Stage Regressions for Endogenous
Variables
(1) (2)
PSNP Payments PSNP Payments * Drought




Cash Payments * Distance to Town 0.002∗∗∗
(0.000)
Public Work Months * Drought 0.507∗∗∗
(0.160)
Cash Payments * Drought 2.260∗∗
(1.116)




Note: Use entire sample to instrument the set of endogenous variables. Standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.6: Impact of Drought and PSNP Payment on Months Food
Secure, Instrumental Variables and Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3)
PSNP Payment 0.019 0.048∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.023) (0.022)
Drought in past year -4.097∗∗∗ -3.693∗∗∗ -4.548∗∗∗
(1.359) (0.376) (0.617)
PSNP Payment * Drought in past year 0.489∗∗ 0.542∗∗∗ 0.560∗∗∗
(0.222) (0.112) (0.135)
PSNP Payment 2 years ago 0.102 0.024
(0.088) (0.058)
Drought 2 years ago -1.500∗ -2.064∗∗∗
(0.802) (0.495)
PSNP Payment * Drought 2 years ago 0.359∗ 0.358∗∗∗
(0.194) (0.120)
PSNP Payment 4 years ago 0.111
(0.077)
Drought 4 years ago -0.741
(0.632)
PSNP Payment * Drought 4 years ago -0.060
(0.159)
N 8005 8005 8005
Hansen J-Test 0.906 0.529 0.500
Note: Eqn(3) Instrumented. N restricted to 2010, 2012 and 2014 due to double lagged structure.
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.7: Impact of Drought and PSNP Payment on Months Food Se-
cure, Instrumental Variables and Fixed Effects, Disaggregated by Land
Area Operated
(1) (2) (3)
All Greater than 1 HA 1 HA or less
PSNP Payment 0.077∗∗∗ 0.160∗∗∗ 0.033
(0.022) (0.037) (0.027)
Drought in past year -4.548∗∗∗ -2.026∗∗∗ -6.490∗∗∗
(0.617) (0.592) (1.176)
PSNP Payment * Drought in past year 0.560∗∗∗ 0.198 0.939∗∗∗
(0.135) (0.124) (0.188)
PSNP Payment 2 years ago 0.024 0.201∗∗ -0.055
(0.058) (0.085) (0.067)
Drought 2 years ago -2.064∗∗∗ -0.229 -2.817∗∗∗
(0.495) (0.735) (0.685)
PSNP Payment * Drought 2 years ago 0.358∗∗∗ 0.109 0.514∗∗∗
(0.120) (0.160) (0.149)
PSNP Payment 4 years ago 0.111 0.111 0.025
(0.077) (0.070) (0.063)
Drought 4 years ago -0.741 -0.394 -2.783∗∗
(0.632) (0.383) (1.177)
PSNP Payment * Drought 4 years ago -0.060 -0.110 0.546∗
(0.159) (0.124) (0.285)
N 8005 2077 5928
Note: N restricted to 2010, 2012 and 2014 due to double lagged structure. Standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.8: Impact of Drought and PSNP Payment on Months Food
Secure, IV, Disaggregated by 2006 Months Food Secure
(1) (2) (3)
All Above Mean Below Mean
PSNP Payment 0.077∗∗∗ 0.001 0.152∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.028) (0.045)
Drought in past year -4.548∗∗∗ -5.375∗∗∗ -3.542∗∗∗
(0.617) (0.653) (1.126)
PSNP Payment * Drought in past year 0.560∗∗∗ 0.739∗∗∗ 0.369∗∗
(0.135) (0.160) (0.153)
PSNP Payment 2 years ago 0.024 -0.186∗∗∗ 0.126∗
(0.058) (0.065) (0.073)
Drought 2 years ago -2.064∗∗∗ -3.768∗∗∗ -1.051∗
(0.495) (0.674) (0.565)
PSNP Payment * Drought 2 years ago 0.358∗∗∗ 0.746∗∗∗ 0.178∗
(0.120) (0.150) (0.104)
PSNP Payment 4 years ago 0.111 0.016 0.303∗∗
(0.077) (0.076) (0.145)
Drought 4 years ago -0.741 -2.199∗∗∗ 1.494
(0.632) (0.655) (1.032)
PSNP Payment * Drought 4 years ago -0.060 0.271 -0.455∗∗
(0.159) (0.172) (0.202)
N 8005 4296 3709
Note: N restricted to 2010, 2012 and 2014 due to double lagged structure. Standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figures
Figure 2.1: Food security and resilience over time
46
Figure 2.2: Distribution of months food secure, by round
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Figure 2.3: Percent households reporting selected shocks in two years prior to
survey round, by round
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Figure 2.4: Recovery trajectory from drought
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Figure 2.5: PSNP and non-PSNP recovery trajectories
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Figure 2.6: Recovery trajectories, disaggregated by land ownership
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RESILIENCE AND THE DYNAMICS OF FOOD INSECURITY,
EVIDENCE FROM MALAWI
3.1 Introduction
In the last 20 years, the literature has shifted from viewing poverty as static to
seeking to understand its dynamic nature (Carter and Barrett, 2006). This in-
cludes acknowledging the high level of stochastic risk poor households face as
their income and assets fluctuate. Their livelihoods are particularly vulnerable
to weather shocks, since they often rely on subsistence agriculture or pastoralism
(Dercon, 2006). Faced with limited access to credit, insurance, and liquid assets,
these vulnerable households struggle to smooth consumption (Carter et al., 2007;
Zimmerman and Carter, 2003). This leads to both transitory and long-term wel-
fare losses, as they are forced to forgo investments and sometimes cut down on
critical food intake (Barrett and Santos, 2014; Hoddinott and Kinsey, 2001). In
order to help understand such adverse consequences in an uncertain environment,
(Barrett and Constas, 2014b) argue that the concept of resilience seeks to quantify
how stochastic well-being trajectories shift over time.
The literature on resilience spans many fields, including ecology, engineering
and psychology. Holling (1973) characterized it as an ecological system’s ability
to remain or return to a dynamic equilibrium in the face of recurring shocks.
Engineers view it as a physical system’s ability to “mitigate hazards” (Tierney
and Bruneau, 2007). Psychologists view it as ‘adaptation to adversity’ (Lee et al.,
2013). In development, interest in resilience has arisen out of concern over the
cumulative effect of humanitarian emergencies. It has emerged as a key concept
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in dealing with the range of risks undermining efforts to reduce poverty and food
insecurity, (Be´ne´ et al., 2012; Walsh-Dilley et al., 2016).
One methodological approach looks at resilience as the perceived persistence of
specific shocks. Constas et al. (2014b) present an attempt to consolidate efforts at
quantifying resilience in the context of food insecurity. They emphasize the import-
ance of focusing on dynamic well-being Yit in the context of shocks Zit conditional
on characteristics Xit. Yit can be a measure of assets, consumption, or food se-
curity. This approach explicitly acknowledges that the effect of mitigating factors
may depend on the shock in question. Trying to operationalize this approach,
Vollenweider (2015) uses a distributed lag non-linear model to estimate the lagged
impact of past shocks on present consumption, and projects consumption traject-
ories into the future. The paper assumes household unobservables are orthogonal
to the recovery trajectory. This is of particular concern regarding weather shocks,
as households living in different climactic zones will certainly have adapted to the
expected occurrence of shocks.
Barrett and Constas (2014b) frame the concept of development resilience as
changes in the distribution of well-being. Heuristically, households make consump-
tion and investment decisions according to their expected well-being trajectories,
subject to stochastic shocks. At certain points along this trajectory it may prove
optimal not to forfeit current consumption by investing in asset accumulation,
choosing instead to remain at a permanently lower level of well-being, a ‘poverty
trap’ (Carter and Barrett, 2006). Barrett and Constas therefore define resilience
as “the capacity over time of a person, household or other aggregate unit to avoid
poverty in the face of various stressors and in the wake of myriad shocks.” Resili-
ence is presented conceptually as the set of possible realizations of future well-being.
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The emphasis on stochastic dynamics allows us to think of resilience as a function
of the probability distribution of well-being.
In a followup paper, Cisse´ and Barrett (2016) propose estimating resilience as
the conditional mean and conditional variance of a household well-being indicator
(e.g. assets) and, by positing a known distribution, constructing the conditional
probability pˆ(X,Z) that this indicator will be above a given threshold. The third
stage regression pˆ(x, z) = βX+γZ estimates the effect of household covariates Xit
and shocks Yit on this probability, labeled ‘resilience’. An elegant feature of this
measure is that it can be disaggregated to the household level or aggregated up
to reflect the resilience of particularly communities, regions or countries. However
its approach does not distinguish between shocks and household characteristics,
confounding the direct effect of a shock on well-being and the latent response
capacity, which we may want to distinguish. It also does not allow for households
to be resilient to certain shocks but not others.
One can also think of resilience as a predictor of future food insecurity. This ap-
proach draws inspiration from an emerging interdisciplinary literature, which seeks
to improve the accuracy of targeted social programs when lacking comprehensive
data on income and consumption. This Proxy Means Testing (PMT) uses easily
identifiable indicators, such as asset ownership, as proxies for poverty. However
such PMT-based formulas, while good at excluding the non-poor, tend to miss
many qualifying households. Brown et al. (2016) show that a typical PMT-based
formula applied to data from nine African countries can predict less than half of
the extreme poor. Attempts to improve targeting accuracy have sought to harness
geo-spatial data and advances in machine learning. McBride and Nichols (2015)
present evidence that applying machine learning algorithms to PMT development
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can substantially improve the out-of-sample performance of these targeting tools.
Rather than predicting poverty, we will draw from this methodological approach
to predict food insecurity.
Resilience can be characterized using longitudinal data. Smerlak and Vaitla
(2016) look at long term time trends in country level caloric availability. Taking a
purely non-parametric approach, they consider a country resilient if its long-term
food insecurity trend is non-negative and any shocks experienced do not persist
over time. In parallel Chavas (2016) uses a threshold quantile auto-regressive
model and defines a resilient system as one where the first unit roots |λ1| > 1
given a particularly negative sequence of shocks (in the bottom quantile of yields)
but returns to a more stable |λ1| < 1 when yields are at or above average. Though
these methods are appealing in their non-parametric emphasis on time trends,
they are limited by the need for a very long time series and lack of plausible
counter-factuals. A minimum of 45-50 rounds required to identify path dynamics
is implausible given the time span of most development projects and inevitable
attrition.
This paper uses a novel 12-month dataset to map out the dynamics of shocks
and well-being in terms of food insecurity. The data was collected from a series
of sentinel sites in southern Malawi during a humanitarian emergency. Our team,
in collaboration with Catholic Relief Services (CRS), piloted the ‘Measuring In-
dicators for Resilience Analysis’ (MIRA) project: a low-burden, monthly survey
measuring food insecurity. Drawing inspiration from the literature, our paper uses
this data to explore and expand on three methodological approaches to measuring
resilience and food security:
1. An analysis of resilience as the perceived persistence of shocks
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2. An analysis of shifts in the stochastic distribution of food security over time.
3. An exercise in selecting the best predictors of future food insecurity.
Using an auto-regressive estimation model, we focus on the adverse effects of
subjective shocks and food insecurity as measured using the Coping Strategy Index.
These measures are fast moving and sensitive to aggravating or mitigating factors,
making them well suited for monthly panel data. In order to illustrate what can
be done with our data using this framework, we perform three types of analysis.
We start with an analysis estimating the persistence of subjective shocks. In
being subjective, the incidence and persistence of these shocks reflects their effects
on household well-being. For example, if two households experience the same
meteorological drought but one reports itself recovered earlier than the other, than
we can consider that household more resilient. We further test whether observed
household characteristics are correlated with the estimated persistence of specific
shocks. We find that having fields far from home and living in the flood plain
is correlated with a lower persistence of drought’s adverse effects, while female
headed households and households with a chronically ill member experience more
persistent effects of illness.
We then perform an analysis plotting the stochastic distribution of food in-
security outcomes. We use a Blundell-Bond estimator to trace households’ food
insecurity trajectories as a stochastic distribution, explicitly allowing for explanat-
ory co-variates that may shift this trajectory. We find that living in the flood plain,
having fields far from home and the gender of the household head shift the distri-
bution of CSI. We also find that though livestock seems to have little effect, the
amount of land households farm improves the distribution of expected outcomes.
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Finally, we seek to identify the best predictors of food insecurity in the immedi-
ate future. We use the Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selection Operator (LASSO),
which introduces a penalty term for additional coefficients and explicitly identi-
fies the best performing ones. We compare its performance to that of a random
forest algorithm, which runs a series of regression trees, splitting the dataset into
subsets defined by each variable. We find that the best predictors across both al-
gorithms are previous levels of food insecurity, living in a flood plain and distance
to drinking water. Mapping out our predictions and comparing them to actual
outcomes, we find with high accuracy that high levels of food insecurity are con-
centrated in small pockets, reflecting the local nature of most shocks. This can
inform geographic targeting decisions.
This paper makes the following contributions: We outline an approach for col-
lecting monthly rapid response data tailored to measuring such resilience outcomes.
We then demonstrate three different approaches for measuring resilience and the
key characteristics that drive it: the first based on subjective shock persistence, the
second on the stochastic distribution of food insecurity, and the third on predicting
future food insecurity.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II outlines our data collec-
tion strategy and summary statistics. Section III outlines how we can use transition
probabilities to describe the persistence of subjective shocks’ adverse effects. Sec-
tion IV uses a Blundell-Bond estimator to infer the projected distribution of food
insecurity as measured using the Coping Strategy Index. Section V demonstrates




3.2.1 The MIRA project
Malawi is a landlocked country in southeastern Africa. With fertile land and an
influx of immigrants from its less stable neighbors, it has one of the highest pop-
ulation densities in the region. Eighty-four percent of its population lives in rural
areas, most of them reliant on subsistence agriculture (Bank, 2010). These factors
make it particularly vulnerable to weather related shocks. As a case in point, the
Shire river basin in southern Malawi was hit by devastating floods in January 2015,
displacing hundreds of thousands of people. With resettlement underway, a con-
sortium of development partners worked with the government to launch the United
in Building and Advancing Life Expectations (UBALE) program, a program that
serves three of the poorest and disaster-prone districts in MalawiChikwawa, Nsanje,
and Rural Blantyre. Over the course of our survey (2016-2017), southern Malawi
was severely affected by a cyclical El-Nin˜o, which led to severe drought and wide-
spread crop failure.
Catholic Relief Services approached Cornell with a proposal to pilot a low-
burden, high frequency data collection protocol that would enable researchers and
policymakers to track household food insecurity on a monthly basis. This differed
from most ‘early warning’ systems in its panel structure, which permitted more
sophisticated analysis than repeated cross-sectional data. In particular, this data
set was to permit the development of measures specific to shocks and coping capa-
cities which CRS would use in its impact evaluation. This agreement became the
Measuring Indicators for Resilience Analysis (MIRA) project.
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The survey was piloted in April 2016. Once finalized, a 45 minute baseline
survey containing demographic, livelihood, economic, and shock history data was
administered between May 18th and June 30th 2016. These household character-
istics were considered either time invariant or sufficiently slow moving as to remain
fixed over a year’s time. In addition to standard indicators of assets, such as land
and livestock, our pilot uncovered locally important indicators of prosperity. A
substantial minority of households who lived far from some of their fields had a
secondary ‘house,’ often a shack where they could store tools and sleep overnight
if necessary. It therefore proved a useful proxy for spatial dispersion of the house-
hold’s fields. We also wanted to control for basic demographic indicators, including
the incidence of chronic illness and disability.
The same households received monthly follow-up visits from June 2106 onwards,
every month for a year up to and including May 2017. During these visits, enu-
merators equipped with smart-phones administered a ‘rapid-response’ 5-15 minute
survey tracking the persistence of shocks and related food insecurity outcomes. Im-
portantly, the surveys retain respondents prior information, allowing for follow-up
questions that focused on the continued effects of previously reported shocks. This
case management feature allowed us to more explicitly track the persistence of ex-
perienced shocks over time.1 In order to address issues of attrition, the researchers
in partnership with CRS worked closely with community leaders to convey the
importance of the data collection exercise.2
1The open source CommCare survey application was selected for the high frequency survey
because of its case-management functionality, which allows for a dynamic survey based on pre-
vious response. Surveys saved on enumerator’s smart-phones were uploaded to the cloud every
month, making anonymous household data available in near real time to researchers for prompt
analysis.
2Tracking households month-on-month was facilitated by relying on local enumerators who
knew the community. These enumerators were incentivized by a compensation scheme which paid
them per successful survey uploaded, reducing attrition. To prevent fraud, the field supervisor
in collaboration with the researchers monitored their meta-data, including location and time of
survey.
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In June 2017 the initial data collection exercise in Chikwawa was capped with
an end-line. This 45 min survey collected the same set of questions as the baseline
in order to construct a panel dataset (see supplementary materials). Because of
the noted importance of social networks, it also included a module on family and
community ties the household had with other members of the community. It
also included a final round of high frequency data. A second round was initiated
in August 2017 encompassing the districts of Chikwawa, Nsanje and Blantyre in
southern Malawi and intended to run until July 2018.
3.2.2 Sampling
Sampling was performed using a combination of purposive and random sampling.
The purposive sampling was used to ensure variation in flooding history and risk.
The Shire river flood plain, though more prone to flooding, is also more fertile than
the higher lands surrounding it, and less prone to drought. In order to identify
this flood plain objectively, we used flood-risk data from the Dartmouth Flood
Observatory.
Within the district of Chikwawa in southern Malawi, we selected 3 traditional
authorities (TAs): Mikhwira, Ngabu, and Lundu.3 Within each TA we randomly
sampled community level administrative units, called Group Village Heads (GVH).
We stratified our sample to ensure it contained both GVHs in the flood plain and
GVHs above the floodplain. This allowed for within TA, between GVH heterogen-
eity in how households experience drought and floods. Figure 3.1 illustrates the
2015 flood-zones and sampled households.
3During the roll-out an initially selected village was dropped and replace with a village in
another TA, M’bande.
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After stratifying the GVHs in each TA into high and low flood risk categories,
two to three GHVs were randomly selected from each TA-strata for a total of
17. One to two villages were then randomly selected from each GVH and 15-25
households were randomly selected from each village. As we can see from table
3.1, the final sample was 580 households, from 31 villages, divided between high
risk flood-zones and low risk non flood-zones.
With random selection carried out at the community and household level, the
household is used as the unit of analysis.
3.2.3 Key Variables
We can classify our data into three types: household characteristics Xi, shocks Zi,t
and food insecurity Yi,t.
Our baseline includes a series of household characteristics Xi which were not
included in the high frequency survey. We included existing measures from previous
surveys for consistency, and added a few which our preliminary field work flagged
as particularly relevant. These include measures of assets, such as the amount of
land farmed, measured in hectares, and livestock owned, measured using Tropical
Livestock Units (TLU).4
Based on their geo-location, we determined whether households lived in the
flood plain as defined by the extent of the 2015 flood. As discussed earlier, we use
owning a second house as a proxy for having fields far from home, as members of
the households would need to overnight there. Followup interviews on the ground
4Tropical Livestock Units are a standardized measure used to aggregate the value of a house-
hold’s livestock, with weight equivalents for every species (Le Houe´rou and Hoste, 1977). We
used the following weights: cattle: 1, donkeys: 1, goats: .15, pigs: .2, chickens: .01
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revealed that these secondary houses are usually little more than shacks, with
negligible value as a standalone asset. We also collected characteristics about the
head of the household, including their age, gender and education level. Finally,
we asked if any members of the household were chronically ill or disabled.5 Table
3.2 summarizes these statistics. We use these to create sub-groups studying their
effect on shock persistence and welfare trajectories.
We also collected on reported shocks Zi,t, where we define shocks as an un-
expected event adversely affecting food insecurity.6 Households were asked about
a series of 14 subjective shocks they may have experienced, as well as their per-
ceived severity. The dynamic questionnaire then prompted any household about
previously reported shocks, asking their perceived state of recovery. As long as the
household had not recovered, the questionnaire would prompt again in subsequent
rounds. They were also asked about any new shocks experienced. A household
could therefore experience the adverse effects of several shocks at once, and exper-
ience the same type of shock again after having previously recovered.
We chose to use a subjective measure of shocks based on the premise that
households are better able to internalize the impact of the shock on their own food
insecurity. There is evidence to support that subjective measures track well with
objective measures of well-being (Oswald and Wu, 2010; Stevenson and Wolfers,
2013). While communities are exposed to similar level of objective risk, their re-
sponses and perceptions are highly heterogeneous (Barrett et al., 2001; Doss et al.,
2008). Realized shocks are also heterogeneously perceived by the community, sub-
ject to individual reference points (Hunter et al., 2013). As it reflects a household’s
5For confidentiality reasons we did not explicitly ask about HIV status. However conversations
with enumerators and local health officials suggest that ’chronically ill’ was often understood as
implicitly referring to HIV.
6We chose to exclude potentially positive shocks as the effects on food insecurity are asym-
metrical (Taylor, 1991).
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perception of a shock rather than its objective incidence, the measure is inherently
endogenous to a household’s capacity to cope. For example, a household may ex-
perience the effects of drought long after the objectively measured drought is over.
In this context, observing the trends in the incidence and persistence of a shock’s
adverse effects can inform us about trends in households’ wellbeing and coping
capacity.
Figure 3.2 shows the reported household incidence of frequently reported sub-
jective shocks across the 12 months monitored. These include drought, flooding,
illness and crop-disease. The dotted line represents the trend lines based solely on
the first and last round.
Finally we track food insecurity Yi,t, measured using the Coping Strategy Index
(CSI). The CSI is a composite weighted score of various strategies households
engage in when faced with short term food shortages (Maxwell, 1996). Coping
strategies reflect activities households may be compelled into, often due to food
insecurity, and compose the set c ∈ C. These include borrowing food, taking on
piece work for additional income, consuming less preferred foods, reducing either
the number or the size of meals and in extreme cases sending children to beg. The
survey asks the number of days in the past week a household engaged in each of
these activities, then multiplies those days by a weight wc.
7




wc ∗ daysc (3.1)
Where daysc is the number of days a household had engaged in a given coping
7We use the following weighting: Borrow food=2, Piece Work=1, consuming less preferred
foods=1, reducing meals=1, reduce size of meals=1, children begging=4. These recommended
weights are the result of extensive consultation and calibration. See Maxwell et al., 2003 for
further details.
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strategy c over the past week, and wc is the assigned severity weight.
CSI is useful for rapidly measuring food insecurity in a humanitarian context,
strongly correlated with more complex and time intensive measures of food insec-
urity (Maxwell et al., 2008). A higher CSI score indicates higher food insecurity
and therefore lower well-being. A household with a CSI of 10 may do some piece
work on the side, eat less preferred foods or limit portion size a few days a week.
A household with a CSI of 30 may do this every day, while also skipping meals and
occasionally borrowing food. A household with a CSI of 60 is engaging in all these
coping mechanisms daily, but must also send its children out to beg on occasion. A
household engaged in all coping strategies all the time has a maximum CSI score
of 70. In the context of chronic food insecurity, as in the Shire river basin, we
consider CSI a valid measure of negative wellbeing.
For illustrative purposes, we disaggregate the observed trajectory of CSI using
household characteristics. For binary variables we disaggregate the population by
type, and for continuous variables we disaggregate by whether a household is above
or below the median.
Figures 3.3 and 3.4 illustrate the non-parametric CSI trajectories disaggregated
by these observable characteristics. We immediately notice that the data collection
exercise began in the midst of a food emergency, with high levels of CSI throughout
the population. The severity of the emergency as measured using CSI abated by
the end of the year, but not equally for all groups. From Figure 3.3, there is no
significant difference in the CSI trajectory when dis-aggregated by the household
head’s age, years of education, or whether a member of the household is chronically
ill. Households headed by men are worse off at first, but the trend quickly converges
with households headed by women.
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From Figure 3.4a, households with above median Tropical Livestock Units
(TLU) experience lower levels of CSI overall, but their trends mimic those of
their neighbors who have below median TLU. We see a marginal difference for
households with above median access to land, but not economically significant.
From Figure 3.4b, households living in the flood plain recover much faster and see
their CSI drop. Having a secondary house, and therefore spatially dispersed fields,
makes one marginally less food insecure, but the trends match those of households
without a secondary house.
3.2.4 Attrition
Attrition is a recurring concern when collecting panel data. If too many obser-
vations drop out of the sample, it erodes the statistical power of our estimates.
We therefore over-sampled initially, allowing for up to 5% monthly attrition. Non-
random attrition can also be a concern. This is problematic when it leads to
correlation between our error term and our observables, leading to bias.
Table 3.3 illustrates attrition across time. Monthly attrition was 1.25 % on
average, though much higher in certain months. Between June and July logistical
friction due to a change in enumerators and data collection platform meant a
village was missed. In December, seasonal flooding washed out the roads, and an
enumerator passed away. To mitigate attrition due to these events, households
missed in a given round were still sought out for interviews in subsequent rounds,
allowing them to re-enter the sample rather than drop out entirely.
To control for potentially non-random attrition, we use a Heckman style two
step estimator (Heckman, 1979). We label an observation Missingi,t = 1 if we
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have no observation for household i in period t, and Missingi,t = 0 otherwise.
We use probit maximum likelihood to estimate whether this attrition is driven by
observable characteristics. Since this is a panel we control for time effects and
community fixed effects.8 Finally, to address concerns that we are selecting on
unobservables we use the enumerators’ unique code as an additional explanatory
variable. The exclusion restriction is valid under the assumption that the identity
of the enumerator will affect the likelihood of response but not the well-being of
the households interviewed. From Table 3.4 living in a flood plain is positively
correlated with the probability of a missing observation. We had anticipated this
discrepancy when we stratified our sample. Other coefficients become insignificant
once we control for community and enumerator fixed effects. The predicted prob-
ability of selection is used to generate a Heckman inverse Mills ratio λˆ, which we
use as control in our subsequent specifications.
Similarly to Lillard and Panis, 1998, we run the probit and use the predicted
outcome to generate the household level inverse Mills ratio λˆ. Because attrition
was driven both We include λˆ as a control in our subsequent regressions. We must
still assume that, conditional on
3.3 Resilience as Perceived Shock Persistence
The perceived persistence of a shock’s effects is a good indicator of resilience. Take
two households experiencing the same shock in a given month; in the next month, if
one household is still experiencing the effects of the shock while the other has fully
recovered, then the latter household is more resilient. The perceived persistence of
8Since we are estimate a probit we cannot use a household fixed effect, see Wooldridge, 2010
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a shock’s effects is therefore a good indicator. The greater the shock’s persistence,
the lower the household’s resilience to that particular shock.
With 12 rounds we can look at how persistent shocks’ effects are over time. We
estimate a linear probability model with discrete states of the world. This allows us
to generate Markov Transition Matrices mapping the probability of experiencing
a shock’s adverse effects and the probability of those effects persisting, for each
month and every shock experienced. We then regress these predicted persistence
probabilities against observed characteristics.
We posit two states Zsi,t ∈ {0, 1}, reflecting whether household i is experiencing
the adverse effects of a subjective shock s ∈ S in period t. Using the questionnaire’s
dynamic nature, respondents were prompted on the persistent effects of previously
reported shocks if Zsi,t−1 = 1. If households reported a full recovery, then Z
s
i,t = 0.
If a household reported not yet recovering from the given shock, then the shock’s
effects persisted and Zsi,t = 1. In the next round households were prompted about
the effects of ongoing shocks, as well as whether they experienced new ones. In both
cases, positive responses meant Zsi,t+1 = 1. As an illustration Table 3.5 shows the
correlation between prevalent shocks and food security. As an inherently subjective
measure, tracking household’s perception of shocks allows us to approximate how
that shock affects a household’s well-being. Households could therefore experience




Given these two states, experiencing and not experiencing shock s, the probability
of passing from state k to state j is a Markov process:
Pr(Zst = j|Zst−1 = k) = pkj (3.2)
Where k, j ∈ {0, 1}.
To estimate shock persistence, we use an auto-regressive (AR) linear probability
model with one lag.9








i,t−1 ∗ δt) + δt + µsi + ǫi,t (3.3)
where γs1 conditions the perceived shock s on previously experiencing shock s, γ
′s
t
allows this persistence to vary by round, δt is a monthly time fixed effect and µ
s
i
is a household fixed effect. With a linear probability model, the coefficients have
an intuitive interpretation: ps0,1 = γ
s
0 + δt is the probability of experiencing the







t + δt is the probability a shock’s adverse effects will persist into
the next period. γst and δt allow for a non-stationary process since the transition
probability can change over time.10
We can present our estimated coefficients as a Markov Transition matrix:
9Our results are robust to additional lags.
10To avoid collinearity we must set one of the time fixed effects to equal 0. This is arbitrary
but then becomes the month of reference for the other δt terms.
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Zsi,t = 0 Z
s
i,t = 1
Zsi,t−1 = 0 p
s
0,0 = 1− (γs0 + δt) ps0,1 = γs0 + δt
(Probability of not experiencing (Probability of experiencing new
new shock s, given shock s was shock s, given shock s was not
not experienced previously) experienced previously)
Zsi,t−1 = 1 p
s
1,0 = 1− (γs0 + γs1 + γ′st + δt) ps1,1 = γs0 + γs1 + γ′st + δt
(Probability of shock s not (Probability of shock s
persisting, given shock s persisting, given shock s
was experienced previously) was experienced previously)
Our key parameters of interest are ps1,1, the probability of shock s persisting,
and ps1,0 the probability of recovering from shock s. We can think of p
s
1,0 as resilience
to shock s. ps0,1 is the probability of shock s occurring when it hasn’t occurred
before. Since it is a subjective measure, we can also think of ps0,1 as vulnerability
to shock s.
3.3.2 Estimating Shock Persistence
We estimate equation (3), the persistence of shocks over time. We take the four
most frequent shocks: S = {drought, flooding, crop disease illness} and regress
them against their own values, lagged by one month. Table 3.6 uses a least squares
regression controlling for household and time fixed effects, with errors clustered at
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the Group Village Head (GVH) level. For succinctness we only report γˆs0 and γˆ
s
1
for a given shock s. As discussed earlier, since we allow the coefficients to vary
over time these reported estimates offer only a snapshot, determined by which time
dummy we set as point of reference. Here we set it as May 2017, our last round.11
Our data also allows us to explore whether multiple shocks interact and
whether those effects exacerbate or mitigate one another. Table 3.7 estimates (3)
but includes lags of the other most prevalent shocks. The only significant cross
correlation is that experiencing flooding makes it more likely to experience crop
disease in the subsequent round.
With four shocks and 11 rounds12, we can construct a total of 44 transition
matrices. For illustrative purposes we choose three periods of reference aligned with
the agricultural calendar: November (round 6), when planting begins; February
(round 9), the height of the hungry season; and May (round 12), when the harvest
comes in (Malcomb et al., 2014). Tables 3.8, 3.9, 3.10 and 3.11 present these
transition matrices across months for our four shocks of interest.






t +δt is the persistence of shock s, the probability
that a household continues experiencing its adverse effects one month later. As
an illustration, from Table 3.8a, the probability of the effects of drought persisting
in November is 88.5%. Households only had a 11.5% chance of recovering from
the effects of drought in the next month, which we consider an indicator of low
resilience. This does not change much over the subsequent six months, as the
probability of a drought’s effects persisting are 85.3% in February (Table 3.8b)
and 86.1% in May (Table 3.8c).
11This is done by setting the relevant time dummy, i.e. δMay2017 = 0 and γ
s
May2017 = 0.
12We lose one round by construct due to the lag
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These tables allow us to track how the perceived incidence and persistence
of the adverse effects of subjective shocks vary of over time. For example, while
the effects of flooding are highly persistent in November (Table 3.9a), by May
(Table 3.9c) the persistence of their effects has subsided significantly. Conversely
the persistence of illness is quite stable throughout the three rounds, as we can
see in Table 3.10. Figure 3.5a illustrates this change in the persistence of shocks
pˆs1,1 visually across all rounds. We see that while the persistence of a drought’s
effects remains stable across time, the persistence of crop-disease’s effects increase.
Unsurprisingly this increase coincides with the planting season.
In addition to estimating persistence, a useful feature of the specification is
that we can separately estimate the probability of a household experiencing the
effects of a new shock, its incidence pˆs0,1 = γˆ
s
0+ δt. For example, crop-disease starts
at a lower level of incidence in Table 3.11a with pˆs0,1 = 15.1% but this rapidly
climbs to 44.8% in Table 3.11b and 41.9% in Table 3.11c. It makes sense that the
adverse effects of crop disease are most acute when the planted harvest is nearing
maturation. Figure 3.5b illustrates how pˆs0,1 changes over time for each shock s.
We notice that incidence and persistence do not necessarily move in tandem. For
example, the effects of drought are very persistent, at pˆs1,1 > 80% throughout the
year, where s = drought. By contrast pˆs0,1 fluctuates over time, reflecting the
seasonality of a drought’s incidence.
3.3.3 Shock Persistence and Household Characteristics
The results of having mapped out the persistence of shocks begs the question:
what are the household characteristics correlated with the persistence of a given
shock s? From the above specification we can predict the probability of persistence
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i . We can then regress
this predicted value against time invariant characteristics Xi:
ρˆsi,t = α0 + α1Xi + ζi,t (3.4)





13 A negative correlation indicates that households
with these characteristics are less likely to experience the persistent effects of a
given shock. As discussed earlier, we consider such non-persistence of a shock’s
effects as a sign of resilience. We estimate equation (4) using the observed char-
acteristics from the baseline. Figure 3.6 presents estimated correlations with their
bootstrapped standard errors. These descriptives are inherently endogenous, but
can help inform which type of households are more vulnerable to shocks.
Living in a flood plain is negatively correlated with the persistence of a
drought’s adverse effects, but positively correlated with the persistence of illness’s
adverse effects. Both of these make sense, as soil in the flood-plain is likely to
retain more moisture, but the abundance of stagnant water offers breeding pools
for malaria and cholera. As discussed earlier, having a secondary house indicates
the household has fields far from its primary home, where they sometimes have to
spend the night. This suggests that households with spatially dispersed fields are
more resilience to drought. Female headed headed households are more likely to
experience the persistent effects of illness and are therefore less resilient. Finally, we
unsurprisingly find a significant correlation between the persistence of an illness’s
effects and whether the household has a chronically ill member.
13Since these are point estimates, we bootstrap the above two-step process.
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3.3.4 Resilience as a Conditional Moments-Based Approach
An alternative to looking at the persistence of specific shocks is to think of resili-
ence as the stochastic distribution in food insecurity outcomes yn,t. For compar-
ative purposes we also estimate the above data using the Cisse´ and Barrett, 2016
approach. This is a three step process:






i,t−1) + δM,1Xi,t + δM,2Zi,t−1 + ui,t (3.5)
where Yi,t is CSI, Xi,t the set of covariates and Zi,t the set of shocks experi-
enced.







i,t−1) + δVXi,t + ǫi,t (3.6)
We posit ˆCSIit and hatsigma
2
i,t as the first and second moments of a con-
ditional distribution, respectively. Under the assumption that CSIi,t has either a
normal or gamma distribution, we construct the cumulative density function and
calculate pˆi,t(X,Z) = P (CSIi,t ≤ ¯CSI), where ¯CSI is a threshold level of food
insecurity. We posit ¯CSI = 10 The estimated parameters are reported in Table







i,t−1) + δRXi,t + ηi,t (3.7)
Where pˆi,t can be thought of as ‘resilience’. Estimates of equations (5), (6)
and (7) for both a normal and gamma distribution are reported in Table 3.12b. Of
the household covariates, flood plain has a large and significant positive correlation
with household resilience. The correlation with having a secondary house is large in
magnitude and positive but not statistically significant. The other characteristics
we identified as important relative to specific shocks, such as gender and being
chronically ill, are not significantly different from 0. Of the shocks, experiencing
flooding is correlated with a significant decrease in resilience, as does drought,
though the effect is only significant for PˆGamma. The effect of Illness is marginally
significant and negative.
These results highlight the similarities and differences between an approach
focusing on subjective shock persistence and one based on conditional moments.
The insights are broadly similar: they emphasize the persistent adverse effects of
flooding and drought on household food security. Both also highlight that living in
the flood plain and having a secondary house mitigates these adverse effects. Some
of the details differ: Gender and being chronically ill have no significant effect on
pˆi,t in Table 3.12. There are two possible explanations: those characteristics only
affect the persistence of illness for the 20-25% of households experiencing illness
at any given time, so the effect might be lost in the statistical noise. Altern-
atively, since persistent illness has little to no effect on food security (see Table
3.5), characteristics shifting the persistence of illness may not affect the stochastic
distribution of food security. This comparative analysis showcases how the two ap-
proaches complement each other and offer a fuller picture of household resilience.
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3.4 Distribution of Food Insecurity
We can also harness this data to infer seasonal trends in food insecurity over time.
We use the Coping Strategy Index (CSI) as our measure of food insecurity. In
general, the more coping strategies a household employs, the worse off it is, and
households which are resilient should experience decreasing levels of CSI over time.
We draw our model from the literature on poverty dynamics and posit CSI as an
observed outcome from a stochastic distribution of potential outcomes. This allows
us to verify whether the characteristics we identified as determinants of resilience
also affect the trajectory of food insecurity.
We estimate an AR(1) model using a Blundell-Bond estimator (Blundell and
Bond, 1998). From the predicted values, we plot the distribution of outcomes as
∆CSI conditional on observable characteristics.
3.4.1 Specification
To motivate our investigation, we build on existing theory concerning household
poverty dynamics: Specifically, we postulate a conditional trajectory for dynamic
food insecurity Yt:
Yt = F (Yt−1, Zt|X) (3.8)
Food insecurity is a function of previous food insecurity Yt−1 and any shock Zt
experienced. F(.) can be a higher order polynomial.14 X represents conditioning
14There is a larger literature on the production function of households living at or near subsist-
ence level, well summarized in Barrett et al., 2016. This production function is often non-linear.
Multiple technologies may lead to a convex hull with one or multiple kinks. Lumpy assets, such
as livestock, may make it difficult to incrementally acquire wealth over time. A linear function
would therefore misspecify how current food insecurity relates to future food insecurity.
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variables, which may lead to different trajectories. Our observed food insecur-
ity outcome yt ∼ Yt is a random variable drawn from an unknown conditional
distribution.
We model the conditional distribution of food insecurity trajectories, CSI, as
a continuous state Markov chain (Sargent and Stachurski, 2016). We can infer the




where p(yt, yt−1) is the joint distribution of yt−1 ∈ St−1 and yt ∈ St. This result




one can compute the family of distributions G(yt, .) by setting:





t−1 + ξt ≤ yt} (3.11)
an AR process with a polynomial of degree K. As discussed earlier, we want to
allow for non-linearity in the dynamics of CSI over time by estimating a higher
order polynomial. We can construct the above by estimating:





i,t−1 + Zi,t + δt + ǫi,t (3.12)
and plotting the predicted distribution. For robustness, we control for observable
shocks with Zn,t.
15 δt controls for time fixed effects.
In order to condition this distribution on various characteristics Xi, we run
the above specification on observable subsets of the sample. These criteria include
15These include the four principle shocks reported: drought, flood, crop-disease and illness.
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age, education, gender, whether the household have a chronically ill member at
home, as well as land farmed, tropical livestock units, whether the household lived
in the flood plain and whether the households has a secondary home. As before, for
binary variables we disaggregate the sample by type, and for continuous variables
we disaggregate by whether a household is above or below the median value.
3.4.2 Estimator: Blundell Bond System GMM
An AR process allows us to exploit the Arellano Bond (AB) estimator (Arellano
and Bond, 1991), which addresses potential endogeneity by differencing the regres-
sion and instrumenting the lagged dependent variable with previous lags.
A followup paper (Blundell and Bond, 1998) addresses the issue of weak
instruments. Instead of differencing the dependent variable, it differences the in-
struments, making them exogenous to the fixed effect and demonstrating that this
achieves greater efficiency. It also performs better closer to the unit root. Because
this combines the original AB estimator with a transformed equation by stacking
the observations, it is often referred to as the System General Method of Moments
(GMM) estimator.
To illustrate, take an AR(1) model:
ynt = αyn,t−1 + ηi + υnt (3.13)
where ηn represents time invariant unobservables, υnt is a time varying stochastic
error term and µnt ≡ ηn + υnt. We assume the following moment conditions in
order for our estimates to be consistent:
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A1) E(υnt, υns) = 0 ∀t 6= s (No serial correlation)
A2) E(yn1, υnt) = 0 for t = 2, ...T (Initial Conditions)
A3) E(µn3,∆yn2) = 0 for t = 2, ...T (Initial deviations uncorrelated
with aggregate error)
Which imply
E(µnt∆yn,t−1) = 0 for t = 3, ...T
Note that stationarity is a sufficient but not necessary condition to satisfy A3. Any
first period randomly distributed deviation from the long term mean will preserve
this assumption. This gives us a set of instruments ∆yn,t−1 to exploit.
The model explicitly assumes an AR(1) process. In general, an observed
AR(T) process requires us to restrict our set of instruments to the set t ≥ T − 1.
Fortunately we can take advantage of our relatively long panel. We also report
Sargan’s J-test of over-identified restrictions.
3.4.3 Estimation
Using CSI as a measure of food insecurity we estimate equation (9) using a
Blundell-Bond estimator for K = 2. We include a square term in order to al-
low for non-linearity in the persistence of CSI across the spectrum of potential
outcomes.16 As we observed in Figures 3.3 and 3.4, there was an acute food crisis
16We test for high order polynomials and find that they introduce too much noise, rendering
all coefficients insignificant.
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at the beginning of the data collection period, leading to high inital levels of CSI
which only gradually abated. In order to capture these shifting dynamics, we di-
vided our sample into two halves, June-November and December-May. The results
are presented in Table 3.13. Column (1) presents the specification for the entire
year sampled, June through May. Column (2) estimates the specification for the
first half of the year, and column (3) estimates it for the 2nd half of the year.17
We ran a series of tests on the specification to verify our assumptions. Under
our first identifying assumption there is no serial correlation of order 3 or above.
By construct, the residuals of the differenced errors in the Blundell Bond model
are serially correlated AR(1). We also find evidence of AR(2) correlation in some
of our specifications, so in order to avoid serial correlation we restrict our lagged
instruments to period t-3 and higher. We test and fail to reject the null of no
AR(3) serial correlation.
We investigate the exclusion restriction on our constructed instrumental vari-
ables with the Sargan-Hansen test, which tests the validity of over-identified re-
strictions.18 The null hypothesis is that the over-identified restrictions are valid,
and rejection of the null would therefore cast doubt on the consistency of our es-
timates. The Sargan-Hansen test fails to reject the null in all our specifications,
except for columns (1) and (3) of Table 3.17a. Given the number of regressions
we run, it is statistically plausible that this is a false positive, but we nevertheless
refrain from interpreting these results.19
17Unlike the estimation in section 3, we cannot divide our sample down further as the Blundell
Bond estimator requires a minimum of 4 rounds, 5 if we want to run a Sargan-Hansen over-
identification test.
18An issue with system GMM is that the large number or instruments generates weakens the
Sargan-Hansen statistic, increasing the likelihood of type I error. We use the Windmeijer, 2005
small sample correction and the collapsed instruments matrix suggested by Roodman, 2009,
restricting the set of lags for increased precision.
19For robustness we run the same specification while varying the number of lagged instruments,
consistently failing to reject Sargan-Hansen with similar coefficient estimates.
80
We estimate equation (9) for sub-samples of the population to determine
which household characteristics affect the expected distribution of CSI. This condi-
tions the distribution of our expected outcomes on characteristics Xn. Tables 3.14,
3.15 3.16 and 3.17 give us the results from estimating a second order lagged poly-
nomial, dissaggregated by observable characteristics as discussed above. Columns
(1)-(3) run the specification for observations above the median, or where the bin-
ary variable equals 1. Columns (4)-(6) run the specification for observations below
the median, or where the binary variable equals 0. Columns (1) and (4) run this
specification for the full time span of the sample, June through May. Columns (2)
and (5) run the specification for the time period June-November, and columns (3)
and (6) run the specification for the time period December-May. For robustness
we estimate the same set of results with the inverse mills ration γ, with similar
results in order and magnitude. These are reported in the supplementary tables.
In order to interpret these results intuitively we predict the change in CSI
conditional on these characteristics and project the resultant distribution. We pre-
dict the outcome variable ˆCSIn,t and by extension ∆ ˆCSIn,t = ˆCSIn,t −CSIn,t−1,
then project the resultant distributions. This is the expected change in CSI next
month, averaged over the sample or relevant sub-sample. Because the recovery
happens largely in the second half of the year, we focus on columns (3) and (6) in
each of the above tables, giving us Figures 3.7 and 3.8. From Figure 3.7a, younger
households are practically indistinguishable from older households in the projected
change in CSI. Households with above median education are slightly more likely
to experience increased CSI, though the difference is not economically meaningful.
From Figure 3.7b, male headed households are more likely to experience increas-
ing levels of food insecurity on average, but have a long left tail. Female headed
households are more stable, with their expected change in CSI centered around 0.
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Households with and without a chronically ill member have similar distributions.
From Figure 3.8a, households with access to more than 2 hectares of farming
land can expect little change on average in CSI, while households with less than
median levels have a greater risk of experiencing increased CSI. Unsurprisingly,
having more land is a good hedge against hunger. There is no distinguishable
difference in the distribution for households with or without livestock. We do not
interpret the results for flood plains because we reject Hansen’s J test (see above).
Interestingly, households with a secondary home have a left skewed distribution,
implying that they can expect lower CSI and therefore a quicker recovery. This
coincides nicely with the insights from Figure 3.6, where having a secondary house
makes it less likely for the effects of drought to persist.
To summarize, the characteristics that most influence a household’s food
insecurity by shifting the predicted distribution of ∆CSI are gender, access to
land and owning a secondary house.
3.5 Predicting Food Insecurity
A third approach to measuring resilience is as the predictor of food insecurity
in the immediate future. In the reduced form specification above we based our
choice of observable characteristics on informed priors, which is not necessarily
desirable when we seek to maximize predictive accuracy. Instead we propose to
search through the full scope of available data to find the best predictors of fu-
ture CSI. We do this using supervised machine learning algorithms. We compare
two algorithms, the Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selection Operator (LASSO)
and Random Forest. Both allow us to identify the best predictors by selecting a
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subset of promising variables within a larger set. We also show how the predicted
outcomes from these algorithms can be used for geographic targeting.
The use of these algorithms has recently gained popularity in terms of both
predicting poverty and shortlisting variables for the purpose of targeting. In
terms of targeting, Jean et al., 2016 show how running an image recognition al-
gorithm through publicly available satellite imagery significantly improves geo-
graphic poverty targeting. Blumenstock et al., 2015 use Call Detail Records
(CDR) from respondents’ cell-phones to predict poverty in Rwanda. A compli-
mentary body of work is concerned with improving accuracy of targeted social
programs when lacking comprehensive data on income and consumption. McBride
and Nichols, 2015 present evidence that applying machine learning algorithms to
PMT development can substantially improve the out-of-sample performance of
these targeting tools. Kshirsagar et al., 2017 use a bootstrapped LASSO to se-
lect a subset of indicators which accurately predict poverty rates, and show that
they outperform a random distribution benchmark. Building on this literature, we
innovate here by applying this approach to dynamic food security data.
Though a wide array of popular supervised machine learning tools exist, the
general premise is straightforward.20 Divide the dataset in two subsets. Using
the first subset of the data, the ‘training’ set, the model is calibrated. These
calibrated parameters are then used to predict outcomes in the second, ‘testing’
subset of the data. The performance of an algorithm is judged by its predictive
accuracy, as measured using the R2. The process is then iterated in an attempt
to improve performance. In addition, as an intermediary step some algorithms
explicitly identify a subset of variables that are considered the best predictors.
20‘Supervised’ machine learning use inputs x to predict outputs y. ‘Unsupervised’ tools seek
to identify patterns in x without corresponding outputs.
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These are the predictors we are interested in.
We use the Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selection Operator (LASSO) and
Random Forests to identify the best predictors of CSI. LASSO was selected because
it retains much of the structure of linear regression analysis, allowing for intuitive
interpretation of the coefficients. These can be compared in sign and magnitude
to results elsewhere in the paper. Random Forest offers a salient contrast, as by
design it is non-linear and every variable is implicitly allowed to interact with
every other variable. Though more flexible, this ’black box’ approach makes it
difficult to interpret the sign of any one coefficient, as it depends on all the others.
Comparing the performance of both is therefore useful. More sophisticated deep
learning algorithms using neural networks were too demanding of the data given
our limited sample size.
We trained our data on the 10 rounds from June to March (the ‘training’
set) and sought to predict the likely outcomes for April and May (the ‘test’ set),
comparing it with actual CSI levels in those two months.21 A feature of using this
machine learning technique is that it harnesses all the variables collected, rather
than just the data described in section 2. These included asset indicators from the
baseline, such as quality of the home, distance to drinking water and diet. They
also included time varying indicators, such as the type and source of assistance a
household received and any change in assets. We kept all variables with less than
2% of observations missing.22 After this cleaning process, we were left with an Rd
space of predictors, where d=79 variables.
21A rule of thumb is splitting the data into roughly 80 % training and 20 % testing. We erred
on the side of a slightly larger training dataset because the algorithms further subdivide this
dataset for cross-validation.
22In order to avoid dropping too many observations, we substituted values for those missing




In a traditional regression, additional parameters always increase predictive per-
formance but risk overfitting the data. LASSO, short for Least Absolute Shrinkage
and Selection Operator, is a linear regression which penalizes additional parameters








(Yi,t − βXi,t)2 + λ‖β‖
}
(3.14)
Each β ∈ Rd must therefore add sufficient explanatory power to overcome the
penalty term λ‖β‖, otherwise it is minimized to 0. Since we have no good a priori
for the penalty term λ′ the algorithm we use, glmnet, uses coordinate descent and a
soft threshold operator to iterate through a plausible range (Friedman et al., 2010).
For each candidate λ′, the algorithm randomly subsets the training data further
and computes the mean cross-validated mean squared error (MSE). It settles on
two candidates values of λ′: λˆ′
min
minimizes the mean cross-validated error. λˆ1se
is the most parsimonious model in terms of number of parameters β while within
a standard error of the minimum. Since we seek to identify the subset of best
predictors, we report the results from λˆ1se, the parsimonious model.
In order to identify the best predictors of CSI, we bootstrap the training data
and run the LASSO algorithm through a thousand iterations, similar to Kshirsagar
et al., 2017. We then compute the mean coefficient and its standard deviation and
keep the 10 most significant variables.24 We report these predictors in Table 3.18.
Lagged CSI is unsurprisingly a strong predictor of future CSI. Location, as indic-
ated by community id (GVH), is also a strong predictor. Receiving assistance from
23We use λ′ to differentiate from the inverse mills ratio λ, defined earlier.
24We kept non-statistically significant variables for their potential predictive power.
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the government and receiving it as food are both predictors of future decreases in
CSI, and therefore decreased food insecurity. The algorithm selects four types
of asset indicators: distance to drinking water, whether any assets were bought,
whether assets were sold, and the quality of the floor. Every additional minute
of walking distance to drinking water increases predicted CSI. Interestingly both
buying and selling assets are predictors of decreased CSI, suggesting that what
matters is liquidity. Living in a flood plain decreases predicted CSI, and experien-
cing drought last month increases it.
With the exception of living in a flood plain, these predictors do not directly
correspond to the characteristics we used in our earlier specification. Unlike those
characteristics, five of these predictors vary over time and are therefore good proxies
for a household’s fluctuating state of food insecurity in the immediate. This points
to a difference in time frame. Whilst our earlier approaches sought to estimate
characteristics contributing to resilience over a year or half year time frame, this
exercise emphasizes predictive accuracy over a one to two month time frame. Time
frame therefore affects the characteristics of interest to our resilience analysis.
We then use the estimated parameters to predict CSI in our test data and
compare its performance to the actual CSI outcomes. When compared, our LASSO
algorithm gives us an R2 = 56.4%.
3.5.2 Random Forest
While it does allow us to narrow down the set of predictors, a LASSO algorithm
remains a linear regression. An alternative approach, regression trees, offers a more
flexible functional form (Hastie et al., 2009). A regression tree chooses variables in
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the set xj ∈ X and the value of that variable s, that split the set into two ‘branches’
which form half planes R1 and R2. xj and s are chosen through an optimization
process which jointly minimizes the mean squared error for the dependent variable






















(yi|xi ∈ R2(j, s)) (3.16)
Each half plane is in turn split into two branches and the process is iterated to
create a ’tree’ which fits the data. Single regression trees tend to suffer from over-
fitting, mistakenly attributing random variations in the outcome to an explanatory
variable. In order to correct for this, random forest randomly select a subset of xj ∈
X as candidate variables for the regression tree, which it fits to the data (Breiman,
2001). By repeating the process, it can compare the cross-mean performance across
these ’trees’, hence creating random forest. Because the performance of any given
variable is conditional on its parent branches, regression trees do not allow for
explicit coefficient estimates. Instead variable xj’s performance is measured as
∆MSEj, ie the increase in Mean Squared Error if the variable is omitted.
We bootstrap the training data and run the random forest algorithm through
a thousand iterations. This gives us a thousand values for each variable: ∆MSEbj .
We calculate the mean across bootstrapped values and divide by the standard de-
viation to normalize it. This allows us to rank the 10 best predictors of CSI, listed
in Table 3.19. Note that because these are not coefficients, we cannot say whether
individual variables predict increased or decreased CSI. Like LASSO, it finds that
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CSI last month, location and the distance to drinking water are good predictors.
Indeed five of the top ten variables overlap between the two approaches. Unlike
LASSO, the regression tree algorithm favors household characteristics from the
baseline. Many of these correspond to the characteristics we used in our other spe-
cifications, including age, education, land farmed and whether the household lived
in a flood plain. A household’s dietary diversity score is also a good predictor.25
The quality of a households roof and whether anyone in the household is pregnant
or nursing round of the top ten variables selected.
By running the subset of selected variables through one more iteration of a
random forest, we generated out of sample predictions for April and May, giving
us an R2 = 55.6%.
Figure 3.9 compares the predictors across both algorithms. Five of the top
ten variables overlap or are very similar. Previous months CSI is the best predictor
in both cases, followed closely by geographic location as indicated by group village
head. Other good predictors include the households distance to drinking water,
the quality of their home and whether they live in a floodplain. The differences
between what each algorithm picks up are illustrative as well, and speaks to the
differences in the objective function optimized. LASSO, by weighing each variable
as a stand-alone in a linear regression, favors time varying variables that imme-
diately affect CSI. By optimizing iteratively, regression trees implicitly condition
variables on each other, thereby favoring underlying variables which affect CSI
via their effect on other variables. Hence it favors time invariant characteristics.
Though LASSO performs marginally better in terms of out of sample R2 (56.4%
vs. 55.6%), this must be traded off against the additional difficulty and expense
25Dietary diversity score, or DDS, is the sum of food types a household reports having consumed
in the past 24 hours.
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of collecting monthly data from these sentinel sites.
3.5.3 Mapping predicted outcomes
Since this data collection exercise occurred during a humanitarian emergency, we
worked with our partners on the ground to feed data into their decision making
process. Given the uneven pace of households recovery from drought, we sought
to determine if there were lingering ‘pockets’ of food insecurity. We used the
predictions from the above algorithms to map out the predicted CSI levels ˆCSI in
Figure 3.10. The first column maps the actual CSI outcomes in April and May. The
subsequent columns show the outcomes as they were predicted using the LASSO
and Random Forest algorithms, respectively. This allowed us to demonstrate the
usefulness of a high resolution system of sentinel sites.
Equipped with such a map, decision makers could target necessary inter-
ventions with improved accuracy. Though not always precise in magnitude, the
predictions provide an accurate forecast of where we could expect high levels of CSI.
These tended to be in tightly circumscribed geographical areas. Such concentrated
levels of high CSI were due to localized co-variate shocks: some communities were
still struggling to recover from the effects of drought. Communities in the flood
plain experienced the adverse effects of localized flooding, while other communities
experienced outbreaks of crop disease.
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3.6 Conclusion
Efforts to measure resilience are increasingly prevalent in development economics.
Rather than adapt our method to the available data, we collected a novel 12
month data-set from sentinel sites in southern Malawi. We use this data to present
three approaches to modeling resilience. This allows us to offer insights into the
characteristics driving households’ resilience.
We describe the persistence of subjective shocks, modelled as a non-stationary
Markov Matrix. We find that some shocks, like drought, are very persistent in their
effects, while the persistence of shocks like flood and crop disease vary over time.
We also contrast shock persistence with experiencing the adverse effects of new
shocks, and show that the two do not necessarily move in tandem. By estimating
household level shock persistence and regressing it against household character-
istics, we find that households with fields far from home and those living in the
flood plain are more resilient to the effects of drought, and households headed by a
woman or with are chronically ill member are less resilient to the effects of illness.
Next we estimate the persistence of food insecurity, measured using the Cop-
ing Strategy Index (CSI), and test whether household characteristics shift this
persistence. We split our sample in two to allow for an initial humanitarian emer-
gency with high levels of CSI, followed by a gradual and heterogeneous recovery.
As an illustration we plot the expected change in the distribution of food insecurity.
We find that access to land, and having fields far from home shift the distribution
of food insecurity.
Finally we use a predictive algorithm to select the best predictors of future
CSI from our dataset. Using a LASSO algorithm, we narrow down the set of best
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predictors to a subset with the most predictive power. When we compare this
to a Random Forest Algorithm, we find that previous levels of food insecurity,
location and distance to drinking water are the best predictors. We also note that
LASSO favors time varying variables, while the regression trees algorithm favors
time invariant characteristics because it implicitly conditions variables on each
other. The out of sample predictive accuracy is similar, with an R2 of 56.4% for
LASSO and 55.6% for Random Forest. Mapping the predicted CSI against actual
CSI gives a relatively accurate indication of which zones experience high levels of
CSI. We find that these zones are geographically concentrated, and would therefore
benefit from targeted interventions.
As a next step in our research, we are expanding our sample to three districts
and collecting monthly data for a second year in Southern Malawi. This will allow
us to make year on year comparisons, comparing seasonal trends in a ’normal’ year
to those in a year of extreme drought or flooding. We are also seeking to replicate
our methodology in other shock prone countries such as Madagascar and Nigeria,
allowing for cross-country comparisons of resilience characteristics. We hope to
start setting in place a system of sentinel sites, providing both early warning of a
humanitarian emergency and valuable data for analysis.
A particularly promising vein of research is in contributing to improved Proxy
Means Targeting in the context of natural disasters, or Post-Disaster PMT. By
combining sentinel site data like ours to geo-spatial and phone record data, re-
searchers can calibrate the latter and use it to predict post-disaster food insecurity
when on-the-ground data is unavailable. It would be a valuable exercise to compare
various proposed algorithms, including LASSO, Regression Trees and Neural Net-





Table 3.1: MIRA Study Sample
Traditional Authority GVH Strata General Village Head Villages Households
(Flood Risk) (N=17) (N=31) (N=580)
Mikhwira
High Mpama 2 40
N=106 Kanyimbiri 2 32
Salvala 2 34
Low Nyambalo 2 39
N=102 Chagambatuka 2 38
Champhanda 2 25
Ngabu
High Jombo 2 50
N=86 Nkhwazi 2 36
Low Malikopo 2 39
N=114 Kalulu 2 39
Chapomoko 2 36
Lundu
High Mafale 2 38
N=92 Biliati 2 39
Sekeni 1 15
Low Bestala 2 38
N=59 Biyasi 1 21
Maseya Low M’bande 1 21
N=21
Totals High risk 8 15 284
by Risk Low risk 9 16 296
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Table 3.2: Household Covariates
Characteristic N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Land (Ha) 580 2.59 1.91 .2 20
Tropical Livestock Units 580 .63 2.66 0 38
Lives in Flood Plain (1=Yes) 580 .50 .50 0 1
Secondary House* (1=Yes) 580 .19 .39 0 1
Head of Household:
Age (Years) 580 42.71 16.2 0 97
Gender (1=male) 580 0.76 0.43 0 1
Education (Years) 580 6.26 4.21 0 15
Chronically ill or disabled 580 0.16 0.37 0 1
*An indicator of owning fields far from home.
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Table 3.3: Sample Attrition Over Time
Missing June July August September October November
No 580 557 572 567 566 543
Yes 0 23 8 13 14 37
Missing December January February March April May
No 421 428 463 490 465 443
Yes 159 152 117 90 115 137
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Table 3.4: Determinants of Missing Observations, Probit
Missing
(1) (2) (3)
Land Farmed (HA) -0.0397 -0.0386 -0.00717
(0.0379) (0.0376) (0.0279)
Tropical Livestock Units 0.0218 0.0312∗ 0.0302
(0.0260) (0.0187) (0.0184)
Flood Plain 0.755∗∗∗ 2.932∗∗∗ 3.139∗∗∗
(0.139) (0.553) (0.601)
Secondary House 0.508∗∗∗ 0.172 0.120
(0.171) (0.138) (0.144)
Age of HH Head -0.00176 -0.00478 -0.00145
(0.00468) (0.00479) (0.00336)
Education -0.00267 0.00113 0.00932
(0.0186) (0.0184) (0.0130)
Gender 0.148 0.0835 0.133
(0.175) (0.177) (0.125)
Chronically ill -0.129 -0.0180 0.106
(0.186) (0.192) (0.135)
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES
Community Fixed Effects NO YES YES
Enumerator Fixed Effects NO NO YES
N 6215 6215 6215
The above were used to generate a Heckman style inverse Mills ratio λ
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.5: Shocks and Food Security
Coping Strategy Index









Constant 12.07 13.77 12.09 14.42
(26.84) (26.82) (27.50) (26.89)
N 5795 5795 5795 5795
Not reported: time fixed effects δt, household fixed effects
µst and inverse mills ratio λˆ. Village clustered standard errors
in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
97
Table 3.6: Lagged Effect of Most Frequent Shocks, OLS
Drought Flooding Illness Crop Disease
Drought 0.521∗∗∗
(1 month lag) (0.0602)
Flood Water 0.133
(1 month lag) (0.132)
Illness 0.403∗∗∗
(1 month lag) (0.0667)
Crop Disease 0.400∗∗∗
(1 month lag) (0.0843)
Constant 0.340∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗ 0.419∗∗∗
(0.0516) (0.0287) (0.0173) (0.0578)
N 5165 5165 5165 5165
Not reported: time fixed effects δt, interaction of time fixed effects and lagged
coefficient γst , household fixed effects µ
s
t . For reference, we set δMay2017 = 0,
inverse mills ratio λˆ. Clustered standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.7: Persistence Across Shocks, OLS
Drought Flooding Illness Crop Disease
Drought 0.380∗∗∗ 0.024 0.0053 -0.004
(1 month lag) (0.041) (0.024) (0.023) (0.031)
Flood Water 0.017 0.406∗∗∗ 0.031 0.104∗∗
(1 month lag) (0.028) (0.047) (0.028) (0.044)
Illness -0.004 -0.013 0.419∗∗∗ 0.0113
(1 month lag) (0.015) (0.022) (0.045) (0.027)
Crop Disease -0.004 -0.010 0.031 0.456∗∗∗
(1 month lag) (0.021) (0.018) (0.019) (0.044)
N 4956 4956 4956 4956
Not reported: time fixed effects δt, household fixed effects µ
s
t , inverse
mills ratio λˆ. Village clustered standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.8: Transition Matrices for Drought
(a) November (Planting Season)
Droughtt = 0 Droughtt = 1
Droughtt−1 = 0 pˆ
s
0,0 = 54.2% pˆ
s
0,1 = 45.8%
Droughtt−1 = 1 pˆ
s
1,0 = 11.5% pˆ
s
1,1 = 88.5%




Nov2016 and δˆNov2016, where s=drought, in table 3.6, column (1)
(b) February (Hungry Season)
Droughtt = 0 Droughtt = 1
Droughtt−1 = 0 pˆ
s
0,0 = 58.3% pˆ
s
0,1 = 41.7%
Droughtt−1 = 1 pˆ
s
1,0 = 14.7% pˆ
s
1,1 = 85.3%




Feb2017 and δˆFeb2017, where s=drought, in table 3.6, column (1)
(c) May (Harvest Season)
Droughtt = 0 Droughtt = 1
Droughtt−1 = 0 pˆ
s
0,0 = 56% pˆ
s
0,1 = 34%
Droughtt−1 = 1 pˆ
s
1,0 = 13.9% pˆ
s
1,1 = 86.1%




May2017 and δˆMay2017, where s=drought, in table 3.6, column (1)
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Table 3.9: Transition Matrices for Flood
(a) November (Planting Season)
Floodt = 0 Floodt = 1
Floodt−1 = 0 pˆ
s
0,0 = 88.3% pˆ
s
0,1 = 11.7%
Floodt−1 = 1 pˆ
s
1,0 = 45% pˆ
s
1,1 = 55%




Nov2016 and δˆNov2016, where s=flood, in table 3.6, column (2)
(b) February (Hungry Season)
Floodt = 0 Floodt = 1
Floodt−1 = 0 pˆ
s
0,0 = 87.9% pˆ
s
0,1 = 12.1%
Floodt−1 = 1 pˆ
s
1,0 = 50.6% pˆ
s
1,1 = 49.4%




Feb2017 and δˆFeb2017, where s=flood, in table 3.6, column (2)
(c) May (Harvest Season)
Floodt = 0 Floodt = 1
Floodt−1 = 0 pˆ
s
0,0 = 89.6% pˆ
s
0,1 = 10.4%
Floodt−1 = 1 pˆ
s








May2017 and δˆMay2017, where s=flood, in table 3.6, column (2)
*though γˆFlood1 is insignificant, the sum of the two coefficients is significant
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Table 3.10: Transition Matrices for Illness
(a) November (Planting Season)
Illnesst = 0 Illnesst = 1
Illnesst−1 = 0 pˆ
s
0,0 = 86.2% pˆ
s
0,1 = 13.8%
Illnesst−1 = 1 pˆ
s
1,0 = 44.7% pˆ
s
1,1 = 55.3%




Nov2016 and δˆNov2016, where s=illness, in table 3.6, column (3)
(b) February (Hungry Season)
Illnesst = 0 Illnesst = 1
Illnesst−1 = 0 pˆ
s
0,0 = 86.7% pˆ
s
0,1 = 13.3%
Illnesst−1 = 1 pˆ
s
1,0 = 44% pˆ
s
1,1 = 56%




Feb2017 and δˆFeb2017, where s=illness, in table 3.6, column (3)
(c) May (Hunger Season)
Illnesst = 0 Illnesst = 1
Illnesst−1 = 0 pˆ
s
0,0 = 86.8% pˆ
s
0,1 = 13.2%
Illnesst−1 = 1 pˆ
s
1,0 = 46.5% pˆ
s
1,1 = 53.5%




May2017 and δˆMay2017, where s=illness, in table 3.6, column (3)
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Table 3.11: Transition Matrices for Crop Disease
(a) November (Planting Season)
CropDiseaset = 0 CropDiseaset = 1
CropDiseaset−1 = 0 pˆ
s
0,0 = 84.9% pˆ
s
0,1 = 15.1%
CropDiseaset−1 = 1 pˆ
s
1,0 = 29.8% pˆ
s
1,1 = 70.2%




Nov2016 and δˆNov2016, where s=crop disease, in table 3.6, column (4)
(b) February (Hungry Season)
CropDiseaset = 0 CropDiseaset = 1
CropDiseaset−1 = 0 pˆ
s
0,0 = 55.2% pˆ
s
0,1 = 44.8%
CropDiseaset−1 = 1 pˆ
s
1,0 = 27% pˆ
s
1,1 = 73%




Feb2017 and δˆFeb2017, where s=crop disease, in table 3.6, column (4)
(c) May (Harvest Season)
CropDiseaset = 0 CropDiseaset = 1
CropDiseaset−1 = 0 pˆ
s
0,0 = 58.1% pˆ
s
0,1 = 41.9%
CropDiseaset−1 = 1 pˆ
s
1,0 = 18.1% pˆ
s
1,1 = 81.9%




May2017 and δˆMay2017, where s=crop disease, in table 3.6, column (4)
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Table 3.12: Estimating Resilience, Conditional Moments Approach
(a) Estimated Resilience Parameters
variable mean standard deviation min max
ˆCSI 25 8.4 5.9 75
σˆ2CSI 121 30 48 252
PˆNormal .14 .16 5.9e-06 .71
PˆGamma .13 .2 1.7e-14 .81
We posit ¯CSI = 10 to calculate PˆNormal and PˆGamma
(b) Resilience, Household Covariates and Reported Shocks
ˆCSI σˆ2CSI PˆNormal PˆGamma
CSI 0.094∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ -0.162∗∗∗ -0.167∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.024) (0.030)
Land Farmed (HA) -0.001 -0.017∗∗∗ -0.008 -0.009
(0.002) (0.001) (0.026) (0.029)
Tropical Livestock Units -0.004∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ 0.009 0.013
(0.001) (0.001) (0.019) (0.021)
Flood Plain -0.063∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.244∗∗ 0.337∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.003) (0.109) (0.126)
Secondary House -0.010 0.152∗∗∗ 0.143 0.187
(0.008) (0.003) (0.121) (0.135)
Age of HH Head 0.005∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.006 0.008
(decades) (0.002) (0.001) (0.033) (0.036)
Education of HH Head 0.000 -0.001∗∗ -0.002 -0.002
(0.001) (0.000) (0.013) (0.015)
Gender of HH Head 0.032∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ -0.070 -0.100
(0.008) (0.003) (0.118) (0.132)
Chronically Ill -0.005 -0.080∗∗∗ -0.062 -0.078
(0.008) (0.004) (0.132) (0.148)
Drought 0.131∗∗∗ 0.349∗∗∗ -0.178 -0.244∗∗
(0.008) (0.004) (0.109) (0.120)
Flood 0.065∗∗∗ -0.172∗∗∗ -0.465∗∗∗ -0.603∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.003) (0.141) (0.168)
Illness 0.059∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ -0.156 -0.227∗
(0.007) (0.003) (0.113) (0.128)
Crop Disease -0.026∗∗∗ -0.055∗∗∗ 0.045 0.059
(0.006) (0.003) (0.101) (0.116)
N 4931 4931 4931 4931
Not reported: CSI2, CSI3, inverse mills ratio λˆ
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 3.13: Coping Strategy Index with Lagged Polynomial, GMM
June-May June-Nov Dec-May
(1) (2) (3)
CSI 1.723∗∗ 4.258 1.807∗
(0.720) (2.983) (0.953)
CSI2 -0.0126 -0.0725 -0.0127
(0.0123) (0.0717) (0.0145)
N 5139 2633 2395
ar2p 0.0000277 0.795 0.118
ar3p 0.140 0.144 0.463
hansenp 0.578 0.121 0.848
(1) full sample, (2) first six month, (3) last six months
Not reported: controls for drought, flood, pests and
illness Zi,t, time fixed effects δt.
Two-step robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.14: Coping Strategy Index with Lagged Polynomial, GMM, dis-
aggregated
(a) Disaggregated by Age of Household Head
Median=40 years
Above Median Below Median
June-May June-Nov Dec-May June-May June-Nov Dec-May
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CSI 1.219 8.034 1.309 1.760∗∗ 2.212∗ 1.928
(0.999) (4.992) (1.141) (0.688) (1.246) (1.381)
CSI2 -0.00373 -0.148 -0.00874 -0.0139 -0.0241 -0.0117
(0.0178) (0.104) (0.0187) (0.0111) (0.0267) (0.0199)
N 2444 1312 1132 2695 1432 1263
ar2p 0.00200 0.539 0.401 0.00493 0.122 0.106
ar3p 0.441 0.444 0.768 0.195 0.500 0.520
hansenp 0.923 0.481 0.763 0.324 0.271 0.415
(1) and (4) full sample, (2) and (5) first six months, (3) and (6) last six months
Not reported: controls for drought, flood, pests and illness Zi,t, time fixed effects δt
Two-step robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
(b) Disaggregated by Education of Household Head
Median=7 years
Above Median Below Median
June-May June-Nov Dec-May June-May June-Nov Dec-May
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CSI 1.061∗ 2.915∗∗∗ 1.558 0.431 2.477 0.918
(0.565) (0.959) (1.635) (0.937) (1.551) (0.903)
CSI2 -0.00297 -0.0364∗∗ -0.0104 0.0131 -0.0345 0.00158
(0.00937) (0.0176) (0.0236) (0.0177) (0.0300) (0.0143)
N 2263 1195 1068 2876 1549 1327
ar2p 0.000715 0.0878 0.210 0.0240 0.777 0.198
ar3p 0.974 0.208 0.853 0.0796 0.667 0.413
hansenp 0.110 0.847 0.0885 0.374 0.00824 0.231
(1) and (4) full sample, (2) and (5) first six months, (3) and (6) last six months
Not reported: controls for drought, flood, pests and illness Zi,t, time fixed effects δt.
Two-step robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.15: Coping Strategy Index with Lagged Polynomial, GMM, dis-
aggregated
(a) Disaggregated by Gender of Household Head
Female Male
June-May June-Nov Dec-May June-May June-Nov Dec-May
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CSI -0.528 1.869 0.640 2.084∗∗∗ 2.518∗ 2.421
(1.862) (2.622) (0.976) (0.803) (1.332) (1.793)
CSI2 0.0225 -0.0270 0.00441 -0.0184 -0.0288 -0.0213
(0.0305) (0.0416) (0.0156) (0.0138) (0.0280) (0.0269)
N 1285 669 616 3854 2075 1779
ar2p 0.285 0.826 0.291 0.000884 0.160 0.355
ar3p 0.744 0.735 0.545 0.162 0.153 0.657
hansenp 0.234 0.160 0.711 0.779 0.129 0.562
(1) and (4) full sample, (2) and (5) first six months, (3) and (6) last six months
Not reported: controls for drought, flood, pests and illness Zi,t, time fixed effects δt.
Two-step robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
(b) Disaggregated by Whether Household Member is Chronically Ill
Chronically Ill No One Chronically Ill
June-May June-Nov Dec-May June-May June-Nov Dec-May
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CSI 2.432 3.756 1.919∗ 1.900∗∗ -0.989 1.733
(1.792) (2.337) (1.053) (0.943) (3.561) (1.068)
CSI2 -0.0222 -0.0619 -0.0225 -0.0171 0.0472 -0.0130
(0.0296) (0.0381) (0.0159) (0.0157) (0.0829) (0.0162)
N 876 470 406 4263 2274 1989
ar2p 0.763 0.709 0.273 0.0000108 0.462 0.0454
ar3p 0.236 0.829 0.222 0.318 0.727 0.865
hansenp 0.198 0.0513 0.466 0.402 0.0386 0.834
(1) and (4) full sample, (2) and (5) first six months, (3) and (6) last six months
Not reported: controls for drought, flood, pests and illness Zi,t, time fixed effects δt.
Two-step robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.16: Coping Strategy Index with Lagged Polynomial, GMM, dis-
aggregated
(a) Disaggregated by Land Farmed
Median=2 HA
Above Median Below Median
June-May June-Nov Dec-May June-May June-Nov Dec-May
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CSI 1.113 -5.665 0.916 2.110∗ 2.316∗ 2.556
(0.876) (14.54) (0.869) (1.086) (1.380) (1.828)
CSI2 -0.00346 0.131 -0.00183 -0.0180 -0.0233 -0.0242
(0.0161) (0.299) (0.0137) (0.0177) (0.0278) (0.0282)
N 2084 1128 956 3055 1616 1439
ar2p 0.00140 0.639 0.264 0.0160 0.685 0.301
ar3p 0.679 0.836 0.782 0.152 0.166 0.486
hansenp 0.789 0.531 0.784 0.389 0.348 0.700
(1) and (4) full sample, (2) and (5) first six months, (3) and (6) last six months
Not reported: controls for drought, flood, pests and illness Zi,t, time fixed effects δt.
Two-step robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
(b) Disaggregated by Tropical Livestock Units
Median=.01 TLU
Above Median Below Median
June-May June-Nov Dec-May June-May June-Nov Dec-May
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CSI 1.056 2.063∗ 1.483 1.727∗∗ 1.625∗ 1.135
(1.503) (1.121) (0.992) (0.775) (0.925) (0.793)
CSI2 -0.00316 -0.0234 -0.00972 -0.0115 -0.0118 -0.00226
(0.0266) (0.0248) (0.0158) (0.0129) (0.0147) (0.0125)
N 2491 1343 1148 2648 1401 1247
ar2p 0.0147 0.356 0.573 0.000255 0.0535 0.0567
ar3p 0.194 0.675 0.397 0.426 0.571 0.848
hansenp 0.436 0.332 0.863 0.993 0.0837 0.571
(1) and (4) full sample, (2) and (5) first six months, (3) and (6) last six months
Not reported: controls for drought, flood, pests and illness Zi,t, time fixed effects δt.
Two-step robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.17: Coping Strategy Index with Lagged Polynomial, GMM, dis-
aggregated
(a) Disaggregated by Whether Household Lives in Flood Plain
Lives in Flood Plain Lives Outside FLood Plain
June-May June-Nov Dec-May June-May June-Nov Dec-May
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CSI 0.813∗ 2.046∗∗ 0.707∗ -1.441 0.394 -3.935∗
(0.469) (1.000) (0.413) (1.134) (2.903) (2.118)
CSI2 0.000742 -0.0258 -0.00168 0.0376∗∗ 0.00842 0.0735∗∗
(0.0104) (0.0240) (0.00783) (0.0189) (0.0571) (0.0325)
N 2364 1364 1000 2775 1380 1395
ar2p 0.0704 0.255 0.0374 0.00147 0.239 0.880
ar3p 0.200 0.255 0.198 0.565 0.832 0.996
hansenp 0.000737 0.0677 0.0188 0.150 0.100 0.979
(1) and (4) full sample, (2) and (5) first six months, (3) and (6) last six months
Not reported: controls for drought, flood, pests and illness Zi,t, time fixed effects δt.
Two-step robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
(b) Disaggregated by Whether Household Has A Secondary House
Has a Secondary House Does Not Have a Secondary House
June-May June-Nov Dec-May June-May June-Nov Dec-May
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CSI 1.966 2.276 -1.009 1.743∗∗ 6.294 2.377∗∗
(2.244) (1.592) (1.484) (0.716) (4.645) (1.107)
CSI2 -0.0205 -0.0250 0.0275 -0.0130 -0.117 -0.0206
(0.0380) (0.0331) (0.0271) (0.0123) (0.101) (0.0169)
N 865 509 356 4263 2230 2033
ar2p 0.0773 0.475 0.516 0.000537 0.633 0.322
ar3p 0.426 0.362 0.419 0.299 0.517 0.644
hansenp 0.267 0.687 0.175 0.0913 0.230 0.990
(1) and (4) full sample, (2) and (5) first six months, (3) and (6) last six months
Not reported: controls for drought, flood, pests and illness Zi,t, time fixed effects δt.
Two-step robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.18: Top Variables Selected by LASSO Algorithm
Variable Coefficient
CSI Last Month 0.473∗∗∗
(0.015)
Group Village Head 0.012∗∗∗
(0.002)
Received Assistance from Government Last Month -1.535∗∗
(0.727)
Received Assistance as Food Last Month -0.662∗
(0.417)
Distance to Drinking Water 0.013∗
(minutes walking) (0.007)
Quality of Floor -0.518
(0.368)
Sold Assets Last Month -0.818
(0.691)
Purchased Assets Last Month -0.778
(0.694)
Lives in Flood Plain -0.662
(0.562)
Experienced Drought Last Month 0.434
(0.371)
N 4308
Out of sample R2 (April, May) 56.4 %
Sample restricted to training set, (June-March)
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.19: Top Variables Selected by Random Forest Algorithm
Variable ∆MSE*
(standardized)*
CSI Last Month 21.70
Group Village Head 25.58
Age 19.98
Education 17.32
Land Farmed (ha) 17.91
Dietary Diversity Score 17.02
Distance to Drinking Water 14.27
(minutes walking)
Quality of Roof 16.76
Pregnant or Nursing 14.65
Household Member
Lives in Flood Plain 13.80
N 4308
Out of sample R2 (April, May) 55.6 %
Sample restricted to training set, (June-March)




Figure 3.1: MIRA households and incidence of 2015 flooding from the Dartmouth
Flood Observatory (Brakenridge and Anderson, 2004)
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Figure 3.2: Most frequent shocks reported
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Figure 3.5: Illustration of the parameters calculated from table 3.6 as they vary
by round.




1, the perceived persistence of shock’s effects
(b) Estimated parameter pˆs0,1 = γˆ
s
0, the perceived incidence of new shocks
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Figure 3.6: Correlation between estimated shock specific probability ρˆsi,t and
household characteristics (bootstrapped s.e)
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Figure 3.7: Predicted probability distribution functions for ∆ CSI for December
through May, conditional on demographic characteristics
(a) Predicted from table 3.14, col (3) and (6)
(b) Predicted from table 3.15, col (3) and (6)
118
Figure 3.8: Predicted probability distribution functions for ∆ CSI for December
through May, conditional on assets and location
(a) Predicted from table 3.16, col (3) and (6)
(b) Predicted from table 3.17, col (3) and (6)
119
Figure 3.9: Top predictors of CSI
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Figure 3.10: Actual and predicted CSI in April and May
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CHAPTER 4
LAND FRAGMENTATION AND FOOD INSECURITY IN
ETHIOPIA
4.1 Introduction
Large gains have been made in reducing food insecurity, but an estimated 815
million people still suffered from chronic malnutrition in 2017 (FAO, 2017b). Sub-
sistence farmers in particular struggle to smooth their consumption over time.
Households are vulnerable if they cannot rely on credit, savings, social networks
or other mechanisms to manage risk and smooth their food consumption in the
face of shocks (Dercon et al., 2005; Dercon, 2002; Fafchamps and Gubert, 2007).
Such households’ inability to deal with risks perpetuates poverty and chronic food
insecurity, as they tend to forego risky but potentially lucrative activities with
long-term payoffs in order to avoid downside risk (Dercon, 2006; Carter et al.,
2007). Deprivations also have long term adverse effects on education and wage
outcomes, especially if experienced at a young age (Alderman et al., 2006; Bar-
rett and Santos, 2014). These negative effects can perpetuate across generations
(Tafere, 2017). Recent literature has emphasized interventions aimed at making
households more ‘resilient’ to the adverse effects of such shocks, and found that
these were effective at reducing food insecurity (Cisse´ and Barrett, 2016; Knippen-
berg and Hoddinott, 2017). It is well documented that household characteristics
may also influence their ability to mitigate risk and smooth food consumption in
the face of heterogeneous shocks (Morduch, 1994).
We explore one such characteristic: a household’s level of land fragmentation.
Land fragmentation is a state of division of holdings into discrete parcels that are
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dispersed over a wide area but operated by a single farmer and his or her household.
It is often driven by a combination of increased population density, inheritance
and government policy (Demetriou et al., 2013). It is pervasive in contexts where
incomplete land markets and lack of access to credit constrain attempts at land
consolidation for commercial purposes (Binswanger et al., 1995).
A strand of thought within agricultural and development economics has long
expressed concern regarding the negative effects of land fragmentation in terms
of crop production and yield (Monchuk et al., 2010). Land fragmentation is as-
sociated with lower agricultural output and reduced productivity, as farmers with
more parcels are further from the production possibility frontier. This has been
demonstrated across a wider array of agricultural contexts, including rural China
(Tan et al., 2010; Nguyen et al., 1996; Wan and Cheng, 2001), India (Rahman
and Rahman, 2009; Jha et al., 2005; Monchuk et al., 2010) and Vietnam (Van
Hung et al., 2007), though some studies find no significant effect on yields (Tan
et al., 2008). Land fragmentation is also associated with higher production costs,
particularly in terms of labor, because of the lost time spent getting to spatially
separated parcels (Van Hung et al., 2007; Tan et al., 2008). Finally smaller, more
fragmented parcels hinder mechanization, increase fixed costs like fencing and are
likelier to lead to land disputes (Foster and Rosenzweig, 2011; Demetriou et al.,
2013).
A complimentary but dissenting view points to the benefits of land fragment-
ation as diversifying risk through the spatial variance in land characteristics. In a
seminal study, Blarel et al. (1992) model how land fragmentation reduces aggreg-
ate risk to the household . Assuming imperfect correlation in yields across parcels,
increased fragmentation decreases the variance of total farm income per hectare
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over time. They demonstrate this empirically using panel data from Rwanda. In a
recent working paper, Veljanoska (2016) uses panel data from Uganda to show that
land fragmentation mitigates the adverse impact of deviations in rainfall on yield .
This is relevant to contemporary concerns regarding climate change and associated
increased variability in rainfall and temperature. Land fragmentation also encour-
ages crop diversification (Van Hung et al., 2007). Though suggestive, these studies
tend to focus on yields rather than inquire as to the effects of fragmentation on
food security in a shock-prone environment.
With the exception of Veljanoska (2016), the above studies do not attempt
to assess whether fragmentation reflects conscious decisions by farms to spatially
diversify (for example, through renting in parcels that are not contiguous with
each other) or whether it reflects exogenous factors such as rules and customs
regarding land access. A rational farmer operating in a functioning land mar-
ket would seek to optimize her portfolio of land holdings, making fragmentation
endogenous to ability. To address this concern we exploit a unique natural experi-
ment: Ethiopia’s land reforms under the former communist regime. We propose to
harness this historical event as an exogenous source of household-level land frag-
mentation. Our identification strategy is premised on the assumption of exogenous
land redistribution in an incomplete market. We will argue that the main driver
of land fragmentation was redistribution efforts, and that land thereby acquired
was then bestowed to the next generation. Household-level unobservables, such as
ability, are therefore orthogonal to the level of land fragmentation.
The paper explores the question of land fragmentation and food security using
Ethiopia’s Living Standards and Measurement Study-Integrated Survey on Agri-
culture (LSMS-ISA), a three round panel dataset jointly collected by the World
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Bank and Ethiopian government. This dataset combines household level charac-
teristics and food security indicators with details on the parcels households farm,
including the origin of their tenure, size and geo-spatial characteristics. This rich
set of indicators allows us to explore the link between land fragmentation and food
security.
Bringing together the literature on land fragmentation and food security,
this paper uses detailed parcel-level data to construct and compare a series of
land fragmentation measures, and shows that land fragmentation reduces food
insecurity. It harnesses a policy-driven natural experiment, using robustness checks
and an instrumental variable approach to argue that this effect is causal. Finally,
it unpacks the risk diversification mechanism, demonstrating that the reduction in
food insecurity is due to variation in plot characteristics and crop diversification,
allowing farmers to absorb adverse weather shocks.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Part 2 reviews the
history of land tenure in Ethiopia, in particular the nationwide land redistribution
efforts under the communist government. Part 3 walks the reader through the
LSMS dataset and presents summary statistics. Part 4 presents the principal
specification. Part 5 includes the principle results, that land fragmentation reduces
food insecurity, and presents evidence that this relationship is causal. Part 6
explores how land fragmentation helps farmers mitigate risk. Part 7 concludes.
4.2 Land Tenure in Ethiopia
For historical reasons, households access to land in Ethiopia differs from land tenure
systems found elsewhere in Africa.
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Until 1974, Ethiopia had a complex land tenure system characterized by its
diversity. Broadly speaking, the tenure system differed between the highlands
constituting the core of the old Christian Kingdom, the subsequently conquered
southern low-lands, and the peripheral area characterized by pastoralism (Ofcansky
and Berry, 1991). In the highlands the major form of land tenure was rist, a form
of communal ownership within family lineages, entitling every male and female
descendant to a share of land in the form of usurfruct rights. Since the land
belonged to the family rather than the individual, it could not be sold, mortgaged
or bequeathed outside the family (Kebede, 2002). Since rist rights could be passed
on through both male and female descendants, in principle individuals who could
trace their ancestry several generations back had access to a large set of rist rights.
Conflicting claims were resolved through informal channels and litigation in court
(Kebede, 2002). These overlapping claims guaranteed access to land for most
farmers and impeded inter-generational land consolidation.
By contrast, gult was an ownership right bequeathed by the monarch or
regional governors, often as reward for military service. Gult owners formed an
aristocracy entitled to a share of the harvest and to labor services from the peas-
antry, including mobilization in times of war (Ofcansky and Berry, 1991). Samon
was land entrusted to the church, which also collected tribute from the peasantry.
After conquering the south at the end of the 19th century, emperor Menelik dis-
tributed Gult rights to northern nobles and loyal southern landlords. This meant
that, in contrast to the northern highlands where tenancy was rare, feudal share-
cropping predominated in the south, constituting 65-80% of holdings (Kebede,
2002). Somali and Afar were predominantly pastoral, though beginning in the
1950s malaria eradication and irrigation led to attempts at large-scale commercial
agriculture. All this changed with the overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie by the
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Marxist Derg regime in 1974.
Under pressure from the peasantry and university students, on March 4 1975
the new government announced its land reform program, which nationalized all
land and abolished tenancy (Ofcansky and Berry, 1991). It also prohibited land
sales, rentals or the use of hired labor. Large landowners, including the nobility,
church and those who operate large commercial estates, had their land seized. The
government encouraged peasant cooperatives to form in each kebele (community)
and proceed in redistributing the land. Peasants were to receive ‘posessing rights’
to a plot of land not exceeding 10 hectares, though in practice they often received
much less. Families received land in proportion to household size, each adult eli-
gible for one timad of land, or about 1/4 of a hectare (Holden and Yohannes, 2002).1
In an attempt to ensure equitable quality, land was classified into 4 categories ac-
cording to soil depth: deep, medium, shallow and very shallow. The cooperatives
then sought to ensure each family had access to a parcel of land in each of these
four categories (Kosec et al., 2016). Land fragmentation increased as a result.
A study found that in Gojjam, a region in northern Ethiopia, the proportion of
farmers with three or four parcels of land more than doubled (Ofcansky and Berry,
1991). Land redistribution was particularly prevalent in the highlands, where rist
was the dominant form of land tenancy. In the more fertile south and particularly
modern day SNNP, the reforms focused on abolishing sharecropper payments to
their landlords, thereby giving them defacto tenure of their homesteads.
The Derg fell in 1991, but did not seek to reverse the reforms. In 1995,
the new government issued a proclamation entrenching the state ownership of
land in the constitution. Sales remained prohibited, as the government wanted
1Traditionally a ‘Timad’ is the amount of land two ox can plow in a day. This will tend to vary
accordingly to land topology, but is held to be approximately 1/4 of a hectare in the literature.
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to mitigate the pressure of landless farmers migrating to the city. State control
of land also facilitated control of the population. Rules were loosened to allow
for limited renting and sharecropping. Existing allocations were frozen in place,
though the government continued to redistribute public land at the margin in order
to accommodate new families and dampen urbanization pressures (Kosec et al.,
2016). To address concerns of land seizure, the government has sought to entrench
existing land tenure rights through a nation-wide land certification scheme, though
without the right to sell or mortgage the titled land (Deininger et al., 2011). Local
authorities used communal and participatory measures to establish rights to the
land, resolve disputes and issue households with a certificate.
Though the current government maintained the exogenous distribution of
land, we may be concerned that subsequent re-allocations could introduce endo-
geneity. As we discussed, both the communist regime and current administration
have maintained severe restrictions on the sale of arable land (Deininger et al.,
2011). Any potential inter-generational re-allocation through inheritance would
face the following constraints:
1. By law, parcels cannot be smaller than a half timad, restricting households’
ability to sub-divide land among their children (Kosec et al., 2016).
2. Although any child can in principle inherit land, customary norms and prac-
tices tend to favor men, either the eldest or youngest, especially as marriage
is predominantly patrilocal and sons are expected to care for their parents
(Fafchamps and Quisumbing, 2005).
A final concern is that households may optimize at the margins by renting in
and renting out land. We address these concerns in our robustness checks. As we
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shall see from the data, the historical reforms and constraints on land re-allocation
have perpetuated high levels of land fragmentation. We use these reforms as an
exogenous sources of variation in land fragmentation, leading to different food
security outcomes at the household level.
4.3 Specification
Our principle specification is a reduced form regression, estimating the impact of
land fragmentation (Fi,t) on food security (Yi,t):
Yi,t = β0 + β1Fi,t + β2Ai,t +Xi,t + δt + ki + ǫi,t (4.1)
where ǫi,t is a time variant error term. δt controls for time fixed effects. ki is
a Kebele fixed effectamer, the smallest administrative unit in Ethiopia. Ai,t is the
total land farmed by the household in hectares.
Since we argue that land fragmentation is historically exogenous, we can-
not exploit inter-temporal variation in land tenure across the three rounds. These
variations are largely driven by decisions to rent-in or rent-out land. This may
allow a household to optimize their land portfolio at the margin, introducing en-
dogeneity. We therefore fix our measure of household land fragmentation to the
first round available and run a pooled regression. As a result we cannot control
for household fixed effects directly, and instead saturate the model with household
level controls Xi,t. These include gender of household head, their age, the size
of household, dependency ratio, and an asset index constructed using principal
component analysis.
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We use population level weights in all our estimation, and cluster errors at
the household level.
4.4 Data
We use data from the Living Standards and Measurement Study-Integrated Survey
on Agriculture (LSMS-ISA), an initiative to collect high quality, standardized data
in developing countries in order to inform policy making. These surveys collect
socio-economic panel data at the household level, with a special focus on agri-
cultural statistics and the link between agriculture and other household income
activities. Ethiopia’s LSMS-ISA data-set is a panel with three rounds collected
in 2011-2012, 2013-2014, and 2015-2016. It initially collected data on 3,776 rural
households, before expanding to 5,262 in the 2nd wave to include households liv-
ing in urban areas.2 After dropping the major cities and keeping only households
for whom we have complete parcel records, we have a sample of 3,730 households
in the first round, increasing to 4,607 households in the second round and 4,449
households in the third round. The attrition rate from round 1 to round 2 is 2.1%
and from round 2 to round 3 is 3.4%. The survey is representative at the national
and regional levels with population weights to adjust for over-sampling. It was
implemented by the World Bank’s Development Data Group in collaboration with
the Central Statistics Agency of Ethiopia, with funding from the Bill and Melinda
Gates Foundation.
Ethiopia’s LSMS-ISA data is characterized by its combination of detailed
agricultural data with household characteristics. It contains both household and
2A number of these households living in peri-urban areas has access to land parcels, and we
include them in our analysis.
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parcel level indicators, including detailed data on the following:
• Parcel-level data detailing the origin of land tenure for each parcel of land.
• Parcel-level measures of area, crop, geophysical characteristics and location,
allowing for the calculation of land fragmentation measures. 3
• Household-level data on welfare outcomes specific to food security.
• Household-level data on demographic characteristics and assets held by the
household.
• Household-level data on shocks experienced, such as drought.
This combination of household-level and parcel-level variables allows us to
estimate the specification outlined above, explicitly linking agricultural land frag-
mentation to household-level well-being, conditional on household characteristics.
4.4.1 Origin of Land Tenure
Given the diversity of land tenure in Ethiopia before the redistribution efforts, the
natural experiment is not equally valid everywhere. As outlined above, though
the scope of the land reforms was nationwide their implementation differed across
regions. In the highlands where ownership was traditionally defined by rist, the
emphasis was on equitable land re-allocation according to family size. This attempt
to ensure each family had access to parcels of similar quality created exogenous
variation by administrative fiat. In the lowlands where tenure was largely defined
3Land data in the LSMS-ISA is collected at three levels of aggregation: parcels; fields; and
plots. Plots are the smallest unit of analysis. Multiple plots can make up a field. Multiple fields
make up a parcel; parcels are the highest unit of land aggregation. For our main analysis we
chose to aggregate all these measures up to parcels, weighed by area. See appendix for details.
131
by gult, tenants simply seized the farms they already cultivated, so there was less
redistribution leading to exogenous variation. We see this in the data. On aggreg-
ate, 79% of households sampled either received land directly from the government
via local leaders, or inherited it from their parents (Table 4.1). Yet this varies
signficantly by region. These forms of ownership are dominant in the Ethiopian
highlands (Amhara, Tigray and Oromiya). Because the lowlands were dominated
by sharecropping, there was less redistribution, as is particularly evident in SNNP.
We therefore drop the lowlands as a robustness check. In pastoral areas (Afar and
Somalie) many households are squatters, likely making land tenure endogenous.
We therefore exclude these areas in our subsequent regressions.
Table 4.2a illustrates how the patterns in land tenure stayed largely un-
changed over time. The one interesting trend to note is that many of the parcels
in the ‘other’ category were purchased, despite the ban on land sales. Followup
interviews found that these were taking advantage of a loophole allowing land
transactions if they include a built structure. The survey therefore added an ex-
plicit question regarding land purchases in round 3.
We also see some limited incidence of land leasing. Ethiopia is unusual in
that it is characterized by reverse-land tenancy. Households with fewer working
age adults, often headed by widows and the elderly, lease out their land to those
with the manpower and capital to farm it. We see evidence of this in Table 4.2b,
where households renting land are younger on average, have smaller families and a
lower dependency ratio. Households renting out land are much likelier to be female
headed, older and with a higher dependency ratio.
Since both the purchase and renting-in of land would allow farmers to endo-
genously restructure their portfolio of land holdings, we conduct two robustness
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checks: we restrict our specification to households whose land holdings are either
inherited or received from local leaders; and we instrument our fragmentation
measures with the number of parcels inherited or received.
4.4.2 Measuring Land Fragmentation
The pattern of tenure suggests that land fragmentation is exogenous to the house-
hold. A key part of the literature is how to measure it. Land fragmentation is the
dispersion of parcels across the landscape, as illustrated in Figure 4.2, where we see
examples of consolidated and fragmented parcels. There are multiple approaches
to measure land fragmentation, summarized in Table 4.3.
The simplest measure of land fragmentation is the number of parcels K held
by a household. All else being equal, more parcels suggests greater fragmentation.
However this does not take into account the different size of parcels, which we
denote αk. One measure incorporating both parcel count and size is the Simpson
FI measure:











Where K is the number of parcels, and αk their size in square meters. A score of
0 would indicate no land fragmentation, while as K →∞FI → 1.
According to Demetriou et al. (2013) this index has three properties:
1. Fragmentation increases proportional to n
2. Fragmentation increases when the range of parcel sizes α is small
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3. Fragmentation decreases as the area of large parcels increases and that of
the small parcels decreases.
The Januszewski index is similar to the Simpson index in scale and compos-
ition (Januszewski, 1968).4 For conciseness we do not report it in our principal
regressions.
We also consider a measure of fragmentation which captures the variability
of fragment size, as proposed by Monchuk et al . They point out that the Simpson
index conflates the effect of increased number of parcels δFI
δn
> 0 with the effect
of increased variability in fragment areas δFI
δσ2
< 0. Since both of these can be
thought to increase’ fragmentation, they propose to isolate the effect of variability






A shortcoming of the above is that it registers a value of 0 for a single
parcel aswell as for a number of parcels with the same size. It should therefore
be considered as complementary to other measures, such as the number of parcels,
rather than a perfect substitute. For a household we take the weighted average of
Sk.
The above measures consider the size and number of parcels, but not their
physical dispersion. If the correlation between fragmentation and labor costs is
driven by travel time, this is an important measure. With the georeferenced co-
ordinates of each parcel, we calculate Dt, the minimum round trip distance to
reach all parcels and return home (Igozurike, 1974).





















1 use path between parcel k and j
0 otherwise
and ckj is the distance from plot k to plot j. We calculate Dt using a travelling
salesman algorithm, finding the shortest route connecting multiple parcel locations
as defined by their longitude and latitude.5
Parcel Characteristics
Calculating the Simpson Fragmentation Index and deviations in parcel size both
require an accurate measures of parcel area α. Most measures in the data were
calculated using GPS coordinates. When GPS observations were missing, enu-
merators measured area using a rope-and-compass method. They also inquired
as to the farmer’s own estimate of the field size. Across three rounds 10.4% of
parcels were missing area measurements taken by GPS, the bulk of them in the
first round. Where GPS measures were missing but rope-and-compass measures
were available, we used the rope-and-compass measures of α. This allowed us to
recover half of the missing observations. In order to validate this substitution,
we regressed GPS measured area on rope-and-compass area for those parcels with
overlapping measures, and found them to be strongly correlated, with a βˆ = 1.04
and R2 = .44.6
5The parcel coordinates are first flattened to cartesian space. A distance matrix is calculated
for each household’s parcels, and fed into a travelling salesman minimization algorithm, specifying
the home as the start and end point.
6See appendix for details.
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We attempted to incorporate the self-reported measures, but many of these
were expressed using traditional Ethiopian measures of area, such as the ’timad’.7
Our attempts to convert these measures to standard hectares found them to be
poorly correlated with GPS measures of area.8 Furthermore, it is well documented
that self-reported measures of parcel area suffer from non-random measurement
error (Carletto et al., 2015).
The number of parcels K, their average size α¯ and the total area farmed by
a household
∑
αk are reported in Table 4.4a. We find evidence that the pattern
of land tenure due to land redistribution persists. In the highland regions most
affected by the reforms, the number of parcels are in the range of ≈ (3.5, 4.5),
which corresponds neatly with the four categories of land discussed earlier. In
other parts of the country, the number of parcels is closer to 2. In these regions
land tenancy is characterized by homesteads. The size of parcels varies, but tends
towards a quarter or half hectare. Recall that the distribution was done in ‘timads’,
approximately a quarter hectare. Finally, the total number of hectares held by
households is between .9 and 1.5 hectare, reflecting strict limits on large land
tenure and further evidence of the legacy of land redistribution efforts.
In addition to area α, the data-set contains geovariables matched at the plot
level using non-scrambled GPS coordinates. These include:
1. Distance from plot to household (in km)
2. Slope of the plot (in percentages)
7A ‘Timad’ is traditionally the amount of land that can be plowed in a day.
8The LSMS Ethiopia documented district specific units of conversion from ‘Timad’ to hectare.
We therefore attempted to convert these self-reported measures but produced a large number
of outliers. As an alternative, we tried using a standard conversion for the ‘Timad’, treating it
as 1/4 of an acre in line with the FAO standard. However, comparisons between self-reported
area and GPS measurements when the two overlapped showed the former to be inconsistent. See
appendix for further details.
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3. Plot elevation (in metres)
4. Plot potential wetness index9
These plot level characteristics were averaged at the parcel level, weighted
by plot area. They are summarized in Table 4.4b.
4.4.3 Food Insecurity
We investigate the impact of land fragmentation on food insecurity Yi,t. We use
two measures of food insecurity: the number of Months Hungry a household ex-
periences and the Coping Strategy Index (CSI). Months Hungry captures the long-
term, extensive experience of hunger while CSI captures the short term, intensive
experience of hunger.
Months Hungry measures the temporal extent of hunger. It is the sum of
months in the past year a household experienced hunger for five or more days.
Households were asked whether, in the last 12 months, they faced a situation
when they did not have enough food to feed the household for five of more days.
Those who did were prompted to list in which months they lacked sufficient food.




1(days hungrym ≥ 5) (4.5)
The Coping Strategy Index measures the intensity of hunger. The CSI is a
composite weighted score of various strategies households engage in when faced
9Local up-slope contributing area and slope are combined to determine the potential wetness
index: WI = ln(As/tan(b)) where As is flow accumulation or effective drainage area and b is
slope gradient. Data matched from the Africa Soil Information Service by the World Bank.
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with short-term food shortages (Maxwell, 1996). It is a measure of the intensity of
hunger. Coping strategies c are a set of 8 questions which reflect undesirable activ-
ities households are forced to engage in due to food insecurity, a set of strategies
c ∈ C.10 As these strategies are unpleasant, unhealthy and socially stigmatizing,
resorting to them is an indicator of short term food stress (Maxwell et al., 2003).
The survey asks the number of days in the past week a household engaged in each
of these activities, then multiplies those days by a weight wc indicating its severity.
The scores are then compiled into the following index:
Coping Strategy Index =
8∑
c
daysc ∗ weightc (4.6)
Where daysc is the number of days a household had engaged in a given
strategy c over the past week, and wc is the assigned severity weighting based on
existing literature.
CSI is useful for rapidly measuring food insecurity in a humanitarian con-
text, strongly correlated with more complex and time intensive measures of food
insecurity (Maxwell et al., 2008). A higher CSI score indicates greater levels of
food insecurity and therefore lower well-being. For example, a household with a
CSI of 10 may eat less preferred foods or limit portion size a few days a week. A
household with a CSI of 30 may do this every day, while also skipping meals and
10Coping strategies and corresponding weights:
“In the past 7 days, how many days have you
or someone in your household had to... Number of Days Weight
Rely on less preferred foods? 1
Limit the variety of foods eaten? 1
Limit portion size at mealtimes? 1
Reduce number of meals eaten in a day? 2
Restrict consumption by adults for small children to eat? 2
Borrow food, or rely on help from a friend or relative? 2
Have no food of any kind in your household? 3
Go a whole day and night without eating anything?” 4
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occasionally borrowing food. A household with a CSI of 70 is engaging in all these
coping mechanisms daily, but also occasionally spends a day and night without
eating.
To understand both the extent and intensity of hunger, Figure 4.1 illustrates
the percentage of households in each round and region which experience non-zero
CSI and non-zero Months Hungry. In general there is a trend towards improved
food security outcomes, with fewer households reporting food insecurity in later
rounds. Yet in some regions up to 40% of the population continues to experience
chronic food insecurity in the latest round.
Household Controls
As we are not using a household fixed effect, we want to control for household
characteristics that would affect food security. These include demographic charac-
teristics such as whether the household head is female, the size of the household,
and its composition in terms of the dependency ratio.11
We also use a roster of 40 reported assets to create an asset index using
Principal Component Analysis (PCA).12 The index plots all households along the
first axis of a PCA vector, maximizing variance. Assuming that none of these are
inferior goods, the index therefore offers an ordinal ranking of households’ wealth
in terms of their asset holding.
The above statistics are summarized in Table 4.5. These include measures of
food insecurity, land fragmentation and household level controls.
11The dependency ratio is calculated as HH Members aged 0-14 & 65 and olderHH Members aged 15-64 .
12Principal Component Analysis (PCA) aims to reduce the dimensionality of a matrix by
transforming each row vector xi using a unit vector of weights wk so as to maximize the variance
of the resultant vector tk(i) = xiw˙)k (Hotelling, 1933).
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Shock Statistics
The LSMS dataset also matches household level GPS coordinates with geospatial
characteristics, most notably the level of rainfall. By comparing it to long term
trends we can construct the standardized deviation (Z score) Zi,t of total rainfall in
the wettest quarter, which farmers rely on most for their crops. These deviations
allow us to objectively quantify weather shocks a household has experienced in
a given year, and infer whether land fragmentation mitigates or exacerbates the
effect of these shocks on food security.
4.5 Results
4.5.1 Land Fragmentation and Food Insecurity
We estimate equation (1) in Table 4.6, separately for Months Hungry and the
Coping Strategy Index across our four measures of land fragmentation.
Table 4.6a shows a significant negative correlation between land fragmenta-
tion and the temporal extent of hunger measured as Months Hungry. This negative
correlation is consistent in sign and magnitude across measures of land fragment-
ation. At the margin, the coefficients reflect changes in the number of Months
Hungry a household experiences. As an illustration, from Table 4.6a column (1)
farming an additional parcel of land, holding area constant, reduces the number of
months hungry on a scale equivalent to farming an additional 2.2 hectares.13 From
column (2), a household at the 25th percentile of the Simpson Index (FI → 0)
13 βˆParcels
βˆArea
= −0.060−.027 = 2.22
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moving to the 75th percentile of land fragmentation (FI = .656), while hold-
ing area constant, would decrease the number of Months Hungry by a third of a
month.14 This effect is comparable to effects achieved through external cash grant
programs (Knippenberg and Hoddinott, 2017).
Table 4.6b finds a negative correlation between land fragmentation and the
intensity of hunger measured using the Coping Strategy Index. At the margin,
the coefficients reflect changes in the intensity of coping strategies employed by
the household, both in terms of their frequency and severity.15 To illustrate using
results from Table 4.6b column (2), moving from the 25th to 75th percentile of
land fragmentation decreases CSI by -2.22, the equivalent of going hungry so one’s
children can eat for a day. This negative correlation retains its significance across
the various measures of fragmentation, suggesting it is a combination of the num-
ber of parcels, deviation in parcel size and distance travelled that is driving the
narrative. The total area farmed also reduces CSI, but only marginally.
4.5.2 Endogeneity Concerns
A concern when using non-randomized data is the potential endogeneity of the key
independent variable Fi,t, measuring land fragmentation. We address some of the
potential sources of endogeneity through the following robustness checks.
Table 4.7 restricts the specification to the highlands where the natural exper-
iment is most relevant. This sub-sample, which includes the highlands of Amhara,
Tigray and Oromia, includes about half of the original observations. It finds equi-
14βˆSimpson ∗ (.656− 0) ≈ −.354
15i.e. eating less preferred foods is less severe (Weight=1) than going a whole day and night
without eating (Weight=4).
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valent effect of land fragmentation on food security in both sign and magnitude.
The coefficient on deviations in parcel size (Table 4.7a col (3)) loses significance,
likely because of the smaller sample size, but is otherwise consistent with the coef-
ficient in Table 4.6a col (3).
If land fragmentation is a risk diversification strategy, then farmers may seek
to optimize their portfolios of land holdings in order to minimize risk. These
farmers may have more fragmented land holdings because of their unobserved
ability, which would also be correlated with reduced food insecurity. Despite legal
restrictions we find evidence of land being bought and rented in. This may enable
more entrepreneurial farmers to diversify their land holdings. Table 4.8 therefore
restricts the sample to farmers for whom all parcels are either inherited or received
from the government.16 It finds similar effects in sign, significance and magnitude
for both Months Hungry (Table 4.8a) and CSI (Table 4.8b) across all measures of
fragmentation.
The variation in land fragmentation may be driven by farmers adding or
subtracting a parcel at the margin. Tables 4.9 and 4.10 use the number of parcels
inherited or received from the government as an instrumental variable for land
fragmentation, similar to the identification strategy used by Veljanoska, 2016. The
first stage regression in Tables 4.9a and 4.10a confirms the instrument’s relevance.
The second stage regressions in Tables 4.9b and 4.10b finds results similar to Table
4.6 in sign and significance, allaying our concerns of bias. In columns (1) and (2)
these coefficients are of similar magnitude, while in columns (3) and (4) they are
almost an order of magnitude larger. The instrument only explains 10-16% of the
variation for the latter two measures of land fragmentation Deviation in Parcel
16Though many of these households do live in the highlands, there is only a 48% overlap
between this sub-sample and the previous one.
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Size and Distance Travelled. Since variation in the second stage is driven by the
instrument, a weaker instrument may push the coefficient upwards (Angrist and
Pischke, 2008).
4.5.3 Non-Linear Estimation
A separate concern lies with mis-specification due to non-linearity of the data
generating process. Both the CSI and Months Hungry have a mass point at 0.
Furthermore, Months Hungry is a discrete count variable, taking on integer values
from 0 to 12. Hence there is a concern that using a linear regression does not
properly reflect the underlying data-generating process. As a robustness check
we estimate our principle specification across fragmentation measures using two
alternative Maximum Likelihood Estimators (MLE). Table 4.11 estimates a Pois-
son MLE, and Table 4.12 estimates a negative binomial MLE. Because we use a
non-linear estimator, to compare the average marginal effects we multiply the coef-
ficients by the sample average of the outcome variable. The results are consistent
with the results reported in Table 4.6 in sign, magnitude and significance.
4.5.4 Selection into the Sample
Finally, we may be concerned about non-random selection into the sample. The
LSMS data only observes household who retained their allocated land and passed
it on to their children. If households who received favorable fragments retained
their land and are more likely to be food secure, while those granted unfavorably
fragmented areas were more likely to perish, out-migrate or abandon their land,
this sample would not be representative. While this does not affect the internal
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validity of our analysis, it may temper the external validity, as we are not observing
the full universe of households allocated land fragments by the government.
4.6 Land Fragmentation as Risk Mitigation
What drives this relationship between land fragmentation and reduced food in-
security? If we allow that land fragmentation decreases yields and profits as the
literature suggests, the effect on food security must be through risk mitigation.
Building on Blarel et al. (1992) we argue that land fragmentation allows households
to better manage the downside risk of shocks such as drought. With incomplete
access to credit and markets, households with multiple parcels are endowed with
an inherently more diverse portfolio. This diversity is reflected in the difference
in parcel level characteristics, which is correlated with decreased food insecurity.
Households can take advantage of this diversified portfolio by tailoring the crop
grown to the parcel characteristics. Households with more land fragmentation also
grow a greater diversity of crops, which is correlated with decreased food insecurity.
4.6.1 Land Fragmentation and Rainfall Deviation
Under the risk mitigation hypothesis, land fragmentation is particularly useful in
the context of severe shocks. To illustrate this, we estimate
Yi,t = β0 + β1Fi,t + β2Zi,t + β3Fi,t ∗ Zi,t + Ai,t +Xi,t + δt + ki + ηi,t (4.7)
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where Zi,t is the standardized deviation (Z score) of total rainfall in Meher, the
rainy season (June-September). Trivially we expect βˆ2 < 0, a good year of rainfall
decreases food insecurity and vice versa. Our interest is in testing whether land
fragmentation exacerbates this sensitivity to rainfall βˆ3 < 0 or mitigates it βˆ3 > 0
.
From Table 4.14 we find that rainfall indeed correlates with decreased food
insecurity as measured by CSI. Since βˆ3 > 0, land fragmentation mitigates the
sensitivity of food security to rainfall.
Figure 4.3 illustrates this visually. Figure 4.3a illustrates the difference in dis-
tribution of CSI between households with a low level of land fragmentation (FI=0)
and households with perfect fragmentation (FI=1), in a normal year, where the
Z-score for rainfall is 0. We find that households with diversified plots have lower
levels of CSI, ceteris paribus. Figure 4.3b illustrates the difference in distribution
of CSI outcomes for the same two households in a year of drought, where the Z-
score for rainfall is -2. We find that though both types of households see increases
in the CSI levels, the difference between the two increases. The household with no
land fragmentation experiences more severe food insecurity in times of drought.
4.6.2 Reduced Risk through Diversification
This drought buffering effect is linked to a diversified portfolio. Land fragmenta-
tion means a greater diversity in parcel level characteristics. We therefore expect
households with a more diverse portfolio of land to have better food security out-
comes. Tables 4.15 and 4.16 regress the household level average characteristics and
standard deviation against Months Hungry and CSI, respectively. These charac-
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teristics include distance from the home, slope, elevation and wetness. Tables 4.15a
and 4.16a show a null result, suggesting that the level is not significantly correlated
with food security. There is no optimal slope, elevation or wetness. However, hav-
ing a diverse set of plots does improve food security. Table 4.15b shows a negative
and significant correlation between Months Hungry and the standard deviation in
distance, slope and elevation. Table 4.16b suggests that households with a diverse
set of plots in terms of slope and wetness experience lower levels of CSI. Together,
these results suggest that agro-ecological heterogeneity plays an important role in
helping households diversify their portfolio. Though no particular slope, elevation
or wetness is ideal, a heterogeneous mix offers a good buffer against shocks, leading
to better food security outcomes.
Endowed with this portfolio of land characteristics, farmers can choose the
crops grown accordingly in order to minimize risk. Dercon, 1996 models how
households with fewer assets mitigate their risk by cultivating low yield, low vari-
ance crops, such as sweet potato, while households with more assets are likelier
to cultivate high yield, high variance cash crops such as cotton. In the case of
Ethiopian farmers, this portfolio of land is an endowment under our assumption
of exogeneity, which households can take advantage of by tailoring their crops to
the lands characteristics. Table 4.17 regresses these parcel characteristics against
the five most prevalent crops grown and find that these characteristics shift the
probability of planting given crops. For example, farmers are more likely to plant
teff and less likely to plant coffee in soils with a high wetness index. This suggests
that one of the advantages of a diverse set of parcel characteristics is the ability to
plant several different crops.
Agro-ecological variation may effect food security via crop diversity or by
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directly reducing production risk within a given crop. Mediation analysis using
a controlled direct effects regression can help disentangle these two mechanisms
(Baron and Kenny, 1986). Given the variation in geovariables GV sdi,t , food security
Yi,t and crop diversity as the mediator CDi,t, CDE estimates:
CDi,t = γ0 + γ1GV
sd
i,t + γ2Xi,t + ǫi,t (4.8)
Yi,t = β0 + β1GV
sd
i,t + β2CDi,t + β3Xi,t + ηi,t (4.9)
Where βˆ1 is the direct effect and γˆ1 ∗ βˆ2 is the indirect effect. Table 4.18
explores the relationship between land fragmentation, crop diversity and food in-
security.‘Number of Distinct Crops’ counts the number of different crop types a
household grows across its parcels. From Table 4.18a, increased diversity in agro-
ecological characteristics increases the diversity of crops grown. Table 4.18b sug-
gests that the increased diversity of crops contributes to improvements in house-
hold food security, evidence of the indirect effect of agroecological heterogeneity
via crop diversification. In the case of CSI, variation in slope and wetness also
directly affect food security, likely by reducing production risk within a given crop.
Both mechanisms operate in tandem.
4.7 Conclusion
Land fragmentation is much maligned as an obstacle to agricultural productivity.
Drawing from the link between land enclosure and the industrial revolution in the
UK, they argue that land consolidation is a precondition for households to emerge
out of poverty. Yet this overlooks the benefits land fragmentation may confer to
subsistence farmers in terms of food security. By allowing them to diversify their
risks, farmers are less vulnerable to a shock wiping out their crop. An empirical
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investigation of this question is hampered by the potential endogeneity of land
allocation decisions.
We exploit a natural experiment in Ethiopia, where the pattern of land re-
distribution under the communist government was maintained by law and custom,
arguing that land fragmentation is therefore orthogonal to farmer’s ability. We
find that higher levels of of land fragmentation decrease both short terms and
long term food insecurity. This result is robust to various subsets of the data and
alternative specifications.
Unpacking this mechanism, we demonstrate that land fragmentation mitig-
ates the impact of drought on food security. Higher land fragmentation means
households are endowed with a more diverse set of parcels in terms of walking
distance, slope, elevation and wetness. The level of these characteristics has no
effect on food security, but a higher standard deviation translates to improved food
security outcomes. In part, this is because a farmer with multiple parcels can cater
the crop she grows to her parcel’s characteristics. Farmers who grow more crop
types are more food secure.
This paper suggests that efforts at land consolidation should be approached
with caution. Though they may improve agricultural productivity, in the absence
of credit and insurance markets land fragmentation plays a crucial role in allowing
households to mitigate risk by diversifying their crop portfolio. The paper also
highlights how households living at or near subsistence levels resort to informal
risk mitigation mechanisms. Though incomplete, these mechanisms must be un-
derstood before they are intentionally or unintentionally disrupted by external
interventions. As in medicine, development practitioners should abide by the rule:
“First, do no harm”.
148
Table 4.1: Land Tenure By Region
Highlands Pastoral*
Tenure Type Tigray Oromia Amhara Afar Somalie
Granted by Local Leaders 64% 33% 48%% 14% 15%
Inherited 13% 44% 33% 31% 52%
Rent 11% 4% 5% 9% 1%
Borrowed for Free 3% 4% 3% 3% 1%
Moved in Without Permission 1% 7% 0% 38% 27%
Shared Crop 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Purchased 1% 2% 2% 1% 1%
Rented out 5% 2% 4% 1% 2%
Other 2% 4% 3% 4% 0%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Lowlands
Tenure Type Benshagul Gumuz SNNP Gambelia Total
Granted by Local Leaders 64 % 20% 48% 36%
Inherited 8% 67% 21% 43%
Rent 6% 2% 2% 5%
Borrowed for Free 3% 2% 4% 3%
Moved in Without Permission 8% 0% 4% 5%
Shared Crop 1% 0% 0% 0%
Purchased 4% 2% 7% 2%
Rented out 1% 3% 2% 3%
Other 4% 4% 13% 4%
Total 100% 100% 100 % 100%
Source: LSMS Ethiopia parcel dataset
* Subsequently excluded from analysis
Tables
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Table 4.2: Land Tenure
(a) Parcel Tenure Type by Round
Tenure Type 2011/2012 2013/2014 2015/2016 Total
Granted by Local Leaders 4,000 4,335 4,214 12,549
Inherited 3,599 4,904 4,989 13,492
Rent in 1,284 1,478 754 3,516
Borrowed for Free 372 142 163 677
Moved in Without Permission 446 309 323 1,078
Shared Crop 0 0 794 794
Purchased 0 0 524 524
Rented out 319 763 955 2,037
Other 507 425 34 966
Total 10,527 12,356 12,750 35,633
Source: LSMS Ethiopia parcel dataset
(b) Household Demographics by Tenure Type
Tenure Type Female Age HH Size Dependency
Granted by Local 26 % 50.23 5.09 1.27
Inherited 21 % 42.98 5.24 1.47
Rent 34 % 36.91 3.84 1.03
Borrowed for Fre 30 % 39.69 4.21 1.21
Moved in Without 24 % 46.01 5.46 1.56
Shared Crop 5 % . 5.63 1.34
Purchased 21 % 52.12 5.34 1.47
Rented out 44 % 51.49 4.26 1.48
Other 19 % 41.13 5.32 1.20
Total 24 % 45.59 5.09 1.37
Source: LSMS Ethiopia household dataset & parcel dataset
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Table 4.3: Proposed Fragmentation measures
Measure Equation Interpretation Data required
Number of Parcels Np • n number of parcels • Parcel count









• n number of parcels • Parcel count
• α size in square meters • Parcel area
• A total size of the land holdings
• K →∞FI → 1




• Captures deviation from the average size • Parcel area
• Independent of number of parcels
Igozurike D • Round trip distance to reach all fields • Parcel Geocodes




Table 4.4: LSMS Land Statistics
(a) Mean Number and Size of Parcels
Region Number of Parcels Average Parcel Area (HA) Household Area (Ha)
Highlands
Tigray 3.17 0.43 1.29
Amhara 4.54 0.27 1.23
Oromia 3.85 0.51 1.69
Lowlands
Benshagul Gumuz 3.43 0.48 1.46
SNNP 2.48 0.40 0.93
Gambelia 2.06 0.21 0.47
Total 3.24 0.39 1.17
Source: LSMS Ethiopia parcel dataset
(b) Parcel’s Physical Characteristics
Region Distance (km) Slope (%) Elevation (m) Wetness Index
Highlands
Tigray 1.20 11.88 1859.73 12.92
Amhara 0.99 14.72 2122.35 12.69
Oromia 0.80 10.33 2007.55 12.71
Lowlands
Benshagul Gumuz 1.64 6.17 1294.88 12.97
SNNP 1.37 15.42 1894.25 12.61
Gambelia 1.40 3.69 754.68 14.53
Total 1.13 11.98 1828.64 12.92
Area-weighted household mean of parcel level values
Source: LSMS Ethiopia parcel dataset
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Table 4.5: Household Level Statistics
Variable Mean Standard Min Max
Deviation
Food Insecurity
Coping Strategy Index 4 8.3 0 84
Months Hungry .9 1.7 0 11
Fragmentation
Number of Parcels 3.2 2.7 1 26
Simpson Fragmentation Index .38 .31 0 .95
Deviation in Plot Size .46 .48 0 7
Round Trip Distance Travelled 4.2 6.6 0 60
(Travelling Salesman)
Household Controls
Household Head is Female .28 .45 0 1
Household Size 4.7 2.4 1 16
Dependency Ratio 1.2 1.1 0 11
(# under 15 or over 64
# between 15 and 64
)
Age of Household Head 44 16 3 100
Asset Index .29 3 -1.2 42
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Table 4.6: Food Insecurity and Land Fragmentation, Pooled OLS
(a) Month Hungry and Land Fragmentation
Months Hungry
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Number of Parcels -0.063∗∗∗
(0.010)
Simpson Fragmentation Index -0.539∗∗∗
(0.103)




Total Household Area Farmed -0.037∗∗∗ -0.043∗∗∗ -0.050∗∗∗ -0.050∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013)
N 8698 8698 8698 8445
(b) CSI and Land Fragmentation
Coping Strategy Index
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Number of Parcels -0.240∗∗∗
(0.055)
Simpson Fragmentation Index -3.390∗∗∗
(0.670)




Total Household Area Farmed -0.173∗∗∗ -0.170∗∗∗ -0.211∗∗∗ -0.215∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.046) (0.052) (0.051)
N 8698 8698 8698 8445
Fragmentation measures fixed to first round. Excludes cities, pastoral areas (Afar, Somalie)
Not reported: controls for gender of household head, dependency ratio, size of household,
asset index, Kebele, round. Household clustered standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 4.7: Food Insecurity and Land Fragmentation, Highlands Only
(a) Months Hungry and Land Fragmentation
Months Hungry
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Number of Parcels -0.060∗∗∗
(0.011)
Simpson Fragmentation Index -0.562∗∗∗
(0.119)




Total Household Area Farmed -0.027∗∗ -0.033∗∗∗ -0.040∗∗∗ -0.039∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013)
N 4768 4768 4768 4779
(b) CSI and Land Fragmentation
Coping Strategy Index
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Number of Parcels -0.163∗∗∗
(0.043)
Simpson Fragmentation Index -2.502∗∗∗
(0.548)




Total Household Area Farmed -0.152∗∗∗ -0.150∗∗∗ -0.174∗∗∗ -0.168∗∗∗
(0.050) (0.049) (0.051) (0.050)
N 4768 4768 4768 4779
Fragmentation measures fixed to first round. Sample limited to Ethiopian Highlands
(Amhara, Tigray & Oromia). Not reported: controls for total area farmed, gender of
household head, dependency ratio, size of household, asset index, Kebele, round.
Household clustered standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 4.8: Food Insecurity and Land Fragmentation, Inherited or Gran-
ted Parcels Only
(a) Months Hungry and Land Fragmentation
Months Hungry
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Number of Parcels -0.086∗∗∗
(0.016)
Simpson Fragmentation Index -0.630∗∗∗
(0.140)




Total Household Area Farmed -0.037∗∗∗ -0.041∗∗∗ -0.046∗∗∗ -0.049∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016)
N 4843 4843 4843 4749
(b) CSI and Land Fragmentation
Coping Strategy Index
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Number of Parcels -0.291∗∗∗
(0.095)
Simpson Fragmentation Index -3.628∗∗∗
(0.936)




Total Household Area Farmed -0.201∗∗∗ -0.190∗∗∗ -0.221∗∗∗ -0.237∗∗∗
(0.066) (0.064) (0.070) (0.072)
N 4843 4843 4843 4749
Sample limited to households with parcels inherited or granted from local leaders.
Not reported: controls for total area farmed, gender of household head, dependency ratio,
size of household, asset index, region and time fixed effects.
Household clustered standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 4.9: Months Hungry and Land Fragmentation, Instrumental Vari-
able
(a) First Stage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Number of Simpson Deviation Distance
Parcels Fragmentation in Parcel Size Travelled
Number of Parcels inherited or 0.730∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.476∗∗∗
received from local authorities (0.025) (0.003) (0.004) (0.057)
N 8853 8853 8853 8763
R2 0.630 0.447 0.168 0.108
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
(b) Second Stage, Regressing on Months Hungry
Months Hungry
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Number of Parcels -0.064∗∗∗
(0.012)
Simpson Fragmentation Index -0.718∗∗∗
(0.131)




Total Household Area Farmed -0.055∗∗∗ -0.052∗∗∗ -0.033∗∗ -0.026
(0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.016)
N 8602 8602 8602 8513
Not reported: controls for total area farmed, gender of household head, dependency ratio,
size of household, asset index, Kebele and time fixed effects. Household clustered standard
errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 4.10: CSI and Land Fragmentation, Instrumental Variable
(a) First Stage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Number of Simpson Deviation Distance
Parcels Fragmentation in Parcel Size Travelled
Number of Parcels inherited or 0.730∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.476∗∗∗
received from local authorities (0.025) (0.003) (0.004) (0.057)
N 8853 8853 8853 8763
R2 0.630 0.447 0.168 0.108
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
(b) Second Stage, Regressing on CSI
Coping Strategy Index
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Number of Parcels -0.361∗∗∗
(0.057)
Simpson Fragmentation Index -4.068∗∗∗
(0.593)




Total Household Area Farmed -0.166∗∗∗ -0.151∗∗∗ -0.038 -0.007
(0.047) (0.044) (0.052) (0.068)
N 8602 8602 8602 8513
Not reported: controls for total area farmed, gender of household head, dependency ratio,
size of household, asset index, Kebele and time fixed effects. Household clustered standard
errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 4.11: Food Insecurity and Land Fragmentation, Poisson MLE
(a) Months Hungry and Land Fragmentation
Months Hungry
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Number of Parcels -0.075∗∗∗
(0.008)
Simpson Fragmentation Index -0.389∗∗∗
(0.053)




Total Household Area Farmed -0.115∗∗∗ -0.136∗∗∗ -0.151∗∗∗ -0.147∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
N 8698 8698 8698 8445
(b) CSI and Land Fragmentation
Coping Strategy Index
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Number of Parcels -0.106∗∗∗
(0.004)
Simpson Fragmentation Index -0.687∗∗∗
(0.027)




Total Household Area Farmed -0.054∗∗∗ -0.064∗∗∗ -0.086∗∗∗ -0.085∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
N 8698 8698 8698 8445
Fragmentation measures fixed to first round. Excludes cities, pastoral areas (Afar Somalie).
Not reported: controls for gender of household head, dependency ratio, size of household,
asset index, Kebele and time fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
159
Table 4.12: Food Insecurity and Land Fragmentation, Negative Binomial
MLE
(a) Months Hungry and Land Fragmentation
Months Hungry
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Number of Parcels -0.089∗∗∗
(0.013)
Simpson Fragmentation Index -0.520∗∗∗
(0.098)




Total Household Area Farmed -0.098∗∗∗ -0.110∗∗∗ -0.120∗∗∗ -0.119∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
N 8698 8698 8698 8445
(b) CSI and Land Fragmentation
Coping Strategy Index
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Number of Parcels -0.143∗∗∗
(0.020)
Simpson Fragmentation index -1.089∗∗∗
(0.145)




Total Household Area Farmed -0.039∗∗ -0.044∗∗∗ -0.054∗∗∗ -0.056∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015)
N 8698 8698 8830 8613
Fragmentation measures fixed to first round. Excludes cities, pastoral areas (Afar, Somalie)
Not reported: controls for gender of household head, dependency ratio, size of household,
asset index, Kebele and time fixed effects.
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 4.13: Months Hungry and Land Fragmentation interacted with
Rainfall, Pooled OLS
Months Hungry
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total rainfall in wettest quarter (mm) -0.128∗∗∗ -0.184∗∗∗ -0.032 -0.117∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.055) (0.044) (0.039)
Number of Parcels -0.053∗∗∗
(0.011)
Number of Parcels* 0.011
Total rainfall in wettest quarter (mm) (0.007)
Simpson Fragmentation Index -0.434∗∗∗
(0.109)
Simpson Fragmentation Index * 0.219∗∗
Total rainfall in wettest quarter (mm) (0.091)
Deviation in Plot Size -0.105∗
(0.056)
Deviation in Plot Size -0.094
Total rainfall in wettest quarter (mm) (0.060)
Distance Travelled -0.006
(0.004)
Distance Travelled * 0.006∗
Total rainfall in wettest quarter (mm) (0.004)
N 5861 5861 5861 5817
Fragmentation measures fixed to first round. Excludes cities, pastoral areas (Afar & Somalie).
Not reported: controls for farmed area, gender of household head, dependency ratio, size of household,
asset index, Kebele and time fixed effects.
Household clustered standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 4.14: CSI and Land Fragmentation interacted with Rainfall, Pooled
OLS
Coping Strategy Index
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total rainfall in wettest quarter (mm) -1.223∗∗∗ -1.129∗∗∗ -0.987∗∗∗ -0.881∗∗∗
(0.209) (0.259) (0.194) (0.171)
Number of Parcels -0.153∗∗∗
(0.056)
Number of Parcels * 0.138∗∗∗
Total rainfall in wettest quarter (mm) (0.036)
Simpson Fragmentation Index -2.446∗∗∗
(0.548)
Simpson Fragmentation Index * 0.949∗∗
Total rainfall in wettest quarter (mm) (0.436)
Deviation in Plot Size -0.681∗∗
(0.273)
Deviation in Plot Size * 0.517∗∗
Total rainfall in wettest quarter (mm) (0.242)
Distance Travelled -0.057∗∗
(0.023)
Distance Travelled * 0.036∗∗
Total rainfall in wettest quarter (mm) (0.018)
N 5838 5838 5838 5794
Fragmentation measures fixed to first round. Excludes cities, pastoral areas (Afar & Somalie).
Not reported: controls for farmed area, gender of household head, dependency ratio, size of household,
asset index, Kebele and time fixed effects.
Household clustered standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 4.15: Months Hungry and Geo-Variables
(a) Household Mean of Characterisitics
Months Hungry









N 8551 8573 8573 8573
Not reported: controls for total area farmed, gender of household
head, dependency ratio, size of household, asset index, Kebele and time
time fixed effects.
Household clustered standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
(b) Household Standard Deviation of Characteristics
Months Hungry









N 8552 8574 8574 8574
Not reported: controls for total area farmed, gender of household
head, dependency ratio, size of household, asset index, Kebele and
time fixed effects.
Household clustered standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 4.16: CSI and Geo-Variables
(a) Household Mean of Characterisitics
Coping Strategy Index









N 8348 8348 8348 8348
Not reported: controls for total area farmed, gender of household
head, dependency ratio, size of household, asset index, Kebele and time
time fixed effects.
Household clustered standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
(b) Household Standard Deviation of Characteristics
Coping Strategy Index









N 8327 8349 8349 8349
Not reported: controls for total area farmed, gender of household
head, dependency ratio, size of household, asset index, Kebele and
time fixed effects.
Household clustered standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 4.17: Parcel Characteristics and Crop Grown, Probit
Maize Sorghum Teff Wheat Coffee
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Distance -0.006∗∗∗ -0.001 -0.001 0.002∗ -0.004∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Slope -0.010∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ -0.002∗ 0.001 0.003∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Elevation -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Wetness -0.009∗ -0.010∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
N 48468 48468 48468 48468 48468
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 4.18: Land Fragmentation, Crop Diversity and Food Insecurity
(a) Number of Crops and Land Fragmentation
Number of Distinct Crops









N 5904 5918 5918 5918
Not reported: land area, controls for gender of household head, dependency
ratio, size of household, asset index, Kebele and time fixed effects.
Household clustered standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
(b) CSI and Number of Crops
Months Hungry CSI
(1) (2)











Not reported: controls for area, Kebele ect...
Household clustered standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figures
Figure 4.1: Incidence of food insecurity across regions
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Figure 4.2: Illustration of land fragmentation
(a) Consolidated parcels
(b) Fragmented parcels
Figure 4.3: Distribution of Food Insecurity
(a) Non-Drought Year (Z-score= 0)
(b) Drought Year (Z-score= -2)
APPENDIX A
SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES TO CH 2
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Table A.1: IV with objective SPEI measure of drought occurence
(1) (2) (3)
PSNP Payment 0.103 -0.112 0.026
(0.093) (0.090) (0.055)
Negative SPEI in past year 0.856 -1.101 -2.005∗∗∗
(0.783) (0.729) (0.770)
PSNP Payment * Negative SPEI in past year -0.134 0.330∗∗ 0.403∗∗∗
(0.141) (0.156) (0.114)
PSNP Payment 2 years ago 0.016 -0.025
(0.076) (0.091)
Negative SPEI 2 years ago -2.346∗∗∗ -3.150∗∗∗
(0.718) (0.957)
PSNP Payment * Negative SPEI 2 years ago 0.312∗∗∗ 0.381∗∗∗
(0.100) (0.130)
PSNP Payment 4 years ago 0.083
(0.071)
Negative SPEI 4 years ago -1.710∗∗∗
(0.566)
PSNP Payment * Negative SPEI 4 years ago 0.269∗∗
(0.123)
N 8005 8005 8005
J-Test p-value 0.2857 0.3932 0.3861
SPEI: Standard Precipitation Evapotranspiration Index, negative values indicate drought conditions
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
171
Table A.2: IV including USAID implemented Woredas
(1) (2) (3)
PSNP Payment 0.056∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗ 0.194∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.023) (0.023)
Drought in past year -3.721∗∗∗ -3.478∗∗∗ -3.840∗∗∗
(0.862) (0.426) (0.507)
PSNP Payment * Drought in past year 0.410∗∗∗ 0.511∗∗∗ 0.479∗∗∗
(0.141) (0.114) (0.108)
PSNP Payment 2 years ago 0.174∗∗ 0.083∗
(0.069) (0.045)
Drought 2 years ago -0.781 -0.969∗∗
(0.737) (0.378)
PSNP Payment * Drought 2 years ago 0.279 0.180∗
(0.199) (0.105)
PSNP Payment 4 years ago 0.097∗
(0.051)
Drought 4 years ago -0.318
(0.465)
PSNP Payment * Drought 4 years ago -0.086
(0.142)
N 8623 8623 8623
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.3: IV excluding Direct Support Beneficiaries
(1) (2) (3)
PSNP Payment 0.015 0.045∗ 0.036∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.024) (0.014)
Drought in past year -3.852∗∗∗ -3.552∗∗∗ -4.922∗∗∗
(1.273) (0.362) (0.542)
PSNP Payment * Drought in past year 0.415∗∗ 0.514∗∗∗ 0.590∗∗∗
(0.185) (0.095) (0.123)
PSNP Payment 2 years ago 0.138 0.050
(0.090) (0.051)
Drought 2 years ago -1.373∗ -2.118∗∗∗
(0.793) (0.614)
PSNP Payment * Drought 2 years ago 0.331∗ 0.348∗∗∗
(0.171) (0.125)
PSNP Payment 4 years ago 0.023
(0.058)
Drought 4 years ago -1.198∗∗
(0.484)
PSNP Payment * Drought 4 years ago 0.033
(0.131)
N 6543 6543 6543
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.4: IV with HABP control
(1) (2) (3)
PSNP Payment 0.013 0.055∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.023) (0.020)
Drought in past year -3.798∗∗∗ -3.775∗∗∗ -4.142∗∗∗
(1.140) (0.324) (0.540)
PSNP Payment * Drought in past year 0.414∗∗ 0.513∗∗∗ 0.470∗∗∗
(0.179) (0.092) (0.118)
HABP -0.340∗∗∗ -0.245∗ -0.403∗∗∗
(0.111) (0.138) (0.134)
PSNP Payment 2 years ago 0.037 0.031
(0.088) (0.047)
Drought 2 years ago -1.698∗∗ -1.457∗∗∗
(0.755) (0.387)
PSNP Payment * Drought 2 years ago 0.370∗∗ 0.242∗∗
(0.175) (0.095)
PSNP Payment 4 years ago 0.176∗∗∗
(0.068)
Drought 4 years ago -0.054
(0.471)
PSNP Payment * Drought 4 years ago -0.151
(0.125)
N 7075 7075 7075
Hansen J-Test 0.9224 0.5394 0.5867
Standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Transfers are in 100 birr increments
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Table A.5: Poisson ML estimator with Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3)
PSNP Payment 0.001∗ 0.001∗∗ 0.001∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Drought in past year -0.143∗∗∗ -0.147∗∗∗ -0.164∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.015) (0.017)
PSNP Payment * Drought in past year 0.002∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.002∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
PSNP Payment 2 years ago 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Drought 2 years ago -0.030∗∗ -0.049∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.015)
PSNP Payment * Drought 2 years ago 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
PSNP Payment 4 years ago 0.001
(0.001)
Drought 4 years ago -0.034∗∗
(0.015)
PSNP Payment * Drought 4 years ago -0.002
(0.002)
N 8005 8005 8005
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.6: Poisson ML estimator with Instrumental Variables
(1) (2) (3)
PSNP Payment -0.007 -0.005 -0.001
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Drought in past year -0.387∗∗∗ -0.337∗∗∗ -0.292∗∗∗
(0.065) (0.077) (0.080)
PSNP Payment * Drought in past year 0.030∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.015
(0.007) (0.008) (0.011)
PSNP Payment 2 years ago -0.007 -0.016
(0.011) (0.010)
Drought 2 years ago -0.190∗∗∗ -0.239∗∗∗
(0.052) (0.056)
PSNP Payment * Drought 2 years ago 0.030∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.011)
PSNP Payment 4 years ago 0.009
(0.012)
Drought 4 years ago 0.068
(0.099)
PSNP Payment * Drought 4 years ago -0.046
(0.032)
N 8005 8005 8005
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.7: IV with Detrended Measure of Food Security
(1) (2) (3)
PSNP Payment 0.032 0.013 0.015
(0.033) (0.021) (0.020)
Drought in past year -3.185∗∗ -3.340∗∗∗ -4.426∗∗∗
(1.340) (0.376) (0.473)
PSNP Payment * Drought in past year 0.365∗ 0.475∗∗∗ 0.556∗∗∗
(0.214) (0.105) (0.111)
PSNP Payment 2 years ago -0.062 -0.094
(0.081) (0.062)
Drought 2 years ago -1.609∗∗ -1.836∗∗∗
(0.714) (0.440)
PSNP Payment * Drought 2 years ago 0.377∗∗ 0.337∗∗∗
(0.167) (0.104)
PSNP Payment 4 years ago 0.069
(0.083)
Drought 4 years ago -0.934
(0.587)
PSNP Payment * Drought 4 years ago 0.032
(0.159)
N 8005 8005 8005
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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APPENDIX B
MEASURING LAND IN CH4
B.1 Plot, Field and Parcel
The Ethiopian Living Standards Measurement Survey Integrated Survey on Ag-
riculture (LSMS-ISA) is a household panel data set with three rounds collected in
2011-2012, 2013-2014, and 2015-2016.
Land data is collected at three levels of aggregation: parcels; fields; and plots.
Plots are the smallest unit of analysis. Multiple plots can make up a field. Multiple
fields make up a parcel; parcels are the highest land unit.
For example, consider a sample household who was interviewed in the 2013/14
survey round. She has two parcels of land, Parc1 and Parc2.
• Parc1 is divided into two fields, Parc1,F1 and Parc1,F2.
– Parc1,F1 consists of a single plot (Parc1,F1,P1).
– Parc1,F2 is divided into two plots (Parc1,F2,P1, Parc1,F2,P2).
• Parc2 is divided into three fields, Parc2,F1, Parc2,F2 and Parc2,F3.
– Parc2,F1 has two plots (Parc2,F1,P1, Parc2,F1,P2).
– Parc2,F2 has one plot (Parc2,F2,P1).
– Parc2,F3 has one plot (Parc2,F3,P1).
It is important to note that different data were collected at the parcel, field
and plot level.
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At the parcel level, the following data were collected on all parcels owned
or rented in:
• Number of fields in parcel
• How parcel was acquired (granted by local leaders; inherited; rented in etc)
• Whether household has a land certificate for the parcel
• Details on parcels and/or fields rented in or out
At the field level, the following data were collected:
• Use during current season (farmed, fallow, etc)
• Size as reported by farmer
• Size as measured by GPS




At the plot level, the following data were collected:
• Land characteristics: slope, elevation, distance from household and potential
wetness index
• geo-spatial coordinates. 1
1Due to confidentiality issues, we do not have access to the actual gps coordinates; however
characteristics derived from these were made available.
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At what level of aggregation (parcel, field, plot) should fragmentation be
measured? To determine this, we note a number of additional features of the data
collection on parcels, fields and plots:
• Unique parcel and field identifiers are available, which allow for merging data
between modules within rounds, but no unique plot ids are available, which
eliminates plot level comparisons as feasible.
• In rounds 2013/14 and 2015/16, parcel data from previous rounds was pre-
filled; this means that, for existing parcels recorded in 2011/2012 enumerators
returned to the same parcels in subsequent rounds. Further, information on
parcels was collected in a consistent manner across all rounds with unique
identifiers. This means that it is possible to construct a panel of parcels.
• It is difficult to construct a panel of fields. There are two reasons for this:
(1) The numbering of fields is not consistent across rounds; and (2) In the
2015/16 round, no data were collected on fields that were not managed by
the household (for example, fields that were rented out; fields that had been
given as gifts to others etc).
This implies that we can calculate the following on a consistent basis across
all three rounds:
1. For each round, the number of fields operated by the household and charac-
teristics of those fields.
2. For each round, the number of parcels operated by the household. Aggreg-
ating the field data (with or without adjustments for the size of each field),
we can construct aggregate characteristics of each parcel.
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3. For each round, we can construct aggregate characteristics of the holdings
operated by the household (with or without adjustments for the size of each
parcel).
4. We can construct a panel of parcels operated by the household over all rounds.
5. We can construct a panel of land operated by the household over all rounds.
When merging land data across rounds, we noted the following issues driving
attrition:
1. There was some data loss after the first survey round, partly because of
households moving and partly because of errors in pre-populating the second
round survey instrument with parcel level data.
2. There was also a change in methodology between rounds two and three.
Previously enumerators continued collecting data on all the parcels surveyed
in round one. However since a number of these parcels were subsequently
rented our or used for sharecropping, this led to data inconsistencies. As
a result, in round three enumerators only collected data on parcels being
operated by the household. This means that we can consistently measure
the size (and fragmentation) of land holdings operated by the household but
not the size (and fragmentation) of holdings to which the household has




In order to measure area at the parcel level, we need to sum it from the field
level measurements. The original data files contained a small number of duplicate
observations; these, comprising approximately one percent of the data on parcels,
were dropped.
Constructing a consistent measure for area from the various measures avail-
able was done through the following process.
We begin with field measures taken by GPS (measured in m2). We divide
these by 10,000 to convert to hectares. Fields larger than 20 hectares are considered
outliers and are dropped. In order to ensure we were not missing a crucial element
of variation we looked into the regional distribution of these ’large’ reported parcels.
Most of them seem to be in Oromiya or Tigray, though the largest one is in Somale.
Either these reflect particularly large land-owners sampled, or enumerator error.
In either case, we decide to exclude them from our principal analysis.











Dire Dawa . 0
Total 39.45 26
Source: LSMS Ethiopia parcel dataset (round 1)
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Across three rounds 10.4% of parcels were missing area measurements taken
by GPS, the bulk of them in the first round. Where these data are missing, meas-
urements were made either using rope-and-compass or were based on farmer self
reports. Where GPS area data were missing but rope-and-compass were available,
the rope and compass measures were used. For consistency these were similarly
truncated below 20 hectares, though there were no outliers. This allowed us to
recover half of the missing observations, as evidenced from the table below:
Table B.2: Parcels Missing Measurements of Area
Round Missing GPS AREA Missing GPS+Plot & Compass
2011/2012 18.6 % 4.37 %
2013/2014 6.4 % 6.39 %
2015/2016 6.4 % 6.39 %
Total 10.4 % 5.73 %
Source: LSMS Ethiopia parcel dataset (panel)
Self-reported holdings suffer from non-random measurement error (Carletto
et al., 2015). To complicate matters further, many farmers report these using non-
standard measures. The most widespread in Ethiopia is the ’Timad’, traditionally
the amount of land that can be plowed in a day. The LSMS Ethiopia documented
district specific units of conversion. We therefore attempted to convert these self-
reported measures to hectares, but this produced a large number of outliers. As an
alternative, we tried using a standard conversion for the most common measure,
the Timad, treating it as 1/4 of an acre in line with the FAO standard.2
As Table 5 shows, there were cases where both GPS and rope-and-compass
measures or GPS and self-reported measures were obtained. This allows us to
assess the correlation between these alternative ways of measuring land holdings.
2We only converted measures expressed in acres, hectares or Timad. Any other measures were
converted as missing observations.
183
Table B.3: Missing Area observations (Round 1)
Rope & Compass Area
GPS Area Not Missing Missing Total
Not Missing 458 25,658 26,116
Missing 4,570 1,401 5,971
Total 5,028 27,059 32,087
Source: LSMS Ethiopia parcel dataset (panel)
Self Reported Area
GPS Area Not Missing Missing Total
Not Missing 25,656 460 26,116
Missing 5,568 403 5,971
Total 31,224 863 32,087
Source: LSMS Ethiopia parcel dataset (panel)
We regress the GPS reported area against four alternative measures: (1) the area
measured using rope and compass, (2) self reported area converted into acres using
the conversion rates provided in the dataset, (3) self reported area where Timad
was converted into acres at the rate of 8 Timads to an acres, and (4) self-reported
area in its original units.
The coefficients confirm that for the small overlapping set GPS and Rope &
Compass area are strongly correlated and one accounts for almost half the variation
in the other (R2 = .44). But irrespective of the conversion we use, the coefficients
on self-reported areas are small and the R2 low, one that barely improves when we
attempt to convert the reported areas into standard hectares. We therefore use the
rope-and-compass measures when GPS measured area is not available. However,
we do not use the farmer self-reported area data.
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Table B.4: Correspondence between Area Measures
(1) (2) (3) (4)
areagps areagps areagps areagps
area (rope & compass) 1.004∗∗∗
(0.00980)
area (self-reported 1) 0.0000479∗∗∗
(0.00000809)
area (self-reported 2) 0.0000525∗∗∗
(0.00000859)
area (self-reported original) 0.0000841∗∗∗
(0.00000692)
cons 0.00271∗∗∗ 0.184∗∗∗ 0.188∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗
(0.000741) (0.00187) (0.00225) (0.00121)
N 458 25,656 25,656 25,656
r2 0.440 0.000702 0.000942 0.00165
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Standard errors in parentheses. Self Reported 1 uses conversion rates provided by the dataset.
Self Reported 2 uses a standard 1/8 hectare conversion rate from the Timad. Orig uses no conversion.
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